Authority, Structure, and Policy: The Roots of U.S. Occupation in Postwar Germany and Japan

By

Marya R. Shotkoski
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Submitted by

__________________________
Marya R. Shotkoski

Approved by:

__________________________
Laura Prieto (thesis advisor) Zhigang Liu (second reader)
Professor, History/Women’s & Gender Studies Associate Professor, History/Modern Languages and Literatures

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Introduction

During his speech during the first Allied Council Meeting in 1946, General Douglas MacArthur responded to the criticism that some had raised regarding occupational policies. He stated that, “To the peoples of the Allied world I would say . . . that history has given us no precedent of success in a similar military occupation of a defeated nation - - anywhere, at any time – to serve as a guide in reshaping Japan to meet the aims to which we are here solemnly committed.”¹ The way that he presented the occupation of Japan, as something that has not been successfully been done before can be misleading. The United States had occupied countries prior to Japan and those occupations provided context for the U.S. occupation of Japan.

I began to examine the U.S. occupation of Japan during my undergraduate history studies and continued studying it at Simmons College. It was during a history seminar at Simmons that I discovered links between the occupations of Germany and Japan with previous U.S. occupied countries. These connections between U.S. occupations have not been discussed to the extent of my knowledge, and the lack of scholarship only generated more interest on my part. I was curious about the impact that prior U.S. occupations had had on the occupations of Germany and Japan.

U.S. occupations have typically been studied as singular events rather than as part of a larger historical context. Quite often, such as in the case of Japan, the scholarship has focused on the reforms that the United States implemented. The scholarship regarding the occupation of Germany, primarily, focuses on the policies and structures that the U.S. utilized in their zones of occupation. The occupations that the United States has either lead or been a part of are not

¹ Verbatim Minutes of the First Meeting Allied Council for Japan Meiji Building, Tokyo, Friday, 5 April 1946 at 10:00 AM; Folder 092.32 Verbatim Minutes 2a-417-1a-45, pg. 3-4; Records of the United States Element, Allied Council for Japan; General Records, 1945-1952; Records of International Conferences, Commissions And Expositions 43; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
singular events that occurred within a vacuum, rather they are events that need to be examined as whole to fully understand the influences and contexts of U.S. occupations.

U.S. occupations have changed from Cuba to Haiti and then from Germany and Japan, which demonstrate connections and important comparisons to previous occupations. I have not been able to find documented evidence indicating this; however, this silence is significant and the observable changes in how the U.S. occupies a country are evidence of this. For example, it is evidenced through changes in the government structure, such as in the first occupation of Cuba (1898-1902), a direct government structure was used. And in the 1915-1934 occupation of Haiti an indirect government structure was utilized with a noticeable American presence. And during the occupation of Germany and Japan an indirect governmental structure was used without a noticeable American presence.

Typically, an occupation by the United States of another country began militarily and eventually would shift more towards an economic and political model. The U.S. occupations of Germany and Japan follow the pattern of previous occupations. This thesis places American occupations within this historical context. It examines the similarities and differences that have occurred during the history of the United States occupying foreign countries, to better understand how previous experiences may have influenced the occupations of Germany and Japan after World War II.

Documents such as the Platt Amendment, the Teller Amendment and the Potsdam Declaration are examples of the documents that established the parameters for American policymakers regarding the U.S. occupations of other countries. These documents provided the framework for American policymakers to create policies and directives regarding the situation in
the occupied country. In many instances there are documents that establish the guidelines for American policymakers to create their occupation models and policies.

The previous countries that I examined that were under U.S. occupations are: Cuba, the Philippines and Haiti. While there have been other countries occupied by the United States I have selected these three countries to allow a better focus on the connections to Germany and Japan. By examining the changes and alterations that were made through prior occupations, the contexts and influences can be seen within the occupations of Germany and Japan. In addition, I have selected these countries due to the available scholarship regarding the U.S. occupation of that country.

