The Contentious and Varied Memorialization of the Bosnian War in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Postwar Memorial Landscape

By

Julia Christine Newman
December 2018

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts in History Dual-Degree Program in History and Archives Management Simmons University Boston, Massachusetts

The author grants Simmons University permission to include this thesis in its Library and to make it available to the academic community for scholarly purposes.

Submitted by

________________________
Julia Newman

Approved by:

________________________
________________________
Steve Ortega Katherine M. Wisser
Associate Professor Associate Professor
Acknowledgements

This project was made possible with support from many friends, colleagues and my family. In particular, I would like to thank Chris Cormier Hayes for taking the time to provide helpful advice throughout the entire writing process. Adnan Tinjic at the Arhiva Tuzlanskog kantona answered my research inquiries and was kind enough to provide photographs of memorial projects in Tuzla for this project. I also received incredible support from my fellow thesis writers, Megan Gallagher and Natalia Gutierrez-Jones. My kind and thoughtful parents have also provided integral encouragement and comfort. Most importantly, the completion of this project would not have been possible without the help of my beautiful, brilliant and supportive partner, Haris Kuljančić. Thank you for sharing your love of Bosnia and for your endless patience; hvala lijepo.
Abstract

The Bosnian War lasted from 1992 until 1995 and saw approximately 100,000 casualties and the displacement of over two million people. The complex political structure established in the postwar period and the lack of a national consensus of the past have infringed upon the memorialization and commemoration of the Bosnian War. In response, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s memorial landscape has become filled with memorial projects created by smaller subgroups through traditional memorial approaches, public mourning spaces and newer “never again” projects. An exploration of the memorialization of the Bosnian War in postwar Bosnian and Herzegovina also necessitates a consideration of the contested, rejected and damaged memorial projects made possible by continued ethnic, political and religious divisions. In order to determine what version(s) of the past are allowed to exist in the larger memorial landscape, this historical project examines a variety of memorial projects, both realized and contested, and their approaches to memorializing the Bosnian War. Moreover, this examination of memorial projects reveals Bosnia and Herzegovina’s contentious memorial landscape.
# Table of Contents

**Introduction** 1

**Chapter 1: An Absent National Narrative and the Response of Subgroups through Traditional Memorial Forms** 15
Bruce Lee Statue, Mostar 17
Memorial to the Children Killed in the Siege of Sarajevo 1992-1995, Sarajevo 21
Memorial to Fallen Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Soldiers, Mostar 24

**Chapter 2: Public Mourning through Cemeteries and Identification** 30
Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery, Srebrenica 32
Kapija Cemetery, Tuzla 41

**Chapter 3: Contentious and Future “Never Again” Projects** 48
“White House” Memorial Project, Prijedor 49
Women Victims of War Association’s Memorial Plaque, Foča 56
Tunnel of Hope, Sarajevo 59

**Conclusion: A Divided Memorial Landscape** 66

**Appendix A: Research Questions** 76

**Appendix B: Memorial Project Images** 77

**Bibliography** 85
Introduction

The Bosnian War took place between 1992 and 1995 and saw an estimated 100,000 casualties and the displacement of over two million people. Following the death of President Josip Broz Tito in 1980, various ethnic groups throughout Yugoslavia began efforts to establish themselves as independent entities. In 1992, the then Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina joined such efforts and passed a referendum for independence. However, dissent from the various ethnic groups inhabiting the region at the time of the referendum resulted in armed conflict. The factions were not only demarcated by their varying ethnicities, but also by their religious identities. These factions included Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats and Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims). Serb forces, backed by the Serbian government and with support from the Yugoslav People’s Army, sought to claim ethnic territory and thus functioned as the main instigator throughout the conflict. With the support of the Croatian government, Bosnian Croats worked to establish a separate Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and engaged in armed conflict against both Bosniak and Serb forces. Bosniaks, in support of the creation of an independent Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, faced heavy casualties in their fight against Serb forces, as their army was poorly equipped. The conflict is commonly characterized by the prevalence of war crimes and atrocities including the many instances of sexual violence, systematic ethnic cleansing and massacres.

The war officially ended in 1995 with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, a formal negotiation between Bosnian, Serbian and Croatian parties that sought to establish

---

stability in the region and resulted in territorial changes. The new regional structure, referred to as Bosnia and Herzegovina or simply Bosnia, created a complicated political system with a tripartite presidency leading two autonomous entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH or Bosnia) and the Republika Srpska (RS). The presidency is comprised of three members from each party involved in the conflict; while the Bosniak member and Serb member are elected from their respective entities, the Croat member is elected from the FBiH. It is also important to note that the government structures within these entities differ with a centralized government in the RS and a decentralized government with 10 cantons in FBiH. In addressing the many war crimes committed throughout the conflict, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was convened in 1993 and saw its first indictment in 1994. In total, the ICTY has seen to the conviction of 45 Serbs, 12 Croats and four Bosniaks for war crimes.

Following the cessation of violence, individuals across Bosnia were left to contend with the traumatic events of the war and the current circumstances of the country. In the period following a political or violent conflict, the party responsible for liberation and those who acquire power often construct the narrative of events. However, the immediate postwar period in Bosnia saw two parties assume leadership and thus, opposing conceptions of the past have complicated the narrative. Therefore, Serbians, Bosniaks and Croats conceive of the war differently as each group shares a separate collective memory and adheres to different political

---

2 It is additionally important to note that violence did not end with the signing of this agreement and a NATO led force was deployed to implement peace in the region.
opinions. The complex political system has further infringed upon the establishment of a formal history of this period and therefore, limited the memorialization and commemoration of the Bosnian War. The lack of a national narrative of the past has rendered a contentious memorial landscape complete with varying memorial approaches and rationales. In various ways, each memorial project placed within Bosnia and Herzegovina’s memorial landscape engages with the same ethnic, religious and ideological divisions responsible for the initial instigation of conflict. Therefore, a consideration of this vast memorial landscape must also review how each memorial project positions itself within or outside these divisions through its memorial approach, location, choice of subject and included narrative.

**Historiography**

Reminiscent of the larger nation’s struggle to confront the past, historical scholarship is still in the process of contending with the memorialization and commemoration of the Bosnian War as only 23 years have passed since the formal end of the conflict. Therefore, the historical discipline did not immediately consider the complexities of memorialization as it became more focused on presenting comprehensive narratives of the war. Such scholarship dedicated to the memorialization of the war would eventually come to exist within a broader field of memory studies, but initial historical scholarship started to offer broad histories of the geographic region prior to the official end of the war in an attempt to understand the circumstances that had led to and allowed for the recent rise of violence. Such work includes Noel Malcom’s foundational *Bosnia: A Short History*, in which Malcom’s intentions to address the origins of the conflict and current claims about the region’s history are directly outlined in the introduction, and Robert J. Donia and John V.A. Fine’s *Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed*, in which the
authors argue the Bosnian War broke with a long history of coexistence. Additional histories were published following the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement as scholars continued their efforts to understand and historicize the Bosnian War. Scholarship also grew to include investigations into the outcomes of ethnic cleansing efforts following reconciliation policies with works like *Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and its Reversal* by Gerard Toal and Carl T. Dahlman.

In grappling with the particular aspects of this war, historians published highly focused examinations into specific events like the massacre at Srebrenica-Potočari. And although this writing certainly offers a view into the Bosnian War, most did not evaluate the crucial interplay of memory in understanding this conflict. More recent scholarship, such as Eric Gordy’s *Guilt, Responsibility, and Denial: The Past at Stake in Post-Milošević Serbia* and the collection of articles in *The New Bosnian Mosaic: Identities, Memories and Moral Claims in a Post-War Society* edited by Xavier Bougarel, Elissa Helms and Ger Duijzings, has sought to fill this gap with more nuanced discussions of the postwar circumstances of former Yugoslavia. Further, this recent historical work tends to include contributions from other disciplines and most often from memory studies. As such, this recent scholarly work supports more complex considerations regarding the intersections of memory and history in relation to the Bosnian War.

---


As the end of the Bosnian War saw the foundation of the ICTY and other reconciliation efforts, discussions of the Bosnian War also appear within scholarship dedicated to understanding the role of transitional justice in coming to terms with the past. Specific conversations about reconciliation in postwar Bosnia can be found in collections of scholarship like *Reconciliation(s): Transitional Justice in Postconflict Societies* edited by Joanna R. Quinn, *My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity* edited by Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein and *Taking Wrongs Seriously: Apologies and Reconciliation* edited by Elazar Barkan and Alexander Karn. As these collections are multi-disciplinary, they include contributions from scholars in history and memory studies, but also incorporate work from the disciplines of psychology, sociology, political science, anthropology, and philosophy. Further, some scholarship distinctly addresses the role of memorials in reconciliation efforts. Lisa Moore, a policy officer with the United Nations, considers the role of sites of memory in national identity building, and provides a short account about the process of reconciliation through memorial construction within Bosnia in her 2009 article “(Re)covering the Past, Remembering Trauma: The Politics of Commemoration at Sites of Atrocity.” A more specific review of memorials’ ability to reconcile past events in Bosnia can be found in Alma Jeftić’s 2013 article “The Role of Memorials in the Post-Conflict Society: Active Memory and (Im)Possibility of Reconciliation,” in which the author outlines the potential for memorial projects to facilitate larger reconciliation processes in confronting the past. Additionally, Jeftić

---

11 Such as the National Coordinating Committee for the Establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Committee in BiH and the Association of Citizens – Truth and Reconciliation.


13 Moore, “(Re)Covering the Past, Remembering Trauma: The Politics of Commemoration at Sites of Atrocity.”

14 Alma Jeftić, “The Role of Memorials in the Post-Conflict Society: Active Memory and (Im)Possibility of Reconciliation” (International Conference on Education, Culture and Identity, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2013).
recognizes the limitations of current projects and recommends more formal organization surrounding memorial projects to prevent complications. Other articles utilize Bosnia to explore the role of monuments in mourning, and their necessity in the process of forgiveness.\textsuperscript{15}

Recent scholarship has additionally offered examinations of the memorial tradition in Yugoslavia prior to the outbreak of the war in 1992. Following the establishment of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, President Tito, with the help of formal laws and the creation of dedicated institutions, erected monuments and memorials across Yugoslavia. As the Bosnian War overwhelmed this memorial tradition, and in some cases destroyed it completely, only a few discussions of these monuments can be found within the body of historical literature.\textsuperscript{16} Leila Dizdarević and Alma Hudović, for example, offer a brief overview of the socialist monuments still standing throughout former Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{17} Scholars focused on individual Bosnian War memorials often overlook this memorial tradition in their surveys of individual projects.

The morbid circumstances of the war have additionally necessitated scholarship regarding mourning, burial practices, cemeteries and missing persons.\textsuperscript{18} And although this scholarship often originates in other disciplines such as anthropology, this work remains useful to consider in reference to the need for public mourning spaces such as cemeteries and gravesites. Both “Liminality and Missing Persons: Encountering the Missing in Postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina” by anthropologist Laura Huttunen and “Intentions of Burial: Mourning, Politics and Memorials Following the Massacre at Srebrenica” by professor of medicine Craig Evan


\textsuperscript{17} Leila Dizdarević and Alma Hudovic, “The Lost Ideology-Socialist Monuments in Bosnia” (International Conference on Architecture and Urban Design, Tirana, Albania, 2012), 455–64.

\textsuperscript{18} A broader discussion of mourning and memorials can be found in Anna Petersson, \textit{The Presence of the Absent: Memorials and Places of Ritual} (Lund, Sweden: Lund University, 2004).
Pollack provide interesting examinations related to the need for such spaces within the memorial landscape. More specifically, Huttunen identifies the value of cemeteries, gravesites and other memorial forms, and the accompanying effort to identify victims, in responding to the general feeling of uncertainty related to the number of missing persons at the end of the Bosnian War.

A range of scholarship has also documented massacres and the work of the International Commission on Missing Persons using DNA analysis to identify victims found in mass graves. Further, as there are clear connections between cemeteries and memorials, such scholarly conversations about these public mourning spaces are valuable when thinking about memorialization related to the distinct conflict of the Bosnian War.

Discussions of individual monuments and memorial projects can also be found in the range of historical scholarship published since the official end of the Bosnian War. As an interesting anomaly to Bosnia’s larger memorial space, Ioannis Armakolas examines the shifting Slana Banja Memorial Complex in his chapter “Imagining Community in Bosnia: Constructing and Reconstructing the Slana Banja Memorial Complex in Tuzla.” Armakolas, a professor of comparative politics, highlights Tuzla’s unique political circumstances through his discussion of the larger complex, but additionally offers a historical overview of the shifts to the physical monuments and memorials. Additional case studies of individual monuments can be found in a range of other articles. Such scholarship provides a broader view into the memorial landscape.
and larger traditions of remembrance in the region but does not include more recent memorial projects dedicated to the Bosnian War.

As memorialization encompasses the remembrance of moments and individuals on an individual and/or collective level, it has been useful to review descriptions of memory and memory discourse in Bosnia for the purposes of this project. Specific descriptions can be found in Monika Palmberger’s chapter “Making and Breaking Boundaries: Memory Discourses and Memory Politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina” found within The Western Balkans- A European Challenge on the Decennial of the Dayton Peace Agreement. While recollections from the Bosnian War remain prevalent in the country’s current population and diaspora, Palmberger suggests that traumatic memories from the war often exist simultaneously with more positive memories of the prewar period, and such conflicting memories could either be used to incite additional conflict or utilized in reconciliation. Larger scholarly frameworks about memory are available in work that does not necessarily focus on Bosnia but grapples with questions about memory following trauma. Such contributions have also been influenced by the work of Maurice Halbwachs and his concept of collective memory, or rather the shared memory of a society that manifests itself beyond the individual. Within this project, Paul Connerton’s foundational How Societies Remember provided support when thinking about memory within a cultural context, while Jenny Edkin’s Trauma and the Memory of Politics guided questions concerning remembrance and the memory of trauma from war and other forms of conflict.

---

26 Connerton; Jenny Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
Available scholarship has also considered the role of memory in the context of memorials and monuments. Such academic writing tends to extend beyond the historical discipline and has been published in edited collections including *Places of Public Memory: The Rhetoric of Museums and Memorials* edited by communication professors Greg Dickinson, Carole Blair and Brian L. Ott and *National Symbols, Fractured Identities: Contesting the National Narrative* edited by language professor Michael E. Geisler. 27 Although these collections do not specifically address Bosnian memorials, their discussions about memorial forms and their various functions inform an awareness of national and public memory. A more detailed consideration of memory within memorials can be found in James Young’s *Stages of Memory: Reflections on Memorial Art, Loss and the Spaces Between.* 28 Young draws on personal and professional experience in overseeing the development of memorials to examine a collection of case studies, and simultaneously interweaves details about the development, design and construction processes of memorial projects. Overall, Young provides a comprehensive overview of the potential to confront particularly difficult memory within the realm of a memorial project.