**Historiography**

Much of the early scholarship on Japan and Germany was written by scholars other than historians. But the scholarship regarding occupations of other countries was pioneered by historians and they continue to dominate the field. Studies of American occupations have focused on five areas of inquiry: foreign relations, economic and policy decisions, the cultural and social influences, American imperialistic goals, and Cold War origin studies. The scholarship regarding countries occupied by the United States prior to Japan and Germany fits within the fields of inquiry that focus on economic and policy decisions, cultural and social influences, and American imperialistic goals. It was not until the 1990s that the scholarship began to discuss the cultural and social influences of the occupations of Japan and Germany, due in part to the “cultural turn” of historical methodologies of the time.

The scholarship initially written regarding U.S. occupations of other countries was focused on foreign relations. The earliest work regarding this area of inquiry is *An Affair of*
Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz from 1962 by Robert E. Quirk, which focuses on foreign policy, Woodrow Wilson and his decisions as president. Another work from this time is Allan Reed Millet’s The Politics of Intervention: The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906-1909 (1968) which focuses on the economy of Cuba and how it could affect the United States. Both authors discuss the implications of U.S. foreign policy in other countries, especially while under occupation. In addition, to how the Cuba occupation continued to inform U.S. foreign policy in Latin America.

In the 1970s, the scholarship began to turn away from foreign relations to the economic and policy decisions that were made during occupations, such as in Occupied Haiti by Emily Greene Balch from 1972. Balch was a professor of economics and sociology. This work was based on Balch’s visit to occupied Haiti and within it she recommended policies that the United States government should adopt towards Haiti. She states that in view of U.S. interests there was little justification for the continuance of the occupation. She recommended the restoration of independence and self-government by using interim provisions such as appointing a commission for the transition and having elections at the earliest date possible. Occupied Haiti created a bridge from the scholarship of the 1960s to the 1980s, when scholars shifted their focus toward the cultural and social impact of occupation upon the occupied people. By the 1990s and 2000s,
the scholarship primarily identified U.S. occupation goals as imperialistic. Mary Renda, for example, examines how the U.S. occupation of Haiti positioned U.S. men and how did those men negotiated their relationship to the nation that they were sent to occupy.

Yet, these projects continue to examine American occupied countries as singular events, without placing each one within the context of U.S. occupations. The occupations of Cuba, the Philippines, and Haiti are the best studied. The scholarship about the Cuban occupation began in 1968 with *The Politics of Intervention: The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906-1909* by Allan Reed Millett and has continued up to Marial Iglesias Utset’s *A Cultural History of Cuba during the U.S. Occupation 1898-1902* (2011). The scholarship about occupied Haiti began in 1995 with *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934* by Hans Schmidt and continues up to Mary A. Renda’s *Taking Haiti: Military Occupation & The Culture of U.S. Imperialism 1915-1940* (2001). For the Philippines the scholarship begins with the 1912 primary resource *The American Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912* by James Blount. The scholarship continues with Stanley Karnow’s work *In Our Image America’s Empire in the Philippines* (1989) and Paul A. Kramer’s work *The Blood of Government Race, Empire, the United States*

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Research on occupations of other countries, such as Veracruz and Nicaragua, has been less rich and consistent.

The scholarship for both Japan and Germany, initially, was written by scholars outside of the field of academia. Many of the scholars were journalists, political scientists, or worked for the military in various positions. Scholarship focusing on the occupation of Japan began in 1960 with Kazuo Kawai’s work *Japan’s American Interlude*. The author was educated in the United States as a political scientist and journalist. Like other early works about the Japanese occupation, it is largely narrative. Theodore Cohen’s work *Encounter with Japan* (1982) is also narrative driven, incorporating aspects of economic and policy decisions. Works such as Cohen’s attempt to argue that Japan’s economic reforms were similar to the American New Deal and the United States role in this economic miracle in Japan. Works similar to Kawai’s utilize a bottom up approach and focus on the influences that the U.S. occupation was having on the people of Japan.

Occupation scholarship did not initially focus on the Cold War and it was not until Michael Schaller’s *The American occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* in 1985 that it did. In other disciplines, such as political science, the U.S. occupation of Japan occasionally enters the scholarship, especially regarding the shifts that occurred in occupied Japan due to the possible effects regarding American worry about the spread of communism. This typically falls into the scholarship that discusses the ‘reverse course’ in Japan, which is not pertinent to this scholarship.

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In the beginning of occupation scholarship, regarding Japan, it focused on American involvement and the changes that the country underwent. In 1989, Howard Schonberger, one of the first historians to write on the Japanese occupation, identified three strains within the American scholarship—the Conservative, Progressive and New Left. The three strains have continued to mark the field, although the scholarship has begun to focus on the reforms through the eye of the occupied. The scholarship has typically stayed in established fields, simply evolving in different directions from the original fields of scholarship.

The scholarship about occupied Germany initially focused on the economic and policy decisions that were made. One of the first works about occupied Germany was *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949* by historian John Gimbel in 1968. Works like Gimbel’s, attempt to explain and argue that the United States occupation politics and use of the military was a good method to utilize for the occupation, especially compared to what the other Allied Powers were attempting. Early scholarship regarding Germany tended to be focused on economic and policy decisions within the occupation. The work by Gimbel is often quoted and referred to in other occupation scholarship, making it a preeminent source in the literature. Early scholarship regarding Germany and Japan had differences in focus and arguments, due to the background and focus of the scholars or academics who were writing.

During the 1980s, there was an increase in the scholarship surrounding the occupation of Germany and Japan. Many of the authors were journalists, political scientists, or employed by the military in various positions. Since many of the scholars that produced works in the 1980s

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were not historians, the focus remained centered on the economic and policy decisions area of inquiry within the scholarship, without considering the larger historical context.

Scholars continued to focus on economic and policy decisions in the 1980s, such as in *Occupation Diplomacy: Britain, the United States and Japan, 1945-1952* by Roger Buckley (1982). Buckley argues that Britain made important contributions to the occupation of Japan even with the occupation being American led. The work focuses largely on the policies and the reforms that occurred in occupied Japan from a British viewpoint. To date this work is the only one that examines another country’s contributions and viewpoints regarding the Japanese occupation.

It’s during the 1980s that the scholarship started to shift from the occupation of Germany to the occupation of Japan. This could be due to the fact that the German occupation was viewed as simply rebuilding Germany, whereas the Japanese occupation was viewed as rebuilding and reshaping Japan. In Germany, it was a European country that had to be rebuilt and shifted into a democracy. Whereas in Japan, it was a vastly different country from the United States, while under a monarchy that some believed needed be reconstructed as a democracy in every fashion.

The historian based scholarship surged during the 1990s, focusing mostly on the cultural and social influences within the areas of inquiry. This can be linked back to the cultural turn since much of the occupation scholarship during the 1990s became focused on the cultural and social effects within occupied Japan. In addition, the scholarship continued to focus more on the occupation of Japan with little scholarship focusing on occupied Germany. The American occupation of Japan reshaped the cultural and social fabric of the Japanese people, making the occupation a prime candidate for scrutiny after the cultural turn.

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22 Roger Buckley, *Occupation Diplomacy Britain, the United States and Japan 1945-1952*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
John Dower’s *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (1999)\(^{23}\) is a preeminent work regarding the American occupation of Japan from the 1990s. The work has a bottom up focus, with a Japanese viewpoint of the American occupation. It also focuses on the occupation reforms, other American actions that occurred, and how it affected the Japanese people. Dower has utilized both American and Japanese sources to create his narrative of Japan following its defeat at the end of World War Two. He combined his work with the postwar financial history project and colleagues such Sodei Rinjiro, General MacArthur’s Japanese biographer.\(^{24}\) Dower also argues against many of the arguments that were made in the early scholarship regarding Japan, by focusing on the social and cultural developments as well as popular consciousness, stating that he has tried to capture a sense of what it meant to start over in a ruined world by recovering the voices of people at all levels of society.\(^{25}\)

Little scholarship regarding the occupation of Germany was written in the 1990s apart from Rebecca L. Boehling’s *A Question of Priorities: Democratic Reforms and economic recovery in postwar Germany* (1996).\(^{26}\) Its focus is on the cities of Frankfurt, Munich and Stuttgart, specifically the policies that were implemented at the city level. The work provides a bottom up approach to the policies that were implemented in occupied Germany. She chose the local level to examine the interplay of expectations, plans, and hopes on one hand, and political and cultural contrasts, on the other. Her approach shows that both American and German motives and activities were different on the local level from the government or national level.\(^{27}\)

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The scholarship regarding the occupation of Germany continued to examine the economic and policy decisions that occurred in the 1990s. This could be due to the lingering belief that occupied Germany did not undergo similar cultural and social changes as did Japan while under U.S. occupation.