One of the more focused discussions of memory and memorial projects can be found in Louis Bickford and Amy Sodaro’s chapter “Remembering Yesterday to Protect Tomorrow: The Internationalization of a New Commemorative Paradigm” within *Memory and the Future: Transnational Politics, Ethics and Society.* 29 In addition to their brief discussion of two memorial projects in Bosnia, 30 the authors review trends in memorialization and commemoration and

---


30 The Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and the *Bruce Lee Statue* in Mostar are specifically addressed by Bickford and Sodaro in their chapter.
propose four “rationales of memorializing”: nation building, democratization of memory, public mourning and the more recent trend of “never again” projects.\textsuperscript{31} The historical project presented here will advance Bickford and Sodaro’s framework of memorialization motivations to consider how the absence of a national consensus of the past influences the memorial space. As such, this project will interweave considerations of the memorial approaches utilized within the creation of these projects and argue for the additional category of contentious projects. The contrary national narrative of the war and the additional absence of a governmental mechanism to oversee memorial projects have created opposition throughout Bosnia’s memorial landscape. Examining a collection of Bosnian War memorials will not only highlight intersections within this framework, but also reveal additional consequences of remembering a divisive and traumatic conflict. The memorial approaches observed within this memorial landscape will provide additional insight into the strategies most often used and engaged to present the memory of the Bosnian War. Thus, in order to facilitate a careful understanding of the memorialization of the Bosnia War, it is crucial to evaluate the memorial projects that are not allowed to exist in the memorial landscape of postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina. The contentions surrounding various memorial projects related to the Bosnian War further reveal how ethnic, religious and ideological divisions are not reconciled in the memorial landscape but are reengaged and possibly advanced.

Methodology

This historical project considers memorials and monuments to be active historical devices. Memorial projects are created intentionally to serve a purpose and therefore, remain representative of a particular understanding about the past. The person, place, event or thing remembered within a memorial project is carefully considered, molded and presented to the

public by those proposing the project. As such, memorial projects do not occupy a passive or unbiased space but offer a functional depiction for they are carefully crafted pieces of memorialization. Additionally, memorial projects are actively engaged by viewers for each individual’s view will be swayed by their own notions of the person, place, event or thing.

Within this discussion of memorialization, the activeness of memorial projects remains within Bosnia and Herzegovina’s postwar memorial landscape as a consequence of the war’s political and ethnic divisiveness. Further, this historical project uses memorial landscape to refer to the collection of memorial projects within a given space. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s memorial landscape is used to indicate the span of the entire country, while Bosnia’s memorial landscape refers to the projects located within the FBiH and the RS’s memorial landscape refers to those located in Serb controlled regions of the country.

The purpose of this project is to investigate and examine how the Bosnian War has been memorialized in the postwar society of Bosnia and Herzegovina. To this end, this study considers eight memorial projects. And although this is certainly not a conclusive record of all memorial projects related to the Bosnian War, this historical project seeks to utilize a collection of memorial projects as case studies to consider the memorialization processes in this memorial landscape. Most monuments considered have connections to the Bosniak community and are located within the FBiH. However, this project takes into account some memorial projects proposed in the RS but does not investigate any Croat initiated projects. For each memorial project, research questions are considered regarding purpose, narrative and relation to trauma, support, funding, governmental approval, memorial approaches and techniques, timeframe, and

32 The Memorial to Fallen ARBiH Soldiers in Mostar was in response to a Croat initiated memorial placed on the Croat majority side of the town at Mostar’s city hall.
utilization of space. These questions guided the research process as information was carefully gathered and reviewed for each memorial project. When information was unavailable, other sources were utilized to fill gaps in order to inform a complete understanding about each project’s approach to memorialization. Overall, these questions facilitated an understanding of the postwar memorial landscape and helped to reveal a more detailed awareness of what occurs when there is no national narrative of the past.

In order to answer these questions, this project considers a range of primary source material from a variety of sources. In addition to the physical structures of the memorial projects as seen through photos made available online and in published material, it primarily draws on articles archived by the International Justice Watch Discussion List, a listserv established to document and preserve materials related to human rights violations with an emphasis on the former Yugoslavia. This collection of materials remains particularly useful as many articles have been translated into English. Additionally, it has proved valuable as much of the original published material is no longer accessible online or has disappeared entirely. This project includes articles published from 2000 to 2017 from a range of news organizations including Agence France-Presse, The New York Times, BBC World News, The Guardian, Reuters, Balkan Insight, Balkan Transitional Justice and the Institute for War & Peace Reporting. It additionally draws on articles and reports published by entities of Bosnia’s government such as the Office of the High Representative, the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees, the Ministry of Justice and the Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Reports from Amnesty International

33 Memorial approaches and techniques related to traditional structures (statues, fountains, plaques), cemeteries/gravesites, reconstructions and other design elements; See Appendix A for a complete list of research questions.
and other organizations involved in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s postwar circumstance are also used. Further, the Centre for Nonviolent Action’s survey of memorials in Bosnia, titled War of Memories, is utilized to fill in details about memorial projects missing within these primary source materials. Due to the barriers created by physical distance and language, the sources included in this project are cautiously considered in order to present clear and detailed information about the circumstances of war memorials in Bosnia.

In considering these memorial projects, this project will explore the effects of an absent national narrative of the Bosnian War on the memorial space. It will utilize Bickford and Sodaro’s “rationales for memorializing” in combination with varying memorial approaches to organize the following chapters and add the additional consideration of contentious projects. The first chapter will begin with a discussion about the absence of a national narrative of the past and the nonexistent legislation related to the approval of memorial projects and will then explore the reaction of subgroups through traditional memorial forms. Chapter 2 will review the role of cemeteries and gravesites as a response to trauma in the memorial space. Next, Chapter 3 will consider rejected “never again” memorial proposals as well as newer projects in order to reach a more comprehensive understanding of the contentious memorial landscape. And finally, the conclusion will return to the main goal of this project and consider what versions of the past have been allowed into Bosnia and Herzegovina’s memorial landscape.

The function of memorial projects is to present a concise interpretation of the past; however, disagreements about past events and responsible parties have not prevented the

36 Centre for Nonviolent Action, War of Memories: Places of Suffering and Remembrance of War in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Centre for Nonviolent Action, 2016).
37 Bickford and Sodaro, “Remembering Yesterday to Protect Tomorrow.”
development of Bosnian War memorials in postwar Bosnia through a variety of approaches. As such, memorial projects throughout the country have faced various forms of opposition. Subgroups have reacted with their own memorial projects and more recent projects have attempted to resolve this divide through educational missions. And although the war rendered cemeteries respected spaces for mourning, these projects have also faced resistance. More recent projects have sought to engage in the “never again” approach to prevent future instances of violence, but such an approach leads to disputes about the details of the war. Overall, the conflict’s divisive nature and the complex government structure have allowed for isolated projects and sentiments within the memorial space. Continued disagreement and denial about the Bosnian War is further evident in this memorial landscape as memorial projects face resistance due to their position within the ethnic, religious and ideological divisions of the postwar environment. Therefore, a complete examination of the memorial landscape must include the constructed and contested memorial projects throughout postwar Bosnia.
Chapter 1: An Absent National Narrative and the Response of Subgroups through Traditional Memorial Forms

The lack of a national agreement surrounding the events of the war has greatly contributed to Bosnia’s disharmonious and complex memorial space. As memorial projects most often provide a concrete representation of the past, the continued disagreement between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska (RS) about the conflict and the associated responsibility has generated a divisive memorial landscape. Although the Dayton Peace Agreement brokered an accord between the involved parties (the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the RS), it certainly did not resolutely settle all conflict. Unlike other brokered accords following a conflict, the Dayton Peace Agreement did not clearly establish an outright victor of the Bosnia War. The subsequent trials of the ICTY established the RS as mainly responsible for the instigation of violence, but apologies from the official Serbian and Croatian governments were not made until 2010. However, none of the three parties have acknowledged full responsibility. Despite such formal apologies, divisions between ethnic, political and religious communities remain throughout the country and thus, infringe upon the memorial landscape. There is no formal understanding between the parties about the events of 1992 through 1995, and thus memorial projects can only be expected to account for one of three versions of the past. Currently, there is no national monument to the Bosnian War as no project has been accepted and endorsed by all three parties.

In 2004, Serbian President Boris Tadić offered a statement in recognition of Serb involvement in the Srebrenica massacre, but did not indicate responsibility for Serb involvement in the larger war. This statement has since been repudiated by various Serbian and Bosnian Serb Officials. In 2010, the Serbian parliament additionally passed a resolution that included an apology that stated, ‘Therefore we unreservedly condemn the crime committed in Srebrenica,’ but again did not reference the larger instigation of violence. Most recently, this resolution has been threatened by a push to vote for its revocation. Croatian president Ivo Josipović offered an apology in 2010 for his country’s involvement in the Bosnian War.; For a larger discussion about the implications of these apologies and associated denials, see Gordy, Guilt, Responsibility, and Denial: The Past at Stake in Post-Milosevic Serbia.
The unavailable legislation regarding the establishment of monuments and memorials is also indicative of the continued disagreement about past events. The complicated political structure established by the Dayton Peace Agreement created cantons in which majority groups maintain control over the municipal government, while minority groups within the same canton struggle to receive government support. This governmental structure continues to sustain alienation between ethnic, political and religious groups. As such, the majority population often supports their understanding of the past without much consideration of different viewpoints. In addition to establishing a new governmental structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Dayton Peace Agreement outlined details on preserving existent national monuments. “Annex 8: Agreement on Commission to Preserve National Monuments” established a committee to oversee the designation of “movable or immovable property of great importance to a group of people with common cultural, historic, religious or ethnic heritage, such as monuments of architecture, art or history; archaeological sites; groups of buildings; as well as cemeteries” as national monuments. However, this agreement did not create regulations regarding the creation of new projects and therefore, it employed memorials and monuments as transitional justice devices. Subsequently, no legislation has been established to effectively regulate or monitor the erection of memorials projects to the Bosnian War. The only piece of government approval needed for memorial projects is a zoning permit given by local planning divisions. However, approval of such permits is directly overseen and inconsistently enforced by local authorities.

Many municipalities tend to support memorial projects representative of the canton’s majority ethnic group and fail to allow for representations of minority group(s). As such, some

---


projects do not seek a zoning permit because they assume rejection.\textsuperscript{4} The insufficient formal regulations regarding the establishment of memorial projects has created varying practices across Bosnia and helped to establish a divided memorial landscape. Nevertheless, projects proposed by majority and minority subgroups have filled in the memorial landscape left vacant by the absence of a national memorial to the Bosnian War. Such projects include the \textit{Bruce Lee Statue} in Mostar, the \textit{Memorial to the Children Killed in the Siege of Sarajevo 1992-1995} in Sarajevo and the \textit{Memorial to Fallen Army of the Republic of Bosnian And Herzegovina (ARBiH) Soldiers} in Mostar. Moreover, individuals across the country have cited a need for memorials to reconcile trauma, recognize loss and remember fading details.\textsuperscript{5}

\begin{center}
Bruce Lee Statue, Mostar
\end{center}

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s memorial landscape is dotted with projects created, funded and supported by local subgroups such as victims’ associations, veterans’ organizations and groups of survivors. In establishing their own memorial projects in reaction to the lack of a national consensus of the war, each local group has also interjected their narrative of the past into the memorial space. In the historic city of Mostar, famous for the Old Bridge (\textit{Stari Most}), this process of memorialization resulted in the erection of a statue of kung fu legend Bruce Lee.\textsuperscript{6} The project was proposed in 2003 by the community led organization Urban Movement-Mostar and realized in 2005.\textsuperscript{7} The life size bronze \textit{Bruce Lee Statue}, sculpted by Boris Jovanovic, was initially placed standing in the Spanish Square, the former frontlines of the conflict in Mostar, but has since moved to a nearby city park.\textsuperscript{8} And while the choice of figure may seem out of place

\textsuperscript{4} BIH Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees and BIH Ministry of Justice.
\textsuperscript{6} See Fig. 1. in Appendix B for image; Hrvoje Prnjak, “We Are All Bruce Lee,” trans. Anes Alic, \textit{Feral Tribune}, September 4, 2003, https://listserv.buffalo.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=JUSTWATCH-L;f0aa60cb.0309.
\textsuperscript{7} Prnjak also notes potential financial support from the Chinese Embassy in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the form of €7,500.
\textsuperscript{8} Prnjak.
amidst considerations of the traumatic events and many casualties that occurred throughout the war, Bruce Lee continues to function as a neutral and heroic figure that both the city’s Catholic Croats and Muslim Bosnians can support. The popularity of kung fu films throughout Bosnia further supported this choice of figure. Despite efforts to resolve divisions intensified by the war, Mostar is still largely ethnically divided with the city’s Catholic Croats and some Bosnian Serbs inhabiting the west bank of the Neretva River and the Bosniaks occupying the east bank.

Although the *Bruce Lee Statue* does not directly memorialize the Bosnian War, it was a direct response by this subgroup to the conflict and its remaining effects in the postwar period. In a news report from 2003, Veselin Gatalo, the president of Urban Movement-Mostar, explained, “With this action -- despite all the politicians' interpretations -- we are trying to prove that the existence of a long period of our past lives cannot be settled with ideology and politics.”

By highlighting a figure so far removed from Bosnia’s political conflicts, Urban Movement-Mostar deliberately demonstrated the lack of a national consensus for there was not one version of the past that could be appropriately represented through memorial form. This choice was additionally reflective of the subgroup’s resistance to formal reconciliation measures in the postwar period as such efforts were often imbued with the same divisions in politics and ideologies as the war. From this subgroup’s understanding, any attempt to memorialize the Bosnian War would inevitably be countered by either the city’s Croats or Bosniaks. In the face of inevitable opposition, Urban Movement-Mostar presented a memorial project that would garner support from both sides of the Neretva River and avoid potential resistance. Therefore, memorialization efforts like the *Bruce Lee Statue* reach beyond the conflict’s boundaries to facilitate resolution of the past.

---

9 Prnjak.
The Urban Movement-Mostar and its president recognized that the continued divisiveness surrounding the Bosnian War would restrict the creation of a commonly respected memorial and thus, utilized a traditional memorial approach to memorialize an uninvolved figure. In some cases, memories can be confronted through familiar means, even if those means do not directly correspond to the memorialized event. Selecting Bruce Lee for this project was certainly unexpected, but nevertheless, a purposeful response by this subgroup. Following official approval in 2005 by Mostar’s municipal government, the monument was erected and Gatalo was interviewed on National Public Radio’s “All Things Considered.” In this conversation, he called attention to Bosnia’s long and complicated history of conflict and stated, “[Bruce Lee] is a hero from childhood of every one of us. Nobody will ask what kind of activities his people made during Second World War, First World War, in Turkish time. He is not Orthodox; he is not Muslim; he is not Catholic; he is not Jewish. It makes him an ideal hero for us, the Urban Movement. We have to show that we are positive.” And while such rhetoric regarding participation in war may be used to incite a sense of nationalism or pride in a different setting and be subsequently utilized in memorial form, Gatalo suggested that the Bruce Lee Statue exists entirely separate from such involvement. In responding to current divisions particularly visible in strictly divided Mostar, this statue draws on a hero not from the most recent conflict or with ties to a particular ethnic group but selects one from the larger collective appreciation of kung fu films. Although such a choice in figure may be seen as an evasion of the conflict’s continued complexities, this subgroup carefully made their selection in response to such complexities.

10 Young, The Stages of Memory: Reflections on Memorial Art, Loss and the Spaces Between.
To accomplish its mission, this project additionally utilizes the traditional memorial structure of a statue. In this instance, a statue of an idealized figures has worked to reconcile two sides of a conflict by demonstrating commonalities instead of divisions.\textsuperscript{12} As a vast number of statues in Bosnia are representative of more religious figures, the \textit{Bruce Lee Statue} draws on visitors’ experience with memorial forms to further its goal. And while such religious statues may only be recognized by members of the corresponding religious community, the \textit{Bruce Lee Statue} stands to be appreciated by members of the varying religious and ethnic groups in Mostar. Further, the popularity of Bruce Lee may also extend to tourists visiting the historic city. As such, this project remains a firm example of the democratization of memory proposed by Bickford and Sodaro.\textsuperscript{13} As a community-led organization of youth, Urban Movement-Mostar worked to establish their project within the local memorial landscape by securing funding, support and approval. Moreover, Urban Movement-Mostar recognized that the memorial space during this period could not be populated with depictions of the recent conflict due to continued local and national divisions. Their unexpected response offered a memorial project accessible to all visitors and simultaneously demonstrated that such projects may also be possible at the national level. The traditional memorial approach and familiar choice of figure remain appropriate in this context and thus, the \textit{Bruce Lee Statue} remains present in Bosnia’s memorial landscape as an example of utilizing a traditional memorial form to recognize an unexpected, but familiar figure.

\textsuperscript{12} Similar projects of unexpected figures memorialized in statues can be found in Ivo Skoric, trans., “New Monuments in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia,” \textit{H-Alter}, April 17, 2007, https://listserv.buffalo.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=JUSTWATCH-L;i723d617.0704.

Memorial to the Children Killed in the Siege of Sarajevo 1992-1995, Sarajevo

In filling the national memorial space, subgroups are seen using the familiar and well-liked in the creation of other traditional memorials. In the capital city of Sarajevo, a subgroup known as the Association of Parents of Children Killed in the Siege of Sarajevo worked to erect the Memorial to the Children Killed in the Siege of Sarajevo 1992-1995 in Veliki Park. Initially proposed in 2004, the memorial remembers the young lives lost during the violent siege of the city. Following insistence from members of this association of mourning parents, this monument was built in 2009 by a commission of Sarajevo’s city council and funded through an effort by the city, the larger Sarajevo Canton and additional municipalities. The memorial was designed by Mensud Kečo and features a large fountain surrounded by a bronze rim patterned with children’s footsteps. A large glass angular structure sits in the middle of the fountain to symbolize “a crystal tower usually built by children playing in the sand” or a “flame frozen in an instant and the light trapped inside.” In consultation with the Association of Parents of Children Killed in the Siege of Sarajevo in 2010, the memorial grew to include seven aluminum cylinders inscribed with 521 names of killed children. This space has been visited by government officials, and has also been used for commemorations like those held on May 9th, the Victory Over Fascism Day. Although this memorial was erected and funded by Sarajevo’s government, it was created in response to requests from a community organization. Therefore, this project

14 See Fig. 2.1.-2.3. in Appendix B for images of memorial project; Mensud Kečo, The Memorial to the Children Killed in the Siege of Sarajevo 1992-1995, 2009, Memorial, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2009.
16 Centre for Nonviolent Action, War of Memories.
17 Centre for Nonviolent Action, 111. See Fig 2.3 for detail of footprints.
18 Centre for Nonviolent Action.
19 See Fig 2.3 in Appendix B for image of cylinders.
continues to demonstrate the potential of local governments to fill the memorial space in response to subgroups’ requests.

The subject featured within this memorial is one that does not necessarily highlight the disagreements regarding the national narrative of the war. This monument does not seek to assign blame for the death of these children, but rather wishes to emphasize their individual lives. It also does not sustain the ethnic, political and religious divides established during the conflict, and represents all children regardless of such identities. Further, this memorial occupies space created by absent government policies regarding the regulation of memorial projects for it was pushed for by a community organization and realized with support from the government. Although there are no direct policies, local governments throughout Bosnia still support memorial projects within their communities. When considering such projects, however, it is also crucial to note which projects have received support and which remain disputed or rejected. As this memorial project highlights the innocent lives of children, it has received adequate support from all sides to remain a well-utilized part of the city’s memorial landscape.

The Memorial to the Children Killed in the Siege of Sarajevo 1992-1995 also engages traditional memorial forms such as fountains and lists of names in communicating its focus. Fountains are often seen in traditional memorials for water is commonly used for symbolic purposes such as reflection and contemplation.21 In responding to sanitized and impersonal national memorials, memorial projects that include lists of names seek to highlight individual sacrifices made during conflict. In this case, the lists of names successfully highlight the victims, but more importantly, stress the victims’ innocence as their age was believed to serve as a protection against the effects of war. Each piece of this memorial centers around the young victims and asks visitors to remain active in their visit to the memorial space. Visitors are invited

21 Young, The Stages of Memory: Reflections on Memorial Art, Loss and the Spaces Between.
to engage with the memorial by reading and touching the names. The small footprints also convey a sense of movement representative of children’s unstoppable motion, while the tactile nature remains indicative of a child’s fondness for touch. Through such an approach, this memorial allows for active and physical engagement by visitors and remembers the victims through an experience suggestive of children.²²

Since its establishment, this memorial has been used for local commemorations and days of remembrance.²³ Due to its placement in the capital city, the Memorial to the Children Killed in the Siege of Sarajevo 1992-1995 acts as an official space for commemoration in that it is often the choice location for foreign officials wishing to demonstrate their sympathies.²⁴ Such visits are similar to state-sponsored activities in which dignitaries visit sites of atrocities or tragedies to show their concern. Therefore, the memorial’s location, government support and utilization position this project as an intersection between two of Bickford and Sodaro’s “rationales of memorializing”: nation building and the democratization of memory.²⁵ When utilizing such memorialization categories, however, it is necessary to consider how certain projects intersect across multiple categories in their mission, approach and focus. In some ways, Memorial to the Children Killed in the Siege of Sarajevo 1992-1995 fills a gap created by an absent national narrative but cannot be classified as a national memorial project because it has not received approval from both the FBiH and the RS. This project also performs a democratized function due to its origins with a community organization and in its memorial approach of centering the focus on the victims. Further, this project fulfills an important function of public mourning of these innocent victims for the local community. As public mourning memorial projects are often

---

²² See discussion of active engagement in the Monument Against Fascism in Young.
²⁴ “Foreign Officials to Visit Memorial for Children Killed During Siege of Sarajevo by the Obligatory Protocol Soon.”
²⁵ Bickford and Sodaro, “Remembering Yesterday to Protect Tomorrow.”
accepted into the memorial landscape, these projects may avoid the contentions accompanying other memorial projects. Overall, this memorial has been allowed to occupy an official space in Bosnia’s memorial landscape as its focus on children and traditional memorial approach remain acceptable.

Memorial to Fallen Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Soldiers, Mostar

Other projects have used traditional memorial approaches to establish a more representative memorial space. However, even when memorial projects are formally accepted and constructed, they are not free from opposition. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s postwar memorial landscape includes many memorial projects that have been defaced, vandalized and targeted more deliberately after their construction.\(^{26}\) In addition to the Bruce Lee Statue, Mostar’s memorial landscape includes a contentious project that was actively attacked. Designed by Anel Jakirović as a large marble \(ljiljan\) (lily or fleur-de-lis), the Memorial to Fallen ARBiH Soldiers was dedicated to the Bosnian Army and constructed in 2012.\(^{27}\) As a direct response to the erection of a memorial project near Mostar’s city hall in 2011 by a Croat veterans’ group, the Association of Families of Shahids and Fallen Combatants worked to establish their own memorial project that would be placed adjacent to city hall approximately 35 feet from the Croat memorial.\(^{28}\) This subgroup funded and supported this memorial project. Prior to its formal construction, however, the status of these two memorial projects caused considerable debate between the town’s Bosniak and Croat politicians.\(^{29}\) Such debates specifically discussed the placement of the memorials, but were undoubtedly used by local politicians as a platform to

---

\(^{26}\) Centre for Nonviolent Action, *War of Memories*.

\(^{27}\) See Fig. 3.1. in Appendix B for image of damaged memorial; Centre for Nonviolent Action, 75; Maja Zuvela, “Bomb Destroys War Memorial in Divided Town,” *Reuters*, January 14, 2013, https://listserv.buffalo.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=JUSTWATCH-L;1ee8778f.1301.

\(^{28}\) Centre for Nonviolent Action, 75.

bolster continued divisions within the town. Within this physically and ethnically divided town, the original Croat memorial project’s placement near Mostar’s city hall on the west bank afforded a level of recognition to the Croat population; the city’s Bosniak population, inhabiting most of the east bank, felt they lacked such acknowledgment.

The memorial project utilized a traditional memorial approach in its use of a familiar design and solid structure to insert the memorialization of Bosnian Army veterans into Mostar’s memorial landscape. The *ljiljan* has medieval origins within the country as it was featured on the crest of the Kingdom of Bosnia but was also included prominently on the initial flag of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992. Thus, the choice of this symbol in recognition of the soldiers who had dedicated their lives to the war effort was not only appropriate, but particularly symbolic to the town’s Bosniak population. Projects utilizing a traditional memorial approach often employ established symbols to demonstrate affiliation with the community most connected to the project. Moreover, the depiction of such symbols in stone confirms the importance of the memorialized subject within the larger memorial landscape and interconnected history. The *Memorial to Fallen ARBiH Soldiers*’ memorial approach was indicative of these traditional means and therefore, directly served the Bosniak community’s interests.

The *Memorial to Fallen ARBiH Soldiers* was bombed in 2013 and subsequently damaged beyond repair. This project attempted to enter into the town’s memorial space in effort to receive formal recognition for Bosnian Army veterans but was purposefully damaged so as to remove its impact. As this memorial project was proposed by a subgroup in direct response to an

---

30 “Bosnian Army War Memorial Blown Up.”
31 Use of symbols particular to each respective ethnic group involved in the conflict was officially outlawed in 2006 by the country’s highest court, but RS and FBiH have continually utilized symbols respective to their particular identities (the checkered flag by Croatians, the double headed eagle by Serbs and the *ljiljan* by Bosniaks); Olga Lola Ninkovic, “Bosnia High Court Outlaws Ethnic Symbols,” *Reuters*, April 2, 2006, https://listserv.buffalo.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=JUSTWATCH-L;b911ed7c.0604.
33 Levinson, *Written in Stone*.
34 Zuvela, “Bomb Destroys War Memorial in Divided Town.”
existent memorial project, it also existed within a democratization of memory rationale. However, the opposition to the memorial project’s existence also demonstrated the town’s continued divisions, which were supported by national uncertainty about the Bosnian War. Therefore, the forceful and active rejection of this memorial project and the broken memorial project’s continued presence in the memorial landscape presents one of the clearest contentious projects. And although the Croat Veterans Associations and the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina have asked for the removal of the memorial, the now damaged Memorial to Fallen ARBiH Soldiers remains in its original location. The initial juxtaposition of these two memorial projects was certainly indicative of the town’s divisions; however, the current arrangement with one project still standing and the other destroyed may be more representative of intensified debates surrounding the future of the town. This memorial project clearly presented, and in some ways continues to present, a narrative sympathetic to the Bosniak community and therefore, it actively engaged in the town’s divisions and may have also furthered opposition to potential reconciliation between the two sides of the river. As the Memorial to Fallen ARBiH Soldiers acted as a democratized memorial project for one ethnic group, its existence was heavily influenced by contentions.

Democratized Memorial Projects

Local memorial projects exist as demonstrations of the democratization of memory and are particularly useful when considering the types of histories allowed to exist within the memorial landscape. The Bruce Lee Statue responded to feelings of uncertainty surrounding reconciliation efforts in the immediate postwar period and thus, the responsible Urban

---

35 Bickford and Sodaro, “Remembering Yesterday to Protect Tomorrow.”
36 Centre for Nonviolent Action, 75.
37 As of 2013, Mostar’s local government has continued to refuse assistance in reconciliation from outside forces. Moreover, social services such as education and utilities are still divided between the two sides of the town; Zuvela, “Bomb Destroys War Memorial in Divided Town.”
Movement-Mostar presented a project without a direct depiction of the conflict. At the time of this project’s development, the divisions prevalent throughout the war were largely relevant and as such, the memory presented by this project is not explicitly linked to the conflict but is rather evidence of similarities in interests beyond such divisions. Instead of drawing on complicated and potentially alienating memories of the war, this subgroup recognized the potential of a Bruce Lee Statue to urge unity.

In a similar attempt to stray from potentially divisive depictions of the conflict, the Association of Parents of Children Killed in the Siege of Sarajevo presented a memorial project that honored the lives of their lost children and subsequently, garnered consensus from the varying sides. The Memorial to the Children Killed in the Siege of Sarajevo 1992-1995 highlights a memory that engages the Bosnian War but is not overwhelmed by detailed representations of the conflict. In focusing the project entirely on the young victims of the Siege of Sarajevo, this memorial avoids entanglement in continuing debates over the exact details and results of the conflict. The memorial’s approach of including the footprints and list of children’s names underlines the innocence of the victims, which acts as another protective factor against possible dissent. Therefore, this memorial space is frequently utilized for public memorialization and commemoration activities. The subgroup responsible for this project successfully collaborated with the capital city’s government to present a history of the conflict that addresses one small aspect of the larger conflict and also reinforces feelings of grief produced when remembering these particular victims. The memory and feelings emphasized by the Memorial to the Children Killed in the Siege of Sarajevo 1992-1995 have allowed this project’s existence.

The subgroup responsible for the Memorial to the Fallen ARBiH Soldiers, however, directly engaged in a divisive memorial landscape to confirm their respective community’s sacrifice during the war. The memory emphasized within this project focuses on the lives of
Bosniak soldiers in light of the already establish memorial project to Croat soldiers. By seeking to also establish the memory of ARBiH soldiers in the memorial landscape, the Association of Families of Shahids and Fallen Combatants became involved in a larger debate related to the town’s divisions between the Croat and Bosniak communities. However, participation in this debate might have drawn enough opposition to lead to the memorial projects eventual demise. In this case, the project’s use of a traditional memorial approach to present its memory of the war was not a sufficient defense against the permeating tensions between the two sides. Therefore, the small memorial landscape outside of Mostar’s city hall came to be representative of local and national divisions.

In approaching a memorial landscape devoid of national projects concerning the Bosnian War, local subgroups have worked to establish their understanding of the conflict through various memorial projects throughout the country. Some subgroups have worked independently to further their projects, while others have collaborated with government entities to see their projects completed. Seemingly, each group must eventually seek government approval for their projects to remain standing and such approval exists solely on the local level because there is no mechanism for national endorsement. Despite efforts otherwise, these democratized projects cannot entirely separate themselves from complicated national divisions and often respond directly to ethnic, religious and ideological divisions. In selecting their focus, location and narrative, each memorial project places itself within such divisions. The subgroup responsible for the Bruce Lee Statue consciously selected a popular figure completely separate from the conflict and therefore, simultaneously avoided direct confrontation with continued divisions. And although this choice fails to directly engage the war in memorial form, it attempts to highlight the potential power of highlighting interests beyond ideology in achieving reconciliation.