After the mid-2000s scholars outside of academia began to produce more studies of the Japanese occupation once again. Many were political scientists or involved in the United States military in various positions. Their scholarship regarding the Japanese occupation continues to be focused on cultural and social influences, like historians’ work since the 1990s.

From the 2000s, the foremost scholarship about the Japanese occupation is the work by Takemae Eiji, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation and Its Legacy* from 2002.28 Takemae Eiji is a political scientist and Professor Emeritus at Tokyo Keizai University. The doyen of Occupational scholarship in Japan, he has written numerous pioneering studies of the early postwar era. The work is largely a narrative of the reforms that transformed Japan and of the men and women, both Japanese and American, who implemented them. It is a great blend of post-war Japanese and Western scholarship which provides a complete account of the occupation from its achievements to its failures.

In the 2000s, the scholarship about occupied Germany turned to cultural and social influences that occurred. Giles MacDonogh’s work *After the Reich: The Brutal History of the Allied Occupation* (2007) is one example.29 MacDonogh is a British writer, historian and translator and has worked as a journalist. His research expertise is central Europe, principally Germany. The work focuses on the experience of the Germans in defeat and to a certain extent it is a study in resignation, an account of their acceptance of any form of indignity in the

knowledge of the great wrongs perpetrated by the National Socialist State. He has utilized individual accounts as much as possible, many from women.\textsuperscript{30} However, it appears that his methods are not truly historical due to the unbalanced critique of the Allied Command Headquarters, which makes the work appear less scholarly and academic. As evidenced by his statement that he realized that it was impossible to make any sense of what was happening in Germany without reference to what was taking place on Mount Olympus: the Allied Command Headquarters and the political forces behind them.\textsuperscript{31} A historical work would take on a more neutral position without bringing personal biases or beliefs into the work.

The scholarship in the early 2000s regarding occupation thus continues to focus on the cultural and social influences upon occupied Germany and Japan, however it has shifted from historians to other scholars. The early scholarship written by others has continued to be revisited and reshaped alongside the scholarship written by historians. The occupation scholarship has shifted to include different areas of inquiry in response to changes in historical focus and new methods of analyzing the occupations of Germany and Japan.

Overall, the scholarship regarding United States occupations looks at single occupations, in isolation from other occupations. Although there appears to be a shift occurring that is examining Japan and Germany under U.S. occupation, however, it is still focused on the reforms that took place. Such as the Masako Shibata work \textit{Japan and Germany under the U.S. Occupation: A Comparative Analysis of Post-War Education Reform} (2005).\textsuperscript{32} This book, while a step forward, only examines post-war Japan and Germany through the education reforms that

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{31} Giles MacDonogh, \textit{After the Reich: The Brutal History of the Allied Occupation}, (New York, N.Y.: Basic Books, 2007), \url{http://tinyurl.com/pa2msog}, preface.
  \item \textsuperscript{32} Masako Shibata, \textit{Japan and Germany under the U.S. Occupation: A Comparative Analysis of Post-War Education Reform}, (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005).
\end{itemize}
occurred. A productive, new direction in the occupation scholarship would be to start considering how these different occupations are connected over time.

Methods and Sources

I am primarily utilizing government records from the National Archives at College Park to examine the occupation of Japan and Germany. The majority of the records are either policies or directives that were written regarding the Japanese and German occupations from the period of roughly 1944 to 1948. I use these documents to examine how the policymakers were making occupation polices, not only to trace the policies’ implementation but also to better understand policymakers’ motivations and whether they refer to prior occupations. These sources show that policymakers produced a large amount of discussion and directives regarding Germany and Japan following World War II. The sources that I examined do not make any explicit connections or references to previous U.S. occupations. The policies that show references typically are referring back to either surrender terms or the Potsdam Declaration. But regardless of whether American policymakers officially acknowledged it or not, similar models of occupation which characterized earlier U.S. occupations, were utilized in Japan and Germany with refinements and adjustments made. For example, an indirect governmental model was used in the occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934. In addition to the focus on economic objectives, the U.S. emphasized democratic reforms within the occupied country.