Through a more direct engagement of the war in its memorial approach, the Memorial to the
*Children Killed in the Siege of Sarajevo 1992-1995* also tries to avoid furthering divisions. The Association of Parents of Children Killed in the Siege of Sarajevo’s choice of subject without regard to identity highlights the tragedy of lives lost too young without regard to accountability. The *Memorial to Fallen ARBiH Soldiers* actively engaged in the town’s ethnic divisions by inserting a memorial in acknowledgment of Bosniak soldiers adjacent to a Croat memorial. Although this project intentionally engaged in local discord, other memorial projects directly respond to national circumstances.

Nevertheless, the *Bruce Lee Statue*, the *Memorial to the Children Killed in the Siege of Sarajevo 1992-1995*, the *Memorial to Fallen ARBiH Soldiers* and many other projects exist in a memorial landscape heavily colored by an absent national narrative of the Bosnian War. And although two of these memorial projects faced little objection due to their memorial approaches, other democratized memorial projects, such as the *Memorial to Fallen ARBiH Soldiers*, are firmly positioned as contentious projects. Moreover, memorial projects created by smaller and local subgroups have filled this space with differing, and often competing, conceptions of the past and therefore, such projects have the potential to contribute to continued divisions. In offering their memory of the conflict, subgroups such as Urban Movement-Mostar, the Association of Parents of Children Killed in the Siege of Sarajevo and the Association of Families of Shahids and Fallen Combatants have utilized traditional memorial approaches to memorialize the familiar and beloved. This memorial approach works to engage viewers with the expected and accepted form and figure, and also gathers widespread support through the avoidance of disputed subjects or by serving a public mourning function. Such an approach has thus substantiated these projects within Bosnia’s postwar memorial landscape.
Chapter 2: Public Mourning through Cemeteries and Identification

The cemeteries and mass burial sites scattered across Bosnia are perhaps the most representative of the Bosnian War. As the end of the war resulted in approximately 100,000 deaths and 40,000 reported missing, cemeteries and gravesites have become important spaces for those grieving the loss of loved ones and also served as largely respected memorial projects.¹ The sheer scale and frequency of mass killings throughout the period often involved mass burials and created the need for extensive identification processes. Further, the ethnic cleansing efforts by Serb forces and the general indiscriminate violence resulted in many unnecessary deaths.

Edkins proposes, “In the aftermath of genocide, when a state has turned on people who considered themselves its citizens, the dead have no names and no burial places because their families are killed too. Memorialisation is difficult if not impossible … after a lapse of time or a change in the political landscape, a narrative takes shape. Events are named, memorials and museums set up and the identity of at least some of the victims established.”² Thus, one of the largest memorial projects to occur following the end of the war has been the identification of bodies found in mass graves located across the country. The creation of formal memorial spaces in recognition of the identified and unidentified dead has been integral to confronting, grieving and recognizing the horrors of the conflict. And although public mourning is often afforded more acceptance and validation within the memorial landscape, such formal memorial projects throughout Bosnia still encounter resistance. And although these memorial projects are not nationally recognized memorials to the Bosnian War, some projects have received various levels of support from the national governments of the continually opposing sides.³

---

² Jenny Edkins, *Trauma and the Memory of Politics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 2.
³ This support varies depending on the side. These projects have been supported almost entirely by the Bosniak and Croatian populations and governments. And despite the Serbian government’s initial support of such projects, the Serb communities in Bosnia offer various forms of opposition through counter days of commemoration. For
In the immediate period after the end of the conflict, cemeteries and mass burial sites often attempted to resolve the chronic uncertainty created by the sheer number of missing persons. In approaching the memorialization of the dead and missing, such memorial spaces satisfy Bickford and Sodaro’s category of public mourning for they directly to the needs of grieving individuals and families and offered dedicated spaces for the remembrance of the dead.\(^4\)

In her discussion of liminality and missing persons in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, Huttunen explains, “defining their absence and lack of proper burial as liminality, helps us to understand the family members’ pressing need to find their missing loved ones, even when they understand that the missing person must be dead.”\(^5\)

In the immediate postwar period, memorialization efforts focused on the identification and burial of the dead and missing. This need for burial can be further understood in consideration of common community mourning practices. In some instances, however, certain cemeteries contain individuals from all sides of the conflict with varying identities.\(^6\)

As the Bosniak population was most affected by ethnic cleansing efforts during this conflict, the corresponding cemeteries and mass graves across the country follow Islamic burial practices. Bosnian Muslims largely believe the soul remains in an interim space that cannot rest until it is properly buried, and funeral rites are performed.\(^7\)

Missing persons feared dead or those improperly buried experience an extended period of liminality, neither remaining on this plane or

---


moving on to the next stage and therefore, cannot fully pass on. Therefore, the identification and burial of these individuals enables their complete passing. Further, formal burial allows individuals the opportunity to mourn their lost loved ones and the physical grave becomes an enduring place for future remembrance. When speaking about the importance of formal and communal burials, grieving individuals often describe a sense of permanence and closure in knowing where their loved ones are buried. Memorial projects comprised of cemeteries and mass graves are created to directly respond to this need. At sites like the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery in Srebrenica and the Kapija Cemetery in Tuzla, collective burials and communal reburials have also offered opportunities to reengage the community’s funeral and mourning practices previously made impossible by the circumstances of genocide.

Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery, Srebrenica

The Srebrenica genocide remains one of the more recognizable events of the Bosnian War. Early in the conflict, the town and surrounding area of Srebrenica were designated as a “safe area” by the United Nations (UN) Security Council and thus would be free from attack and other forms of violence. However, due to various factors, UN forces in the area dwindled and the situation deteriorated. Serb forces overtook the area throughout July of 1995 and subsequently, oversaw the genocide of 8,000 Bosniaks and some Croats. Most victims were men and boys as women and younger children had been systematically moved to other areas throughout the country. Srebrenica and other ethnic cleaning efforts resulted in the creation of mass graves throughout the country and an immediate concern in the postwar period became the identification of victims. Due to the deteriorated conditions of the mass graves and the absent

---

8 Craig Evan, “Intentions of Burial,” 130-132.
10 Rhode.
11 The International Committee of the Red Cross and Doctors without Borders oversaw much of the immediate identification efforts. For more information about such efforts, see Huttunen, “Liminality and Missing Persons,”
physical markers, DNA analysis was used extensively to facilitate the identification of the victims. As of 2018, 6,940 genocide victims at Srebrenica have been identified using DNA analysis, 33 have been identified by a non-DNA method and 6,539 have been formally buried. Since the discovery of these graves and with a general concern about the memory of the area, Wolfgang Petritsch, the then UN High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, designated the site of Srebrenica for a future memorial in 2000.

Although general concern for the fate of victims discovered in graves located in and around Srebrenica was certainly present in the immediate postwar period, the official memorial-cemetery complex known as the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery was not officially sanctioned by Petritsch until June 2000, approximately five years following the end of the conflict. Resistance from the Serb controlled local government had delayed efforts to establish a formal cemetery for the victims and a grieving space for their families. Following his promise to build such a memorial project, Petritsch worked closely with community subgroups such as the Srebrenica Families Association and the Association of Mothers of Srebrenica and Zepa to consider their wishes and identify a space for the cemetery. After additional opposition from the local government resulting in the resignation of Srebrenica’s mayor, a plot of land across from the battery factory, in which most of the victims were held prior to their deaths, was

12 Identification processes have been additionally complicated by comingled graves, in which an initial mass grave was dug up and buried in another location, sometimes multiple times.
15 In the five years following the end of the war, only 60 remains had been identified and no proper burials had been conducted; Office of the High Representative, “OHR Press Release,” October 25, 2000, https://listserv.buffalo.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=JUSTWATCH-L;63fc10f7.0011.
16 Carlotta, “For Bosnia’s Bereaved, Solace in a Graveyard.”
designated for the cemetery. In a press release following his verdict, Petritsch identified this cemetery as “an important decision for the relatives of those killed, and those that survived. There is now a place where they can mourn their dead, and from where they, and the rest of Bosnia and Herzegovina, can try to come to terms with the past and build a future.” With this project, Petritsch responded to the increasingly pressing need from the larger community for a public space for mourning, and clearly recognized this memorial’s potential to act as a tool in national reconciliation. Moreover, Petritsch emphasized the important involvement of the Serb community and stated, “Srebrenica was a defining tragedy and reconciliation will not be possible without the Serbs’ accepting their role in it.” With consideration of Serb resistance to this project, the cemetery would begin to satisfy the community’s need to remember Srebrenica’s victims and eventually, it might facilitate larger recognition of this genocide’s traumatic memory.

Despite hopes for its future potential, this project’s approval was met with additional opposition from certain factions wishing to emphasize absent recognition of Serb suffering during the war. Resistance to the project also included outright denial of the genocide from the local community with some stating, “It is not true that so many Muslims have been killed here.” Nevertheless, the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery remained focused on the victims of a massacre executed under Serb control. As such, the local Serb controlled government was ordered by the Human Rights Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a judicial body established by the Dayton Peace Agreement to try human rights violations, to donate

18 Carlotta, “For Bosnia’s Bereaved, Solace in a Graveyard.”
20 Carlotta, “For Bosnia’s Bereaved, Solace in a Graveyard.”
21 Official recognition remains elusive as Serb authorities are currently in the process of revoking their support of a resolution condemning Serb involvement in the Srebrenica genocide.
22 Gostimir Popovic, “Unselective Threats or the Road to Uncontrolled Dictatorship?,” Yahoo Groups, May 12, 2001, https://listserv.buffalo.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=JUSTWATCH-L;4fb0a69b.0105.
approximately one million euro to the Foundation of the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery as compensation. In order to meet the project’s estimated costs of five to six million euro, additional independent donations for this memorial project were received from the Netherlands and the United States.

Following arrangements surrounding funding, the allotment of land and the identification of victims, the first 582 victims were buried in the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery on March 31, 2003. Nearly 300 more bodies were buried later that year on July 11, now marked as a day of remembrance for Srebrenica. An official opening ceremony was also held in 2003 on September 20 and included a formal dedication by former United States President Bill Clinton. Since 2012, the memorial site has held annual burials on July 11th for those identified throughout the previous year. Each grave is marked with a white marble obelisk and as the number of identified victims grows each year, the cemetery has expanded to become a sea of white graves. The center point of the memorial includes a visitor center and an expansive wall of names overlooking the graves that is periodically updated to reflect the newly identified.

The Intricacies of Srebrenica’s Memorial Approach

Due to its function as a cemetery, this memorial project has a keenly focused memorial approach. The Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery was conceptualized to accommodate an unknown number of massacred victims with a particular emphasis on the

---

24 The Republika Srpska was also ordered to make four subsequent 250,000 euro to the foundation; Amnesty International, “Bosnia-Herzegovina: Human Rights Chamber Decision on Srebrenica- A First Step to Justice,” Press Release, March 7, 2003.  
28 Cerkez-Robinson.  
30 See Appendix B for additional images of Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery.
identification of the dead to facilitate grieving. In this instance, the DNA analysis conducted by the International Commission of Missing Persons to identify victims was crucial to this project’s memorial approach and has proven equivalent to the importance of the memorial’s public mourning space. The identification of the victims not only validated the veracity of this massacre but has also provided resolve to some families searching for answers about missing loved ones. The cemetery’s impact in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s memorial landscape was strengthened by the emphasis on the unnamed victims and the families’ need for identification. Such an emphasis on the families’ plights and desire for resolution was frequently utilized in reporting about Srebrenica and the establishment of this memorial project.\footnote{For example, see Carlotta, “For Bosnia’s Bereaved, Solace in a Graveyard.”} Further, it was community-led organizations with connections to Srebrenica that fought for the cemetery despite pushback from the local government.\footnote{Carlotta.} The town’s local government and residents worked to prevent the this memorial project’s realization as they still denied the truthfulness of the Srebrenica genocide.\footnote{“First Srebrenica Victims to be Buried at Bosnian Massacre Site.”} A cemetery composed entirely of victims would certainly act as evidence of a genocide and therefore, contradict claims regarding Serb innocence. In consultation with subgroups such as the Association of Mothers of Srebrenica and Zepa, UN High Representative Petritsch overruled the local community’s resistance and approved the construction of this project. In these ways, this project exists as a democratized memorial project in search of providing indisputable evidence to the local and national Serb population.

In approaching this space, the \textit{Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery} combined the personal with the communal. The intimacy of the cemetery was reinforced by the identification of bodies occupying mass graves, while the shared experience of grieving has been supported by the placement of these bodies in one location. As the cemetery is situated in the
same geographic location of the genocide, the project has also worked to reclaim the space for the victims and their families. In selecting a location, 12,000 survivors were polled and the plot of land near the battery factory was selected.\textsuperscript{34} It was not an uninformed decision made by outside forces but was an active choice by survivors to reengage the space that had seen the deaths of so many. Prior to the creation of this memorial space, survivors described great difficulty returning to Srebrenica as it was not only full of traumatic memories, but they were barred by local authorities from visiting.\textsuperscript{35} Nedziba Salihovic described the importance of this memorial project for it would allow her to return to this space and mourn her lost loved ones. She stated, “We hope it will get better, but every day it feels worse. They don't let us go back, they don't let us bury our children. At least with the cemetery, I would know where they are and know their bones have not been taken away in the River Drina. At last I would have a place where I could give my prayers.”\textsuperscript{36} It is in this memorial project that families can grieve the dead and also recognize the larger impact of the genocide. In coming together for annual communal burials of the newly identified, the community further highlights the trauma associated with this massacre while simultaneously emphasizing the lives of the dead. The white uniform grave markers remain representative of this intersection between personal and communal. Each marker serves to remember one individual, while the collective group of markers creates a powerful visual of the trauma.\textsuperscript{37} The wall of names that spreads across the open terrace but does not obstruct the view of the graves is similarly powerful. These components contribute to the physicality of the space and support this memorial’s approach. The identification of victims has rendered this memorial an intimate project and also allowed for families to address the liminality of the missing within a public mourning memorial space.

\textsuperscript{34} Carlotta, “For Bosnia’s Bereaved, Solace in a Graveyard.”
\textsuperscript{35} Carlotta.
\textsuperscript{36} Carlotta.
\textsuperscript{37} See Appendix B for images of the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery.
The Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery is positioned firmly within the public mourning “rationale of memorializing.” The cemetery accommodates the dead and provides space for the living to grieve. Seemingly, such memorials are generally accepted within the larger memorial landscape due to this rationale; however, additional efforts were required to realize this project because of postwar national circumstances. The families’ need for a public mourning space was made more than apparent in the five years following the Dayton Peace Agreement as subgroups pleaded for assistance in identifying and burying their dead. In describing the need for a memorial space in Srebrenica, leader of the Association of Mothers of Srebrenica and Zepa Munira Subasic stated, “The first killings, rapes and beheadings started there, and the place where someone died or where the crime was done should be the place of memorial.” After losing her son, husband and many other relatives in Srebrenica, Subasic worked with fellow survivor Advija Sehomirovic to organize over 10,000 women and begin work on this memorial project in the years following the war. Despite their efforts, the lack of a national consensus about the war and disagreements about the perpetrators of the Srebrenica massacre delayed the creation of the cemetery.

The opposition to this memorial project was characteristic of these larger national circumstances as local Serb authorities rejected the project’s focus. Therefore, the final decision in realizing this project was made by the outside authority of the UN, which subsequently created additional resistance. As such, this project also sits well within Bosnia and Herzegovina’s absent national memorial landscape. Despite such hindrances, the project was accomplished and still provides a physical space to recognize the long-held grief associated with immense loss and permeating unknowingness. In selecting the location of the massacre as the site for the cemetery,

38 Bickford and Sodaro, “Remembering Yesterday to Protect Tomorrow.”
39 Carlotta, “For Bosnia’s Bereaved, Solace in a Graveyard.”
40 Carlotta.
41 Carlotta.
this project also asks visitors to return to the site of the genocide and confront any associated trauma. As the land has now been transformed into a public mourning space, the memorial project may also facilitate the settlement of individual and communal trauma generated by the Srebrenica genocide and larger Bosnian War.

The memorial project’s dual function additionally points to intersections with other rationales. As a democratized memorial, this project was supported by subgroups (i.e. the Srebrenica Families Association and the Association of Mothers of Srebrenica) and features memorial techniques that emphasize the individual such as the list of names. Its function as a cemetery is to serve grieving individuals and families, but as it is also a memorial honoring the victims of a massacre; it performs a larger purpose. On July 11th of each year, the memorial events held at Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery are attended by local, national and international politicians and dignitaries.42 Displaced individuals from across the globe travel to attend these events. Yet, this memorial project is not recognized as a national memorial to the Bosnian War. It has been utilized as a point of emphasis in national discussions of responsibility for the conflict due to changing statements regarding Serb involvement in the Bosnian War and events of Srebrenica.43 Details made available since the end of the war clearly position Serb forces as the perpetrators of the massacre and further reveal Serb authorities’ systematic ethnic cleansing efforts throughout the war.44 The still growing cemeteries at Srebrenica and at other

---


mass grave sites across the country provide physical evidence of violence committed throughout the war. However, the Serb government has failed to officially recognize the Srebrenica massacre as a genocide.\textsuperscript{45} Serb led-organizations have also been known to hold counter celebrations for Serb victims of the war in the days after July 7\textsuperscript{th}.\textsuperscript{46} This memorial project has faced additional opposition in the form of threats, planted bombs and other protests.\textsuperscript{47} This memorial project was successfully constructed and is engaged yearly by a mostly Bosniak population, however, this cemetery continues to exist as a contentious memorial project due to local opposition and national disagreements about the details of the Bosnian War.

The \textit{Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery} has established the Srebrenica massacre as a crucial moment in the war’s history. The involved subgroups and this memorial project highlighted the prevalent denial of responsibility by the Serbian government in its demand for public recognition of the massacre. Moreover, the identification of victims has created a more intimate narrative of the massacre that remains indicative of the larger conflict’s brutality and severity. This identification work has also assisted in resolving some of the liminality felt by those searching for missing loved ones. The annual burials held on July 11th of each year at the cemetery offer families an opportunity to formally grieve and also remind the local, national and international community of continued efforts to mourn the victims. And perhaps most importantly, these events honor the memory of the massacre. Although this project was initially conceptualized as a potential tool for reconciliation in the postwar period by UN High Representative Petritsch and the associations of survivors, part of Bosnia’s national

\textsuperscript{45} Gordy, \textit{Guilt, Responsibility, and Denial.}
\textsuperscript{47} Police located and deactivated two large bombs (35kg of explosives) near the \textit{Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery} prior to the annual burial in July 2005. As the annual event is generally attended by a large number of citizens, a considerable police force is present as a security measure; Debelnogic, “Police Find Large Bombs Near Srebrenica Memorial.”
government and the Serbian government have yet to formally recognize the event as a genocide. Most importantly, this refusal restricts the cemetery’s memorial approach as it cannot fully realize its reconciliation potential without recognition from all involved parties. Therefore, this memorial project’s continued existence and engagement by the public will continue to reinforce the understanding of this massacre as a genocide. The history told within this memorial space is one that places the victims at the center with a goal of mourning, remembrance and recognition.

Kapija Cemetery, Tuzla

Although the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery is frequently included in discussions of the Bosnian War, additional memorial sites exist at other mass graves across the country. Another space for public mourning was constructed in the northeastern town of Tuzla and later transitioned into a formal memorial site. On May 25, 1995, 71 civilians were killed by Serbian artillery fire in the center of the town. The victims’ ages and the event’s closeness to the end of the war added to the significance of the Kapija massacre. Following the massacre and despite the varying religious and ethnic identities of the victims, the local community decided to bury all victims together within the already established Slana Banja Memorial Complex. And although there was some dissent from local religious communities, subgroups within the community including the families of the dead, local authorities and other community-led subgroups pushed against furthering ethnic divisions in the scope of this memorial project. And while exact details about the funding for this memorial project remain unknown, it appears the local government, at the request of the victims’ families, oversaw the development of this

48 Similarly, national reconciliation efforts will continue to be delayed and limited by lack of involvement and willingness from all parties to consider the events of the war and reach a consensus. 49 Ivana Avramovic, “Tuzla Takes Time to Recall Victims of 1995 Mortar Fire,” Stars and Stripes, May 27, 2003, https://listserv.buffalo.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=JUSTWATCH-L;371bd60c.0305. 50 Kapija, meaning Gate, refers to name of the town center. 51 Ioannis Armakolas, “Imagining Community in Bosnia: Constructing and Reconstructing the Slana Banja Memorial Complex in Tuzla,” in War and Cultural Heritage: Biographies of Place, ed. Marie Louise Stig Sørensen and Dacia Viego-Rose (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 236-237.
project. And thus, community support at all stages was crucial in the realization of this project. An additional memorial to the massacre was erected in the years following the war at the site of the shelling in Tuzla’s main square. This memorial and the cemetery are recognized and visited by members of the local community and others on the anniversary of the massacre.

Most of the victims are buried in the Kapija Massacre Cemetery, also referred to as the Civilian Memorial Cemetery or the Youth Arbour. The memorial was designed by the local Public Institute of Urban Planning with assistance from Professor Zlatko Ugljen. In an active attempt to avoid positioning this memorial project within the divisions of the war, those involved in the design of the memorial project decided the victims would be buried in “tombstones of the same style.” In designing this project, families were also offered the option to inscribe one of four symbols on a small silver medal underneath a photo of the victim on each grave marker. The choices included an open book, ljiljan, rose, or crescent and star. And while some families did indeed select a religious symbol such as the crescent and star, this site remains largely devoid of other religious markers for many families selected non-religious symbols more descriptive of the individual. The individual graves are arranged in five neat rows with a grated wall near the back of the cemetery that often holds hanging flower wreaths. Further, the bed of each individual grave also allows room for additional greenery such as flowers, small trees and

---

52 Centre for Nonviolent Action, War of Memories: Places of Suffering and Remembrance of War in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Centre for Nonviolent Action, 2016), 171.
53 When visiting in 2015, flowers and small mementos were placed at the foot of the memorial.
55 See images (Fig. 5.1.-5.2). in Appendix B. Centre for Nonviolent Action, War of Memories, 171.
56 Centre for Nonviolent Action, 171.
58 Armakolas, “Imagining Community in Bosnia.”
59 Centre for Nonviolent Action, 171.
60 See Appendix B for images of gravesite and individual graves.
61 The wreath can be seen in the background of Fig. 5.1 in Appendix B.
shrubs. As the cemetery exists as a part of a larger memorial space, the grounds are also well maintained.

The memorial approach seen in the Kapija Massacre Cemetery is not frequently used within similar public mourning memorial projects in Bosnia due to the often competing religious and ethnic mortuary practices of the various groups involved in the Bosnian War. In burying most of the victims together in one location and utilizing a uniform style of grave, the cemetery clearly emphasizes the victims’ lives over their individual identities. In another circumstance, the victims might have been buried in separate locations and would have most likely been separated by their respective identities. The Kapija Massacre Cemetery’s uniformity actively works against this potential by bringing all the victims together in one public mourning space despite their varying identities. And although the small medallions on each grave may indicate the individuals’ affiliations, they are also used to indicate more than religious or ethnic divisions. As this choice of memorial approach was made during the conflict, it further demonstrates this community’s commitment to act against continued divisions within memorial projects.

Although this site’s placement within the Slana Banja Memorial Complex shifted its purpose to serve a more immediate and local function, it also further indicated the importance of communal cemeteries and burial practices after the war within this town. Prior to the war, the larger complex contained numerous socialist era monuments and memorials to the partisan figures of World War II. Following the cessation of violence, many monuments and structures in this complex were shifted to include specific mentions of the Bosnian War and symbols synonymous with Bosnian culture to further distract from its previous socialist history. The addition of the cemetery to the memorial complex expanded the initial mission of this space to

---

62 Some families decided to bury their family members in other locations closer to other family members.
63 For example, a traditional Bosnian carpet pattern was painted on the floor of the central memorial space; Armakolas, “Imagining Community in Bosnia,” 244-246.
64 Armakolas, 246.
encompass the intimate tragedy experienced by the community. Further, these memorial projects have been continually and actively utilized by the community for commemoration purposes.

For the community of Tuzla, it is fitting that many memorial projects adjacent to the Bosnian War were inserted into the Slana Banja Memorial Complex as this seems to be where the community keeps its many memories.

Kapija Cemetery’s Inclusive Memorial Approach

To some extent, Tuzla has existed apart from residual national divisiveness surrounding the war due to the town’s historic moderatism. Throughout the war, Tuzla’s non-nationalist government worked to challenge the ethnic and religious divisions promulgated elsewhere and therefore, created “a post-Yugoslav and pro-Bosnian local identity … connected to ideas of tolerance, inter-ethnic unity and a legacy of antifascism.” Additionally, Tuzla functioned as UN “safe area” and became a destination for many fleeing their homes during the conflict. This less tolerant ideology continued into the postwar period and established a connected, but slightly separate memorial space within Bosnia’s larger memorial landscape. Memorial projects within Tuzla often attempt a more careful or comprehensive approach to the past. Similar to its response during the war, Tuzla’s memorial landscape directly responded to national circumstances through this choice of memorial approach. At its inception and with its memorial approach, the Kapija Massacre Cemetery rejected the ethnic and religious divisions that had led to and prevailed throughout the conflict. Within another community in Bosnia, such a memorial project may have faced enough backlash from local governments and communities to prevent its realization. Tuzla’s government and local community worked together to erect a memorial project representative of the town’s larger identity.

---

65 Muslimović, “Tuzlanska Kapija Victims Comemorated, Families Disappointed at Lack of Justice.”
66 Armakolas, 227.
and the larger Slana Banja Memorial Complex exist within a memorial landscape devoid of a national narrative, but simultaneously offers a quasi-national narrative of the war. The historical narrative presented within this memorial complex directly challenges the current national memorial landscape for it attempts an inclusive history of many identities and beliefs. Therefore, the Kapija Massacre Cemetery attempts to place itself outside of pressing divisions. The Kapija Massacre Cemetery offers another example of intersections within Bickford and Sodaro’s “rationales for memorializing.”69 This memorial project’s original function as a cemetery locates it within the public mourning rationale, but its unique position as a community and nationally adjacent memorial also situate this project within nation building and the democratization of memory. Perhaps most importantly, the Kapija Massacre Cemetery demonstrates the potential for future memorial projects to respectfully include more than one ethnic, religious or political identity.

As the Kapija Massacre Cemetery was created in direct dichotomy to the national divisiveness of the Bosnian War, its place within the memorial landscape remains more indicative of Tuzla’s inclusive history than of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s larger memorial landscape. This memorial project presents a clear counter history to the divisive and often exclusionary narratives seen throughout other projects in the memorial landscape. Further, the cemetery’s mission, accomplished through its unique and inclusive memorial approach, remains focused on mourning and remembering the individuals lost during the massacre. Through this approach, this memorial project responded directly to potential hostility and thus, does not seek or desire national acceptance due to Tuzla’s distinctive and separate political position within the larger national circumstances. In providing a space for remembrance and commemoration, the

69 Bickford and Sodaro, “Remembering Yesterday to Protect Tomorrow.”
Kapija Massacre Cemetery continues to actively serve Tuzla’s community while simultaneously challenging the limitations created by opponents to the national memorial landscape.

‘Unobjectionable’ Public Mourning Memorial Projects

The Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery and the Kapija Massacre Cemetery are two examples of public mourning spaces in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s memorial landscape. The violent nature of the Bosnian War has made such spaces integral and widespread in the postwar period. Designated spaces for mourning were utilized by individuals returning to the communities they had fled, but also by those in search of the missing. Within the larger postwar period, cemeteries also functioned as dedicated spaces in which individuals could directly confront the consequences and associated trauma of the conflict. Memorial projects throughout Bosnia initiated by local subgroups, communities, or governments responded directly to the need for public mourning, despite continued opposition surrounding the national narrative of the war. Although they both responded to this need, these two memorial projects offer differing insights into the histories constructed within Bosnia and Herzegovina’s larger memorial landscape and the associated dissent.

In approaching the dismal circumstances of the war, the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery and the Kapija Massacre Cemetery present spaces for public mourning and grieving. As their main purpose, cemeteries offer dedicated spaces for grieving and remembrance. Within the confines of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s memorial landscape, these two projects accomplish such a purpose but also defiantly engage the memory of the war. And although public mourning spaces are often granted more room to exist within the memorial space, these projects faced opposition from their respective communities during their initial development and continue to encounter resistance from opposing sides. The realization of these projects has not completely eliminated local resistance for memorial projects often act as
constant physical and visual reminders of the initial and continued disagreements about the details of the war. However, within these two circumstances, the work of subgroups such as the Association of Mothers of Srebrenica and Zepa and members of Tuzla’s community counteracted resistance related to their memorial projects by inserting their own narrative of the war into the memorial landscape. These efforts directly confronted the harmful divisions perpetuated throughout the war and sustained into the postwar period for they disputed conceptions of the past that failed to recognize the realities of the war. These democratized public mourning memorial projects serve as examples of efforts to ensure certain memories are not erased or forgotten in the larger memorial landscape.

These memorial projects ask visitors to remember and mourn the victims, but to also consider the events that caused their deaths. In doing so, these cemeteries attempt to substantiate the histories of these massacres into the larger memorial landscape and the narrative of the Bosnian War. As a whole, each cemetery provides an opportunity for visitors to bear witness to the loss of life caused by these particular events and the larger Bosnian War. The grave markers also function as physical evidence of the human suffering caused by conflict. In offering a space for public mourning, these projects also engage in the “never again” sentiment now frequently utilized in more recent memorial projects. Such projects encourage visitors to remember the victims, the massacre and the war in an attempt to prevent future conflict. Although such a sentiment may not be the primary goal of the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery and the Kapija Massacre Cemetery, these memorial projects demand active engagement through mourning and remembrance.
Chapter 3: Contentious and Future “Never Again” Projects

Despite considerable efforts from a variety of memorial projects across both Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska (RS) throughout the postwar period, the memorial landscape remains without an officially recognized national memorial to the Bosnian War. A range of memorial approaches have been employed as a means to directly respond to this absence. Although considered a newer approach in the larger field of memorialization, proposals for “never again” memorial projects were made early on in the postwar period and have continued into present day. The “never again” sentiment asks visitors to memorial projects to bear witness to a memory in order to discourage similar conflict or violence in the future. This memorial approach operates under the understanding that if a memory of a horrific event is carried by larger communities and through generations, parallel acts of violence or other forms of conflict will be prevented. The “never again” rationale became increasingly common in memorial projects related to the Holocaust and is now frequently utilized in projects associated with other human rights atrocities.¹ A memorial project can encourage such a sentiment through education, experience and empathy.² More recent projects memorializing the Bosnian War, including those yet to be formally constructed, have specifically employed educational and experiential components in their memorial approach.