The two main chapters of the thesis focus on Japan and Germany, respectively. The first chapter discusses the American occupation of Germany divided into three main topics: authority for the occupation, the organization or structure that was planned and the policies and directives. Within each of these topics I compare the similarities and differences between previous U.S.
occupations and the occupation of Germany. The occupation of Germany appears to have substantial similarities to previous U.S. occupations of other countries such as Haiti, Cuba and the Philippines. The biggest similarities are the indirect government structure that was used following a direct military government, in addition to the basis of authority being partly founded on the rights of a conquering power. One main difference between Germany’s occupation and that of other countries is the amount and duration of planning that was involved for Germany. The planning for post-war Germany began in 1944, almost a year prior to the documented planning that began for post-war Japan.

The second chapter discusses the American occupation of Japan divided into the same main topics. Within each of these topics there is also a comparison at the end to highlight the similarities and differences between previous U.S. occupations and Japan. The occupation of Japan appears to have similarities with previous occupations as well, such as indirect government following a direct military government, the shifting of one government structure into a democracy and the basis of authority largely based on the rights of a conquering power when compared to the U.S. occupation of Haiti, Cuba, and the Philippines. One significant difference between Japan and prior countries is how the model of the indirect government was utilized there. In occupied Japan, U.S. occupiers almost completely faded into the background whereas in other U.S. occupations the American presence was more noticeable. A second significant difference was the smaller number of policies that were created for Japan, when compared to the number that was produced for Germany.
CHAPTER ONE: U.S. Occupation of Germany 1945-1952

American military planners prepared for the country’s involvement in World War II prior to the United States’ official entry into the war. Between January 29th to March 27th, 1941, British and U.S. military planners met secretly in Washington and established a number of fundamental strategic principles that were to guide the coalition throughout the war. In addition, before the defeat of Germany there were several official conversations and policy decisions made regarding what would occur in Germany after defeat or surrender. Those decisions were made at conferences like the Three-Power Conference held in Moscow in September 1941, the Allied Cairo Conference, codenamed Sextant, held from 23 to 26 November and 3 to 7 December 1943, and Argonaut, codename for the Allied Conference at Yalta in 1945.

These meetings considered what would occur in Germany once they surrendered or were defeated. There was a wide consensus that the Treaty of Versailles had been too punitive and created the conditions after WWI that allowed Hitler to come into power, especially in that the economy was not allowed to grow or recover. The postwar actions of the Allies after World War II were geared to prevent a similar situation. The United States focused instead on rebuilding the German economy to help ensure it would become a successful member of the community of nations. The organizational structures and policies that were created for occupied Germany were geared toward restructuring the country through democracy and the economy.

In the United States’ plan for restructuring Germany, especially with regard to the economic rehabilitation, there are similarities to previous occupation models. The occupation utilized an indirect governmental structure in Germany as in previous U.S. occupations, such as

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in Haiti. In prior occupations, the United States came to favor an indirect government structure over a direct structure.

**Authority**

American policymakers discussed the Allied Powers’ rights of occupation within Germany in *General Order No. 2* (1944). This general order states that acting in the interests of the United Nations, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics “have the right to occupy with any forces at their disposal and in any way or manner they may deem appropriate, any or all parts of Germany, and to exercise throughout all or any part of the country, all the rights of an Occupying Power, in addition to all other rights arising under the provisions of the Instrument of Surrender and Acknowledgement of Unconditional Surrender.”35 Within this order the Allied Powers had been given the instruction, by their policymakers, stating that they could occupy their zones of Germany as they deemed fit, allowing a broad range of occupation methods and tactics that were unique to each Allied country.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff”s design for the military government for the U.S. zones established a wide range of responsibilities for the Supreme Commander. For example, a Directive for the Military Government in Germany in 1944 provided the Supreme Commander with “supreme legislative, executive, and judicial authority and power in the areas occupied by forces under your command.”36 Orders and directives such as these, issued prior to the defeat or

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36 Directive For Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender C.C.S. 551 17 April 1944, Enclosure Draft Directive For Military Government In Germany Prior to Defeat Or Surrender; Foreign (Occupied) Area Reports
surrender of Germany, aided in the foundation of the rights of a conquering power. In addition, such directives and orders helped to ensure that all involved understood their rights as occupiers and what types of authority the American forces would have initially before the official occupation began after the military occupation ended in 1946.

In addition, the U.S. created discussions and polices in regards to the type of government that was to be created prior to the defeat or surrender of Germany. The Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S.) directive from 17 April, 1944 stated the “Military government will be established and will extend over all parts of Germany, including Austria, progressively as the forces under your command capture German territory.”37 The military government evolved piecemeal as territory was captured, rather than being instituted as whole. This was due to the ongoing military campaign making it very difficult to establish a centralized occupation authority until the major military campaigns were finished. The major military campaigns began in 1945 with the invasion and continued as the Allied Powers advanced towards Germany. The majority of the campaigns were finished by 1946 and the focus shifted to the military government in Germany.

The Supreme Commander (General Dwight D. Eisenhower) was responsible for the establishment of the initial military government for Germany. An interim directive for the Military Government of Germany from 9 November 1944 to Supreme Headquarters ordered that the “Military Government will be established by you (Supreme Commander) immediately on the occupation by your forces of any part of German territory.”38 The military government that was established within the existing structure helped pave the way for the creation of the occupational

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37 Directive For Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender C.C.S. 551 17 April 1944, Enclosure Draft Directive For Military Government In Germany Prior to Defeat Or Surrender; Foreign (Occupied) Area Reports 1945-54 pg. 1; (The Adjutant General’s Office) Administrative Services Division Operations Branch, RG 94.  
38 Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Office of the Chief of Staff, AG 0141.1-1 (Germany)GE-AGH, 9 November 1944; Folder 3: Military Govt of Germany Interim Directives for; General Correspondence, 1944-45 pg. 1; Records of U.S. Occupation Headquarters, WWII RG 260; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
governmental structure instead of having to create a new structure following the collapse of the
Nazi government.

The initial phase of the occupation was to be based upon the right of conquering power as
designed from initial directives and policies. A directive to SCAEF (Supreme Commander Allied
Expeditionary Force) from 1944 stated that “Germany will not be occupied for the purpose of
liberation but as a defeated enemy nation. The clear fact of German military defeat and the
inevitable consequences of aggression must be appreciated by all levels of the German
population.”39 The U.S. was not in Germany to help a liberated nation; rather they were there to
impress upon the German population the error of the ways under the Nazi government. The U.S.
believed in the collective guilt of the people of Germany and wanted to make sure that the entire
populace understood their guilt. General Eisenhower made this clear to the German people when
he issued Proclamation No. 1 as Allied Forces entered Germany in 1945. Stating, “We come as
conquerors, but not as oppressors.”40 General Eisenhower, through his first proclamation,
established that the United States military came to conquer Germany. However, it was not the
United States’ desire to oppress the German people. Germany was a defeated nation, however,
the United States was not there to rule; rather they were there to redirect the nation to a liberal-
capitalist democracy.

After the collapse of Germany, the United States based its occupation on the surrender
terms and the right of a conquering power as per previous directives and official polices. The
initial organization plan from the Office of Military Government for Germany from 5 December,

39 Combined Civil AFE IRS Committee C.C.A.C 119/4, 6 October 1944, Enclosure Directive To SCAEF Regarding the
Military Government Of Germany In The Period Immediately Following The Cessation Of Organized Resistance
(Post-Defeat); G-5 Div., SHAEF, Development of Policy for Germany (Oct. ’44 from Aug ’44), pg. 2; Historical
Division-Program Files-SHAEF; Records: Military Government, 1944-46; Headquarters, European Theater of
40 Military Government – Germany, Supreme Commander’s Area of Control, Proclamation No. 1; Folder 22 J.C.S.
Memo and U.S. Delegation Proposal; Records of the U.S. Group Control Council (Germany) (USGCC); Records of
United States Occupation Headquarters, World War II RG 260; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
1945 stated that the authority was based upon several sources: the Potsdam Agreements, from 2 August 1945; the European Advisory Commission Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany from 14 November 1944; the United States Theater Organization Plan, Ag 322 GET-AGO, Headquarters, U.S. Forces, European Theater, from 20 September 1945; and the Directive “Organization of Military Government,” AG 014.1 GEC-AGO, Headquarters, United States Forces, European Theater, from 26 September 1945. These documents laid the foundation for the U.S. occupation government of Germany, even with the current military government in place.