As “never again” memorial projects require the establishment of a narrative in order to accomplish their mission, such projects must contend with the continued national opposition surrounding the details of the conflict. Each memorial project’s distinctive memory of the war furthers the absence of a consensus about the past, which allows for potential resistance rooted in

---
² Bickford and Sodaro, “Remembering Yesterday to Protect Tomorrow.”
ethnic, religious and ideological divisions. Therefore, the approval of “never again” projects is influenced by the presented narrative, the location of the project and opposing national narratives. The nonexistent governmental mechanism to mediate the development of memorial projects and monitor the memorial landscape additionally contributes to potential opposition as local governments in turn determine the shape of the national memorial landscape. Overall, local and national opposition can act as a barrier to the creation of memorial projects such as the yet to be realized “White House” memorial project and the rejected memorial plaque in Foča. Although most memorial projects face similar barriers during their development, “never again” projects are distinctively representative of the contentious memorial landscape and therefore, not all “never again” projects are readily accepted and often face more dramatic opposition.

“White House” Memorial Project, Prijedor

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s memorial landscape remains reflective of the complicated and divided political system implemented by the Dayton Peace Agreement. Therefore, memorials located within the FBiH tend to remain sympathetic to the Bosniak population, while memorial projects dedicated to fallen Serb forces and victims are widespread throughout the RS. Debates surrounding the development of memorial projects are most often stirred when a project challenges the conventions of this division. For example, near the northwestern town of Prijedor, a “never again” memorial project was initially proposed in 2004 by a minority Bosniak community and subsequently rejected by the Serb controlled local government. The proposed memorial project sought to memorialize the “White House,” a site which saw the torture, abuse and murder of Bosniaks and Croats held as prisoners in the Omarska camp, located in a local

iron ore mine from May to August 1992. Although the events that occurred at the “White House” during the war were reviewed and documented during the ICTY trials, the site remains entirely devoid of physical markers describing its role in the conflict.

When the mine was bought in 2004 by Lakshmi Mittal, then Britain’s richest citizen, and his steel corporation, a collection of concerned citizens and community led organizations reached out about the fate of the Omarska camp. At just nine years since the formal end of the war, both survivors of the camp and Prijedor’s current Bosniak population wished to memorialize the camp as a way to prevent the destruction of its memory. The proposed project’s goal was to educate visitors about the history of the space and thus, this project’s approach was reminiscent of the “never again” approach. In speaking about the project, Omarska camp survivor Edin Kararic explained “What matters is that the memory of what happened in Omarska not be allowed to disappear. That there must be … Something that future generations can learn from, so that it does not happen again.” Such language is commonly utilized in discussing the mission of “never again” projects located at sites of atrocities. Although this view about the memorial project was widely shared among the Bosniak community, the local Serb government, still failing to recognize the camp’s existence and the violence committed within, continually pushed against this proposal. However, the Mittal Steel corporation responded to the public outcries and stopped altering the physical structures of the mine and most importantly, the company agreed to preserve the “White House” until an agreement was established between all involved parties.

4 Velma Šaric and Rachel Irwin, “Calls for War Memorials Divide Bosnia,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, December 6, 2010, https://listserv.buffalo.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=JUSTWATCH-L;3d1dd84e.1012; See Fig. 6.1. in Appendix B for image of “White House.”
6 Vulliamy, “New Battle Breaks Out Over Serb Death Camp.”
7 Vulliamy.
8 Vulliamy.
9 Bickford and Sodaro, “Remembering Yesterday to Protect Tomorrow.”
10 Wesselingh, “Bosnian Omarska Camp Survivors Fight for Memorial.”
Within a year from its initial proposal, an educational “never again” approach became a key component of the larger memorial project.11

Due to the particularly contentious circumstances surrounding this memorial project’s development, a non-governmental organization named Soul of Europe was hired by the Mittal Steel corporation to mediate negotiations between the company, Serb government and Bosniak community about this memorial project.12 The first formal proposal for this memorial project was released in late 2005 and focused on the “White House.”13 The memorial project would not only rename the “White House” as “The House of No Words,” but work to create a memorial space within the site and add a visitor center.14 In continuing the initial “never again” goal, the visitor center would provide a historical overview intended to educate; however, the narrative would not necessarily focus on the events of the Bosnian War.15 Other versions of this proposal suggested the addition of trees, a memorial wall of barbed wire, benches, statues and a fountain.16

Further, the memorial’s educational function would also serve to facilitate reconciliation efforts in the community.17 Representatives from each party met in late 2005 for a mediated discussion about the proposal and the Mittal Corporation approved the construction of the memorial project at the “White House.”18

The plans for the “White House” memorial project stalled completely in February of 2006 when the Mittal Steel corporation withdrew its support and cited continued community

11 According to Wesselingh, some hoped for an “interactive memorial with films and photographs of what happened in the camp in the “white House” building.”
13 Mutton, “Burying the Memory of Omarska.”
14 Mutton.
15 Mutton.
16 Mutton; “Mittal to Erect War Memorial in Bosnia Mines,” Reuters, December 1, 2005, https://listserv.buffalo.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=JUSTWATCH-L;be5b37ef.0512.
opposition to the project as the rationale for their decision.\textsuperscript{19} Debates about the memorial project had grown more considerable and extreme since the preliminary 2005 discussion. A news report by \textit{Bosnian Institute News} from the following year indicated that tensions surrounding the project remained as the Serbian controlled government continued to deny the seriousness of the Omarska camp and many Bosniak community organizations still hoped for a respected place within the town’s memorial space.\textsuperscript{20} Community led efforts were reinvigorated in 2010 when an additional roundtable about Bosnia’s memorials was held by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting.\textsuperscript{21} In speaking again about the value of memorializing the space, Omarska camp survivor Kemal Pervanic explained the benefit of education despite disagreements about the past and argued, “It shouldn’t be to portray blame on someone, but rather to build lessons for the future. The way I see it, this is not what ‘they’ did to ‘us’ because for me, we are all humans and this is what human beings do to each other in times of war. Wars are never black and white.”\textsuperscript{22} This statement was shared by other survivors who wished to mark the location without assigning blame or engaging in dangerous divisions.

Despite realizations within the Bosniak community about the potential complexities of a “White House” memorial project, resistance to the project was still present in the town’s Serb population and Serb controlled government. General denial about the camp was also present. Security guards stationed at the mines were quoted as stating “’There was no camp here. It was all Muslim lies.’”\textsuperscript{23} Efforts continued into 2011 when members from various community and victims’ associations within Bosnia were invited to visit the concentration camp at Dachau in


\textsuperscript{20} Keulemans, “Omarska - Fifteen Years On.”

\textsuperscript{21} Šaric and Irwin, “Calls for War Memorials Divide Bosnia.”

\textsuperscript{22} Šaric and Irwin.

\textsuperscript{23} Vulliamy, “New Battle Breaks Out Over Serb Death Camp.”
Germany and speak with German scholars in memorialization and human rights advocates.\textsuperscript{24} This meeting allowed these representatives to gather a better understanding of how Dachau has been memorialized and identify the similarities and differences within the respective projects. Moreover, the visiting members came to understand the potential of “never again” projects to maintain memory, but one of their biggest conclusions concerned the length of time required for the development of such a project as 20 years was spent transitioning Dachau into a formal memorial project.\textsuperscript{25} Nevertheless, this momentum did not continue past this visit and the “White House” remains without markings, interpretation or security from destruction. Further, Serb controlled Prijedor has rejected additional memorial projects from the Bosniak community in more recent years.\textsuperscript{26} The opposition prevalent throughout the initial proposal of a “White House” memorial project and the continued local resistance remains indicative of the lack of a national consensus of the Bosnian War.

Although not initially envisioned as a “never again” memorial project, the “White House” memorial project’s approach quickly came to include an educational component aimed at informing visitors about the Omarska camp’s character and memory. This project was heavily supported by community members, victims and community led subgroups including the Association of Concentration Camp Detainees in Bosnia and other victim’s advocacy groups. As such, this project intersects the democratization of memory due to the community’s involvement and more clearly, the “never again” rationale.\textsuperscript{27} The “never again” rationale is supported by the words and phrases used by involved individuals when speaking about this project, which


\textsuperscript{25} Kamber.


\textsuperscript{27} Bickford and Sodaro, “Remembering Yesterday to Protect Tomorrow.”
included “lessons for the future,” “future generations,” “learn from …”, “historical record,” “our future,” “future of Bosnia,” “not forgotten,” “warning,” and “living monuments.” In order to accomplish the mission of preventing the repetition of mistakes, “never again” projects tend to employ educational methods to present a narrative that will be used to guide visitors through to a final conclusion about the memorialized person, place, event or thing. Within different iterations of the “White House” project, the memorial approach presented narratives with various pieces of information about the camp and its victims, the usage of the “White House” and the larger Bosnian War. And although the formal memorial project proposal mediated by the Soul of Europe included a visitor center with educational components, the included narrative was negotiated to be a broader history of the region devoid of information about the Bosnian War. Such a disconnect between the memorial space within the “White House” and the visitor center would have supplied visitors with a complicated and disconnected understanding of this memory. The defeat of this memorial project was greatly impacted by contentions surrounding the events of the Bosnian War and more specifically, the local Serb controlled government’s uneasiness about the main component of a “never again” project, a concrete narrative of the past.

**Opposition to the “Never Again” Memorial Approach in Prijedor**

The very nature of the “White House” memorial project challenged the RS’s memorial landscape and thus, it faced heavy opposition. This memorial’s “never again” approach increased Serb resistance as it would offer a definitive narrative of the past inconsistent with Serb denial. As the projects within RS’s memorial landscape present a history of the Bosnian War crowded with Serb victims and sacrifices, there is little to no room for memorial representations of the

---
past sympathetic toward the Bosniak population. The “White House” memorial project was not only proposed by Bosniak victims and community organizations but attempted to highlight the history of a space in which Bosniaks were abused and murdered by Serb forces. The proposed “White House” memorial is further rendered a contentious project as it demonstrates the results of an absent national narrative of the Bosnian War. This national lack of consensus has allowed for diverging understandings of the past and in some ways has also authorized denial of the horrific outcomes of the war. Prijedor’s Serb community denied the existence of the camp and simultaneously, discredited the claims of survivors and rejected their need for memorialization. Thus, the eventual rejection of the “White House” memorial project by the local community also represents a continued divide in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s memorial landscape. Further, Prijedor continues to be a site of contentious projects as the town most recently rejected a proposal for a memorial project dedicated to the children victims of the war. Within this memorial landscape, even memorial projects centered around largely agreed upon subjects such as innocent victims will still face opposition.

The opposition to the “White House” memorial project in Prijedor was a clear indication of the town’s hostility toward the past. In its various iterations, this memorial project sought to identify the location of trauma to recognize the camp’s victims and guard against the reoccurrence of similar violence. However, the Serb majority town was unwilling to reconcile the past and provide such a space for memorialization. The involvement of the Mittal Steel corporation in this memorial project presented additional complications as a rejection of the memorial would prove to create a public relations scandal, while support of the project

29 Centre for Nonviolent Action, War of Memories: Places of Suffering and Remembrance of War in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Centre for Nonviolent Action, 2016).
30 “Parents Demand Children’s Memorial in Bosnia’s Prijedor”; Panic, “Prijedor’s Serbs Reject Memorial to Killed Children.”
contradicted the wishes of the corporation’s partner in the mine. As such, the town’s continued resistance and the eventual withdrawal of the corporation’s support essentially triggered the dismissal of this aspect of the war’s history. The history of the “White House” and the Omarska camp has been left pending as the physical remnants of the space have not been wholly destroyed, but certainly face extinction without continued support. An annual commemoration is held on August 6th of each year, but access to the physical space is heavily restricted throughout the rest of the year. Such restrictions further impede the victims’ ability to maintain control over the history of this place. Therefore, the decisions surrounding this memorial project have created a version of the past heavily guided by Serb abandonment of the camp’s memory and without recognition of the Bosniak experience.

Women Victims of War Association’s Memorial Plaque, Foča

Since the end of the Bosnian War, additional memorial projects have been firmly rejected from the memorial landscape. Contentions surrounding memorial projects are generally stirred when a project proposes the memorialization of an ethnic, religious or ideological group different than that of the municipal government. Within Prijedor, the “White House” project presented a memorial project centered around Bosniak suffering at the hands of Serb authorities, and thus was rejected by the Serb controlled government. Memorial projects that challenge the conventions of the memorial landscape may face considerable opposition during their development and remain representative of continued divisions between various identities across the country. Resistance to a memorial project is often most present during the initial development stage and may come in the form of local debates, rejection from local politicians or protests. In some cases, opposition to a memorial project in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s memorial

31 In negotiating the sale of the mine, Mittal Steel maintained the controlling 51% share of the venture, while the RS would keep the remaining 49% share of the mining complex. ; Vulliamy, “New Battle Breaks Out Over Serb Death Camp.”
32 Centre for Nonviolent Action, War of Memories, 86.
landscape has been more active. In 2004, the Women Victims of War Association attempted to place a memorial plaque at the local “Partizan” sports center in the eastern town of Foča but was prevented from doing so due to opposition from the Serb controlled local government. This memorial project specifically sought to recognize the sports center’s role in the conflict; Bosniak women were held and raped at the center during the war.

Proposed by a subgroup, the memorial project’s approach was to mark a space of abuse and trauma in order to highlight the sports center’s complete history. According to a news report from 2004 by the Federation News Agency, “This plaque was supposed to be a symbol of remembering the crimes of rape against Bosniak women committed in the said facility in 1992.” However, its placement within the RS rendered this democratized memorial project contentious for it challenged the local understanding of the past. The Serb controlled government, which has maintained authority in the area since the end of the war, explained their rejection of this memorial project by stating that the Women Victims of War Association had not secured the proper permission to establish their project at this site. It seems unlikely that Women Victims of War Association would have received official approval of their memorial project if they had applied for the necessary zoning permit with the local Serb government. Thus, rejection was inevitable for this memorial plaque as it contradicted the community’s memory of the war and so this subgroup proceeded without local support. When attempting to place their memorial plaque, members of the Women Victims of War Association were denied access to the

---

33 Bosnian Serbs Reject Rape Plaque,” BBC World News, October 1, 2004, https://listserv.buffalo.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=JUSTWATCH-L;e264e06a.0410; No images of this memorial project are available as it was not allowed to exist in this space.
35 ‘Women-Victims of War’: Attempt to Lay Memorial-Plaque in Foča.”
36 “Bosnian Serbs Reject Rape Plaque.”
sports center by police and approximately 300 local citizens. After their failed attempt to establish the memorial project, the members of the association placed the plaque and some flowers in a space adjacent to the sports center.