It was generally accepted by the Allied Powers that Germany would be divided into American, British and Russian zones of occupation, with an area embracing Berlin occupied by forces of all three powers, and that a tripartite commission or council would be set up in Berlin under the supreme control of three high-ranking military commanders appointed by the governments of the United States, United Kingdom and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respectively. Prior to the surrender of Germany, the Allied Powers had discussed plans for the division of Germany during the Yalta Conference, as evidenced by this policy. This was crucial information to have determined before entering Germany, to prevent the seizing of territory and arguments over control of captured territory.

The Plan for Operation of Military Government from 7 September 1944 outlined the military government for the forces under the command of the Supreme Commander Expeditionary Force. It discussed how “The existing civil administration, judicial and law

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41 Organization Plan Office Of Military Government For Germany (U.S.) And Office Of Military Government (U.S. Zone); Foreign (Occupied) Area Reports 1945-54; Special, Germany (U.S. Zone The Adjutant General’s Office Administrative Services Division Operations Branch, RG 94; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
42 Higher Policy for Military Government in Germany Appendix, 15 August 1944 to 15 October 1944; G-5 Div., SHAEF, Development of Policy for Germany (Oct. ’44, from Aug. ’44); Historical Division-Program Files; SHAEF, pg. 5; Records: Military Government, 1944-46; Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (World War II); National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
enforcement structure will be utilized to the fullest extent possible. Military Government will be effected as a general principle through indirect rule.”

Rather than creating a new governmental structure, the U.S. decided to use the existing structure in Germany. This allowed the U.S. to focus on creating a liberal-capitalist democracy in Germany, through changes in the political environment and the Germany economy.

The authority of the military governor of Germany was similar to what any head of state would have during that period of time. A directive to the Commander-In-Chief of U.S. Forces of occupation from 1947 states that “Your authority as Military Governor will be broadly construed and empowers you to take action consistent with relevant international agreements, general foreign policies of this Government and with this directive, appropriate or desirable to attain your Government’s objectives in Germany or to meet military exigencies.”

The Military Governor of the United States zone of occupation was given full authority to run the German government through directives from the United States policymakers. If a situation did arise that needed immediate action, the military governor could act without consulting U.S. policymakers prior.

With the basis of authority stemming from the surrender terms for Germany, U.S. policymakers had the liberty to interpret that authority as they wished, as long as the surrender terms and objectives were met. This allowed the policymakers to structure the occupation of Germany based upon preceding occupation models that were utilized previously. The surrender terms were broad enough to allow the United States to interpret and shape the authority for the

43 Annex IV, Section 1 Political and General; First Army G-5 Section Military Gov’t in Germany #2 1944; Instructions and Directives Concerning the Military Occupation of Germany, 1944-1944, pg. 54; Records of U.S. Army Operational, Tactical & Support Organizations (World War II And Thereafter) RG 338; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

44 Department of State, For The Press July 15, 1947 No. 582, Directive; Foreign (Occupied) Area Reports 1945-54; Special, Germany (U.S. Zone) pg.2; The Adjutant General’s Office Administrative Services Divisions Operations Branch RG 94; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
occupation to support their choice of occupation model. This occupation model for Germany echoed earlier United States occupations in various ways, especially through the use of an indirect government.

The U.S. used a larger number of policies to structure the occupation of Germany than it had in previous occupations. Previous occupations relied more on broad American foreign relations policies; amendments and policies (such as in Cuba), and/or the right of a conquering power, as in the Philippines. The right of a conquering power changes the entire character of an occupation. An occupation based on the rights of a conquering power proceeds differently than an occupation stemming from intervention. Typically when an occupation begins following an intervention or invasion, there are prearranged parameters predetermined parameters, such as The Hague Regulations and Geneva Conventions, which characterize the occupation. The opposite usually occurs when occupation begins based on the right of a conquering power, due to a lack of predetermined guidelines. In such a case, the occupying power determines the guidelines and objectives that are to be met during the occupation of the conquered country or territory.