The town’s rejection of this memorial project serves as another example of the general strategy of denial used by Serb authorities in discussing the war. By marking a place of trauma, this memorial project engaged the “never again” rationale in the hopes that the plaque would serve to inform the larger public about the violent truth of this space. This education would then work to discourage future incidents of rape or sexual violence. The active dismissal of the Women Victims of War Association’s memorial plaque further reveals a definitive reaction to traditional memorial projects challenging the memorial landscape. Plaques are generally used to mark a place of importance and provide passersby with relevant information about a site. The Women Victims of War Association utilized this traditional approach to identify the sport center’s significance. In a situation similar to the “White House” memorial project, individuals with connections to the site were and are continually prevented from visiting the space and therefore, cannot sufficiently participate in respective memorialization.

The memorial plaque proposed in Foča wished to memorialize a physical place of trauma, while recognizing the victims’ trauma associated with the space. Although it did not provide an experiential component, the memorial project’s “never again” approach served an educational and empathetic mission by exposing the events that occurred within an otherwise inconspicuous space. Thus, this memorial projected attempted to prevent the occurrence of additional sexual violence or trauma. However, it was pushed from the memorial landscape because its focus on rape victims, location in the RS and narrative about Serb involvement

37 Members of the association were also pelted with rocks and eggs; “Bosnian Serbs Reject Rape Plaque;” “Serbs Forbid Muslim Rape Victims to Place Plaque,” Reuters, October 1, 2004, https://listserv.buffalo.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=JUSTWATCH-L;e435acaa.0410.
38 “Serbs Forbid Muslim Rape Victims to Place Plaque.”
directly contradicted the local history of the Bosnian War presented in Foča’s memorial landscape. Thus, the outright objection to this memorial project by the local Serb government and citizens fully prevented its entry into the town’s memorial landscape and thus, prevented the memorialization of the victims’ trauma and the continuation of the sport center’s history in the larger national memorial landscape.

Tunnel of Hope, Sarajevo

Although more recent memorial projects often face less assertive resistance as they are more removed from the Bosnian War than those developed and constructed during the immediate postwar period, newer “never again” projects reveal that acceptance into the memorial space is heavily reliant on location and the supporting forces. Debates about the responsibility of the war have become subdued only slightly and therefore, memorial projects must still follow the conventions of their respective memorial landscape in order to gather approval and avoid objections. The increasingly familiarity of the “never again” sentiment, due to the more well-known projects at sites like the National September 11 Memorial and Museum in New York City, further establishes projects that utilize educational, experiential or empathetic approaches as admissible throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina’s memorial landscape.39 Most of the recent “never again” projects, however, are located within the FBiH and many are independent projects.40 One of the newest memorial projects to enter Bosnia’s memorial landscape will be the Tunnel of Hope, a combination memorial project and research center to be erected at two ends of the Sarajevo International Airport.

A 2016 competition held by the Memorial Fund of Sarajevo Canton, the Institute for the Protection of Historical Heritage, the Institution of Urban Develop in Sarajevo Canton and the

39 Young, *The Stages of Memory.*
40 The “White House” project is the most well-established (and yet to be realized) “never again” memorial project in the RS. It appears that other “never again” memorial projects that necessitate a firm narrative of the past have not entered into the RS memorial landscape.
Association of Architects B&H sought proposals for a memorial centered around the Siege of Sarajevo. More specifically, the selection committee requested memorial projects that would recognize the 700-meter ‘tunnel D-B,’ which remained the only way to access besieged Sarajevo throughout the Bosnian War. Bosnian architect Sabina Tanović’s Tunnel of Hope was officially selected as the winner of the competition in early 2017 and construction for the project is projected for this next year. Although not clearly stated, funding for the project will most likely come from the four associations comprising the committee responsible for the competition. Tanović’s memorial project proposes two architecturally unique and angular structures that descend deeper into the earth with the entrances peaking above ground level. The structures utilize wood, glass and earthen walls with green roofs. Building D, located on the Dobrinja side of the tunnel, will contain a research center complete with a library, research spaces and an auditorium. The memorial component will be located in the other half of the project in Building B, placed on the Butmir side of the tunnel and will feature temporary and permanent exhibition spaces and a stretch of the original tunnel. Each entrance will also incorporate a glass ‘memory board’ designed to showcase historical images of the scenery during the war. The project seeks to provide a balance between the original components of the space and the new memorial approach.

In constructing this project, Tanović’s main inspiration was “lifted layers of soil” to signify the role of earth in the construction of the original tunnel. The two buildings will

---

43 Zeitoun, “Sabina Tanović Commemorates Sarajevo Siege with ‘Tunnel of Hope’ Memorial Site.”
44 See Appendix B for images of proposed Tunnel of Hope memorial project.
46 Tanović, 3.
47 Tanović, 1.
48 Tanović, “Memorial Museum & Research Center ‘Tunnel of Hope.’”
therefore utilize light, darkness and descent into the earth to further the emphasis on the tunnel and the Siege of Sarajevo. In addition to the temporal aspects of the two structures, this project will utilize educational and experiential components in its memorial approach. The memorial component will use exhibition spaces to provide a history of the tunnel, but this will undoubtedly facilitate a larger narrative of the Bosnian War. Seemingly, such a narrative will contain details about the war that present victims and perpetrators. As a segment of the tunnel will be visible and open, this project will use authentic features to educate visitors about the impact and memory of the war. This experiential space will also encourage visitors to remember the reality of the Siege of Sarajevo. By experiencing the authentic tunnel, visitors will then corroborate the difficult historical circumstances of the siege. The research center will continue this project’s educational effort as visitors can utilize the library to gather additional information about the tunnel and the siege. The Tunnel of Hope’s memorial approach will offer visitors the opportunity to discover information about ‘Tunnel D-B’ through curated exhibition spaces and independent research. Overall, this memorial project will engage visitors with the memory of the tunnel, the siege and the larger conflict through a mostly educational approach.

Constructing a “Never Again” Approach at Sarajevo’s Airport

As this memorial project incorporates both a memorial space and research center to further its educational approach, it remains suggestive of the “never again” rationale.\(^49\) In educating visitors, the Tunnel of Hope aims to sustain the memory of the tunnel and the larger Bosnian War to deter the development of future conflict.\(^50\) It does not directly engage in one ethnic identity over another, but rather attempts to provide an overarching history of the war. Similar to other “never again” memorial projects, the continuation of memory within this memorial project strives to prevent the repetition of similar mistakes. The narrative of the war to

\(^{49}\) Bickford and Sodaro, “Remembering Yesterday to Protect Tomorrow.”

\(^{50}\) Tanović, “Memorial Museum & Research Center ‘Tunnel of Hope,’”
be presented by the *Tunnel of Hope* will dictate the type of memory preserved by this project. As this memorial project was commissioned by a Bosniak led local government and will be situated in a city with a majority Bosnian Muslim population, it will most likely feature a narrative sympathetic to the Bosniak population.\(^{51}\) Although this project has been sanctioned by the local Sarajevan government and not by the national government, its placement at the country’s largest airport may communicate a sense of authority that could translate to the narrative promoted by the memorial approach. As such, this project may receive resistance from various entities including the RS government. Despite its placement within Bosnia’s capital city at a prime location, which may indicate a nation building “rationale of memorializing,” this memorial project remains sourced and supported by the local government and therefore, cannot be considered a national project.\(^{52}\) Nevertheless, potential conflict over the *Tunnel of Hope* could alter the memory presented by this memorial project and infringe upon its larger “never again” goal. The acceptance of this project into the larger Bosnian memorial landscape, however, indicates a shift toward educational memorial projects that encourages a perpetuation of memory.

**Inevitable Opposition**

The examination of a memorial project’s rationale and approach generally helps to reveal an understanding about the type of history allowed to exist within the memorial landscape. An exploration of contentious projects, however, confirms that certain narratives about the past are rejected from the memorial landscape. Bosnia’s absent national narrative and regulation of the memorial space renders all projects subjected to the approval of their local government and community. Therefore, memorial projects not belonging to the same identities as the local

---


52 Bickford and Sodaro, “Remembering Yesterday to Protect Tomorrow.”
government face opposition at all stages of the memorial process. Such resistance appears particularly forceful in response to “never again” projects as the corresponding narrative of the past often contradicts the local government or community’s understanding of the past. Additional opposition is generated when “never again” projects use charged language to further ethnic, religious or ideological divisions or present clearly one-sided narrative of the past.53 Such choices in a memorial project can confuse a larger understanding about the potential of “never again” projects to accomplish their mission of preventing future conflict. Nevertheless, projects that engage in the “never again” approach serve as useful examples in conceptualizing the memorial landscape.

Firmly opposed memorial projects are prevented from establishing their conception of the Bosnian War into the memorial landscape. Therefore, the memorial landscape is colored by local representations of the past that align with the respective majority identities. The RS’s memorial landscape includes many projects in recognition of Serb suffering and sacrifices but tends to reject memorial projects from Bosniak communities as they often challenge the larger denial of the past and Serb involvement in the conflict.54 Consequently, memorial projects in FBiH are largely sympathetic to Bosniak suffering and trauma. This division renders a contradictory memorial landscape clearly representative of the country’s larger political and ideological divisions that have remained since the war. Moreover, this division has allowed for the erasure and denial of certain memories of the war. In the instance of the “White House” memorial project and the memorial plaque in Foća, the memories of the victims may slowly fade away without recognition through a memorial project. Still, the “never again” sentiment remains a

---

53 According to Šaric and Irwin, “Calls for War Memorials Divide Bosnia,” some memorial projects have utilized qualifying language within memorials to incite additional debate and further demonstrate bias. For example, some recent projects state victims were killed in a “beastly” way indicating that those that are responsible for the killing are “beasts.”

54 Centre for Nonviolent Action.
guiding objective for many memorial projects seeking to contend with difficult and traumatic memories of the war. The *Tunnel of Hope* has been approved by the local government in Sarajevo but may still face opposition from outside authorities in the RS due to its distinct and seemingly key placement near the airport. This approval or resistance may also depend on the memorial’s position within the larger divisions through its use of narrative. However, potential agreement between the FBiH and the RS about the yet to be built *Tunnel of Hope* could render this the only memorial project accepted by both entities, which may in turn signal an important move away from divisions in the memorial landscape and disagreements about the national narrative of the past.

The current process of memorialization allows local governments to control what enters the memorial landscape and therefore, projects that dispute the majority’s identities are not allowed to exist and cannot preserve their memories into the foreseeable future. Therefore, the history of the Bosnian War presented in the larger memorial landscape does not include a national consensus about the past. Taken as a whole, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s memorial landscape offers varying versions of the past that often engage in the divisions responsible for the instigation of the conflict. Although traditional approaches such as statues, fountains and cemeteries are still utilized and necessary in the national memorial landscape, more recent projects have explored the varying potentials of memorialization through other non-traditional forms including education centers and museum/gallery hybrids.55 Other memorial projects have utilized online spaces of memory to further their memorial approach and reach a larger

---

55 For an example of a museum/gallery, see Galerija 11/07/95. Opened in 2012 by photographer Tarik Samarah in the capital city of Sarajevo, this memorial project offers a permanent exhibition dedicated to the Srebrenica massacre and includes the Wall of Death (list of victims’ names), a collection of 640 portraits of victims and Samarah’s photography exhibit “Srebrenica – Genocide at the Heart of Europe.” Visitors are asked to view images related to the war, which will hopefully insight an empathetic response, and come to their own conclusions about the conflict. And although it purposefully avoids the introduction of a narrative of the past, it remains a “never again” memorial project due to its firmly stated mission of deviance against all forms of violence. Galerija 11/07/95, “Permanent Exhibition ‘Srebrenica,’” 2015, http://galerija110795.ba/exhibitions/permanent-exhibition-srebrenica/.
Such interjections could effectively challenge the conventions of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s memorial landscape and continued ethnic, religious and ideological divisions.

For an example of an online memorial project, see Ziyah Gafić’s photographic project “Quest for Identity.” This project features everyday objects found in mass graves across the country. In this memorial project, objects such as watches, utensils, combs, toothbrushes and photographs appear frozen against the silver forensic tables. This project was not only published as a physical book, but also exists partially online as a photographic archive and received additional recognition due to Gafić’s TED talk in March 2014. Ziyah Gafić, *Quest for Identity* (New York, NY: de.MO design, 2010), http://www.quest.ba/en/; Karen Frances Eng, “Orphans of the Narrative: Bosnian Photographer Ziyah Gafić Documents the Aftermath of War,” TED Blog, August 22, 2014, https://blog.ted.com/orphans-of-the-narrative-bosnian-photographer-ziyah-gafic-documents-the-aftermath-of-war/.
Conclusion: A Divided Memorial Landscape

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s memorial landscape is perhaps most indicative of the divisions reinforced throughout the Bosnian War and still in existence following the cessation of violence. As the nature of memorialization draws heavily on commonly understood dynamics of power and a consensus about the past, it remains simultaneously at odds with the circumstances of the postwar period. The governmental structure established under the Dayton Peace Agreement produced two politically equal entities with different and often competing notions about the Bosnian War. Subsequently, no national narrative of the past is available for memorial projects to draw on in their engagement of the war. The history presented within memorial projects throughout the larger memorial landscape reflects the respective majority community rather than a national narrative of the Bosnian War. Therefore, memorial projects are often subjected to opposition if their focus does not align with that of the local government and community. Such responses have worked to establish a memorial landscape full of contentious projects. And although certain subjects are occasionally afforded more room in the memorial landscape due to their emphasis on the innocent or other egregious acts, objection to all of the “rationales of memorializing” is one of the clearest characteristics of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s memorial landscape.¹ The memorial projects presented within this project offer individual narratives of the war suggestive of the country’s complex divisions.

The general absence of a national narrative of the war has created space for subgroups throughout the country to propose and construct their own memorial projects. However, as memorial projects face approval or rejection from their respective community, such an arrangement has created room for objection on the local and national level. The current processes

of approval further constrict the type of projects constructed within the memorial space as only a few will receive enough support to be realized in their entirety. Although democratized memorial projects have used a variety of memorial approaches, those that use a traditional memorial approach to emphasize an agreeable topic tend to avoid absolute opposition but are certainly not immune to resistance. The *Bruce Lee Statue* and the *Memorial to the Children Killed in the Siege of Sarajevo 1992-1995* both use a traditional memorial approach, but more importantly highlight topics that received and continue to receive widespread approval from their respective communities.\(^2\) As neither engages in a narrative with a victor and enemy, they have been accepted into their respective memorial landscapes. The traditional memorial approach in the form of statues, fountains, plaques and other symbolic structures has been used in the construction of successful memorial projects throughout Bosnia.

However, a traditional approach does not always guarantee approval. The democratized memorial projects that challenge the conventions of the memorial landscape will undoubtedly encounter various forms of resistance on the local or national level, or both. The *Memorial to Fallen ARBiH Soldiers* in Mostar, a democratized memorial project that utilized a traditional approach in its choice of structure, faced forceful opposition because it disputed the delicate balance of Mostar’s memorial landscape.\(^3\) Additionally, the Women Victims of War Association responded to a gap in the memorial landscape by proposing a democratized memorial in the form of a traditional plaque, but faced active resistance from the community due to their memory. Like other forms of memorials, democratized memorial projects will encounter opposition depending on the history it presents, and the support needed for its approval. The accepted democratized memorials included within this historical project purposefully selected topics to


\(^3\) Anel Jakirović, *Memorial to Fallen ARBiH Soldiers*, Marble Ljiljan, Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2012.
avoid opposition, but projects with more targeted goals of remembering certain aspects of the war will continue to face opposition from those not wishing to remember or recognize such memories.

The intersection between democratized memorial projects and those that serve a public mourning function remains in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s memorial landscape. Many of the public mourning memorial projects were first initiated by subgroups, but often required more formal support from local communities or outside forces in order to be fully realized. As the importance of such memorial projects was seen across the country due to the prevalence of mass killings and mass graves, some of these memorial projects have been granted more room to exist in the memorial landscape. The additional identification function of these projects rendered them increasingly important in the resolution of liminality felt by those missing family members in the postwar period. However, certain public mourning memorial projects wishing to engage in a history of the past disliked by the respective local government have been forced to establish themselves in the face of local and national opposition. Although now well-known within Bosnia and Herzegovina’s memorial space, the *Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery* faced initial opposition similar to that of the “White House” memorial project in Prijedor. Yet, the *Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery* was fully realized because the UN High Representative stepped in to mandate its creation.\(^4\) Without such an intervention from an outside force, the “White House” memorial project has been left unrealized and the continuation of its memory is threatened. Moreover, local subgroups clearly responded to national divisions and the general lack of consensus about the past in the creation of public mourning memorial projects. Tuzla’s *Kapija Massacre Cemetery* is one of the clearest responses to the national circumstances for this memorial project functions as a democratized public mourning space that presented a

---

\(^4\) Carlotta, “For Bosnia’s Bereaved, Solace in a Graveyard.”
counter history to the Bosnian War through its inclusion of all victims without consideration of their respective identities.\(^5\) Although incredibly descriptive of Tuzla’s historical tendencies, this memorial project also demonstrates the potential of memorial projects to respond to divisions in the national landscape but create a successful memorial project that actively avoids contention. The intersection of public mourning memorial projects with other rationales has created some unique memorial projects, but also reveals the ability of such interesting projects to counteract the divisions created by competing national narratives.

The divisions maintained on a national level not only restrict the development of a consensus about the past but translate clearly into Bosnia and Herzegovina’s memorial landscape and have stifled the creation of numerous memorial projects. Each memorial project places itself within or outside the ethnic, religious and ideological divisions in its selection of subject, location and narrative. The continuation of these divisions responsible for the perpetuation of the conflict may result in consequences on a much larger political and humanitarian scale, but the contentious development of memorial projects to the Bosnian War can be understand as symptomatic of this continuation. To a greater extent than the public mourning memorial projects included in this project, the “never again” memorial projects proposed in the postwar period show the prevalent contentions surrounding the memorialization of the past. In order to accomplish their mission of deterring the development of future violence or conflict, “never again” projects construct a narrative of the past that clearly outlines victims and perpetrators. As the entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to disagree on these exact details of the Bosnian War, “never again” projects have spurred considerable opposition when they are proposed. The “White House” educational memorial approach threatened the local government’s conception of the conflict and contradicted the community’s understanding of the Omarska camp. If the site

were to welcome visitors from the local community, the presented narrative would have to fit with the Serb’s denial of the past. In this instance, the “White House” memorial project did not receive enough outside support to be realized and the associated memories remain unsecured for future generations. Opposition surrounding memorial projects and their various approaches have certainly forced certain memories of the Bosnian War out of the memorial landscape.

Despite the educational, experiential or empathetic approach it may take, “never again” memorial projects attempt to preserve a clear history of the Bosnian War in order to inform future generations of the past. And while the national circumstances and continued divisions have prevented the vast development of “never again” memorial projects, newer projects have attempted to engage this sentiment through new approaches. Education centers, such as the one proposed in the Tunnel of Hope, are clearly within the “never again” approach as they aim to inform visitors about the circumstances of the war. However, such efforts may still face opposition depending on their location and aim in the memorial landscape. Although the *Tunnel of Hope* has been formally approved, its placement at the airport provides a sense of weight that RS authorities may not approve of depending on the narrative included in the projects. Independent projects can seemingly avoid rejection from the memorial landscape because they do not rely on government funding or support to be realized. Newer independent memorial projects have also sought to engage in the narrative of the war. Projects such as *Galerija 11/07/95* in Sarajevo and Ziyah Gafić’s photographic project “Quest for Identity” may face opposition from various factions, but such resistance may not be as harmful or prevent their existence. Moreover, recent projects may not be entirely removed from continually present

---

6 Bickford and Sodaro, “Remembering Yesterday to Protect Tomorrow.”
ethnic, political or ideological divisions, but they may still produce new memorial approaches to challenge the prevalence of such divisions in the memorial landscape.

The lack of a national consensus of the Bosnian War has clearly impact Bosnia and Herzegovina’s memorial landscape as subgroups have responded with their own memorial projects. As most memorial projects have some community-led component, the larger memorial landscape is filled with projects representative of community interests and their respective conceptions of the past. However, as subgroups have also come to control the memorial landscape, they have also dictated the type of history made available through memorial landscapes. In the acceptance and rejection of various memorial projects, majority groups are promoting their own conception of the past and simultaneously diminish the experience of the minority communities throughout the country. Therefore, the conventions of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s memorial landscape further national divisions. Situations in which a minority community proposes a memorial project that does not correspond to the majority community’s interests often brew additional conflict. In this way, a cycle has been created in which a lack of national consensus of the past due to governmental divisions has granted subgroups the responsibility of overseeing the memorial landscape, which in turn reinforces divisions regarding the Bosnian War between majority and minority communities throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Seemingly, not enough time has passed to allow for the establishment of a concrete national narrative of the Bosnian War. When considering the memorialization of other atrocities like the Holocaust and the Rwanda genocide, however, length of time is not necessarily descriptive of readiness for the memorialization process. In these other instances, the conflicts

---

9 Auschwitz was almost immediately made into a memorial project in 1947, Dachau concentration camp was officially turned into a memorial project in 2003 and the Kigali Genocide Memorial Centre was opened six years after the formal end of the genocide; Bickford and Sodaro, “Remembering Yesterday to Protect Tomorrow”; Ajdin
ended with a clear understanding of the victors and those at fault for the violence. Following the end of the Bosnian War, the Dayton Peace Agreement negotiated an arrangement between all entities without assigning responsibility for the conflict to one party over the other. This agreement eliminated the opportunity for formal apologies to be rendered between victims and perpetrators. The efforts of the ICTY, however, worked to establish Serb forces as the main instigators of the initial conflict and related ethnic cleansing efforts against the country’s Bosniak population. The Serbian government and various Serb controlled local governments throughout the Republika Srpska have not formally apologized for their role in the Bosnian War or for their clearly documented involvement in the Srebrenica massacre because they have not been forced to by any official governmental mandate. It is important to note that this complex conflict cannot be reduced down into just victims and those responsible; violence was committed by all sides and victims belong to all ethnic, political and ideological identities. Nevertheless, apologies and the recognition of denial can be crucial pieces in the reconciliation process and may additionally support the resolution of trauma. Such efforts can additionally support the development of a consensus about the circumstances of the past and allow for a cohesive national narrative to be formed. However, the conditions and agreements surrounding the end of the war contributed to a complex and difficult reconciliation process that has yet to be fully resolved. In dealing with various political and structural issues created by Bosnia and Herzegovina’s tripartite presidency controlling two autonomous entities, the larger country has failed to respond to the alienation perpetuated by ethnic, religious and ideological divisions. Moreover, Bosnia and Herzegovina

became a formal country immediately following the end of the war. Its history as an independent entity is entirely linked to the Bosnian War; its prewar history does not exist unless you wish to consider its interwoven identity in the former Yugoslavia. As its nation building occurred within a period of conflict, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s identity as an independent nation may not be fully formed and subsequently, it lacks a familiar national narrative that can be drawn on in the memorial landscape.

Memorial projects have been recognized as useful in the resolution of divisions and as a means of reconciliation, but the potential benefit of memorialization has not been utilized in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The process and potential success of memorialization has been immensely delayed by the governmental structure and circumstances implemented by the Dayton Peace Agreement. Potentially, the appropriate length of time has not passed to allow for the establishment of a national consensus of the past. However, it seems there are major issues related to governmental structure, instability and continued divisions that must be addressed before Bosnia and Herzegovina’s memorial landscape will reflect a unified understanding of the conflict. And while this may take more than just the 23 years that have passed since the formal end of the Bosnian War, active efforts by all entities will be required in order to accomplish such a goal.

Contestation has been the main component of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s postwar national memorial landscape. Therefore, considerations of the memorialization of the Bosnian War necessitate a particular emphasis on the projects that do not reconcile the opposition in their development process and thus, are prevented from entering the memorial landscape. It is helpful to consider the various “rationales of memorializing” currently in existence, but also examine

---

how differing memorial approaches support the development of particular memorial projects.\textsuperscript{13} Traditional memorial approaches used within democratized and public mourning memorial projects that highlight unobjectionable subjects tend to persevere various levels of opposition due to their larger goal. Public mourning spaces are not without resistance, but such memorial projects remain imperative in the postwar period due to their practical purpose for those mourning lost loved ones and although some of these projects have eventually been afforded room within the memorial landscape, not all have survived debates over their existence.

Moreover, the purposeful choice to avoid or include contentious topics through a memorial approach does not protect against opposition in this memorial landscape. As such, “never again” memorial projects are still struggling to establish space within the national memorial landscape due to their educational, experiential and empathetic approach. Although “never again” projects are often opposed, such a memorial approach offers to fill the absence of a national consensus by establishing a concrete narrative of the past most descriptive of the project’s organizers, supporters and location. “Never again” memorials projects could serve as an interesting possibility in a memorial landscape scrambling to present a cohesive conception of the Bosnian War due to its various intersections across the “rationales for memorializing.”\textsuperscript{14} The “never again” memorial approach does not only have the potential to interweave with various rationales, but can also incorporate democratized memorials, public mourning space and contentious projects into one larger memorial project. Moreover, a “never again” memorial project to the Bosnian War could also respond to the nation building rationale absent in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s memorial landscape.

The history of the Bosnian War currently presented by Bosnia and Herzegovina’s memorial landscape is one that recognizes the sacrifice of victims, especially if they were

\textsuperscript{13} Bickford and Sodaro, “Remembering Yesterday to Protect Tomorrow.”

\textsuperscript{14} Bickford and Sodaro.
innocent, massacred or belong to the memorial project’s respective majority group. This history further values the memories and experience of victims, but again, only if those memories align with the larger community’s conception of the past. While the history presented in the memorial landscape also highlights the sheer number of individuals who lost their lives, the quantity of active public mourning spaces also indicates that work in the form of identification and reconciliation is still needed across Bosnia and Herzegovina. And although this history does not present a conclusive and linear narrative of the instigation of violence, the victims and the perpetrators, the obvious split between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska differing memorial landscapes clearly demonstrates continued contentions. Perhaps closest to the reality of the conflict’s history, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s memorial landscape leaves a clear picture of complexities that have yet to be examined or resolved. However, the establishment of a national narrative and communal legislative body to oversee the development of memorial projects across Bosnia and Herzegovina’s memorial landscape would signify the start of cooperation between the two entities and subsequently, the memorial landscape may eventually come to reflect the reconciliation of the many divisions truly responsible for the conflict. Bosnia and Herzegovina has yet to formalize a national narrative of the past and therefore, cannot accommodate a unified memorial approach. The various memorial projects included in this historical project highlight and support the continued ethnic, religious, ideological and national divisiveness surrounding the memorialization of the Bosnian War.
Appendix A: Research Questions

For each monument or memorial project, the following research questions are considered:

- Who proposed the memorial project? Who is it for?
- Who or what does it seek to memorialize/commemorate/remember?
- Does it tell a story? What story is told? Does it focus on victims or aggressors?
- Was it approved by the local/national government?
- What other forms of support surround the project?
- How is the memorial project funded?
- What narrative does it seek to promote (national, historical, local, personal)?
- Does the project seek to reconcile trauma? Or does it engage in the reconciliation process?
- Is the memorial project utilized for commemorations or days of remembrance?
- Does it provide a space for grieving or mourning?
- What is the timeframe surrounding the memorial project?
- What memorial approaches and methods are engaged in the project?
  
  Traditional structures (statues, fountains, plaques)
  Cemeteries/gravesites (religious traditions)
  Tactile
  Reconstructions
  Design elements
Appendix B: Memorial Project Images


Fig. 2.2. Memorial to the Children Killed in the Siege of Sarajevo Columns with Names (Photo by Jennifer Boyer, Flickr, June 9, 2011, https://www.flickr.com/photos/jenniferboyer/6043317174).

Fig. 2.3. Memorial to the Children Killed in the Siege of Sarajevo 1992-1995, Footprints (Photo by pyegirl, Trip Advisor, July 5, 2016, https://www.tripadvisor.co.nz/ShowUserReviews-g294450-d10105781-r389310098-Sarajevo_Memorial_for_Children_Killed_during_Siege-Sarajevo_Sarajevo_Canton.html#photos;aggregationId=&albumid=&filter=2&ff=198866754).

Fig. 4.1. Graveyard at the Srebrenica/Potočari memorial center in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Photo by Mazbln, Wikipedia Commons, https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Srebrenica_Graveyard.JPG#file).
Fig. 4.2. Gravestones at the Potočari genocide memorial near Srebrenica (Photo by Michael Büker, Wikipedia Commons, March 18, 2009, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/07/Srebrenica_massacre_memorial_gravestones_2009_1.jpg).

Fig. 5.1. Kapija Cemetery in the Slana Banja Memorial Complex, Tuzla (Photo by Adnan Tinjic, July 6, 2018).
Fig. 5.2. Close up of Rusmir Ponjanić gravestone in the Kapija Cemetery is the Slana Banja Memorial Complex, Tuzla (Photo by Adnan Tinjic, July 6, 2018).

Fig. 6.1. The infamous White House at the Omarska camp, where non-Serb detainees are said to have been tortured and murdered. Survivors commemorate the closing of the camp every August 6. (Photo by Sanda Ullen, Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 2010, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/calls-war-memorials-divide-bosnia).
Fig. 7.1. Building B for Tunnel of Hope Project (Illustration included in Tanović, “Tunnel of Hope” Architectural Plans, 2016, https://designingmemory.com/design/memorial-museum-research-center-tunel-of-hope-sarajevo/).

Fig. 7.2. Building D for Tunnel of Hope Project (Illustration included in Tanović, “Tunnel of Hope” Architectural Plans, 2016, https://designingmemory.com/design/memorial-museum-research-center-tunel-of-hope-sarajevo/).
Fig. 7.3. Exhibition space with entrance to tunnel (Photo included in Tanović, “Tunnel of Hope” Architectural Plans, 2016, https://designingmemory.com/design/memorial-museum-research-center-tunel-of-hope-sarajevo/).

Fig. 8.1. “Wall of Death” at Galerija 11/07/95 in Sarajevo (Photo available through Galerija 11/07/95, “About,” 2015, http://galerija110795.ba/about-gallery-110795/).
Fig. 8.2. Exhibition space inside of Galerija 11/07/95 with wall of portraits (Photo available through Galerija 11/07/95, “About,” 2015, http://galerija110795.ba/about-gallery-110795/).
Bibliography

Primary Sources


https://listserv.buffalo.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=JUSTWATCH-L;e264c06a.0410.


Secondary Sources