During the 1890s the United States became concerned over how Spain was exercising its power in its colony, Cuba. In 1895, Cubans had launched a new war for independence from Spain, and Spain had adopted a policy of “reconcentration.” This was a series of decrees ordering the rural population to relocate to designated fortified towns.45 In 1898, the U.S. battleship Maine exploded in Havana harbor and while the Spanish denied any involvement, the incident became a battle cry for many Americans. At first, President William McKinley tried to avoid war with Spain by offering to purchase Cuba, however Spain rejected that course of action.

The Congress of the United States approved a declaration of war against Spain on April 25, 1898.\footnote{The World Book Encyclopedia, \textit{Spanish-American War} (Chicago, IL: World Book Inc, 2014), 753.}

After the Spanish-American War ended, the United States gained control over the former Spanish possessions of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines. The Treaty of Paris, signed by the United States and Spain on 10 December, 1898, officially ended the war. Under the treaty, Spain gave up its claim to Cuba, and handed over Guam, Puerto Rico and the Philippines to the United States. The United States then paid Spain $20 million for the Philippine Islands. Although both the Philippines and Cuba sought independence, the McKinley administration made the decision to retain control of the island and archipelago. The administration’s reasons included a desire to expand the power of the United States and to “uplift” and “civilize” other peoples.\footnote{The World Book Encyclopedia, \textit{Spanish-American War, Results of the War} (Chicago, IL: World Book Inc, 2014), 754.}

The basis for the occupation of Cuba was founded in documentation, such as the Teller and Platt Amendments. Historian Louis Perez, for example, states that “The U.S. purpose in Cuba, as explained by President McKinley, consisted of a forcible intervention . . . as a neutral power to stop the war. ‘Neutral intervention’ offered a means through which to establish, by virtue of military conquest, U.S. claims of sovereignty over Cuba.” However, some members of Congress wished to have recognition of Cuba independence and McKinley accepted a compromise, the Teller Amendment. The Teller Amendment specified that the U.S. did not have any intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over Cuba except for pacification and when that was accomplished to leave the government of the island to its people.\footnote{Louis A. Perez, \textit{Cuba Under the Platt Amendment, 1902-1934}, (Pittsburgh, PA.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986), 30.}

While the U.S. could also utilize the right of a conquering power in Cuba, the Teller and Platt Amendment placed limitations on United States sovereignty there. These amendments,
especially the Platt amendment, created the platform for future U.S. intervention in Cuba following the Spanish American War. As historian Allan Reed Millet states in *Politics of Intervention* in 1906 Theodore Roosevelt, citing his responsibilities to Cuba under the Platt Amendment, intervened and reluctantly assumed direct control of the Cuban government.\(^49\) The United States occupied Cuba for a second time from 1906 to 1909 citing the political upheaval that occurring in Cuba as the reason for U.S. intervention. Under the Platt Amendment the United States was given an avenue to intervene in Cuba should the need arise after the first U.S. occupation.

In the Philippines, the Treaty of Paris of 1898 was partly the basis for authority, although the occupation began based more on the rights of a conquering power. In James H. Blount’s work he stated that “With the signature of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain by their respective representatives at Paris and the result of the victories of American arms, the future control, disposition, and government of the Philippine Islands are ceded to the United States.”\(^50\) The basis for the authority of the occupation of the Philippines, as an outcome of the Spanish American War, is founded in various treaties and upon the rights of a conquering power. In addition, since the rights of sovereignty were ceded to the United States by Spain, the U.S. had no restrictions placed on their decisions regarding the Philippines.

Regarding authority, the German occupation initially resembled the Philippines the most. When the United States, as part of the Allied Powers, first entered Germany they occupied territory that they had seized based upon the rights of conquerors. However, after Germany formally surrendered in 1945, the basis of authority shifted to becoming based on the surrender


terms, which bears more similarities with the occupation of Cuba. The U.S. occupation of Cuba was based upon documents such as the Teller and Platt Amendments that provided guidelines for the models that were to be used in addition to occupation objectives that needed to be met prior to the ending of the occupation. The surrender terms for Germany served a similar function as the Teller and Platt Amendments did for Cuba.

In countries like Cuba and the Philippines the United States occupation occurred during the transition of colonial rule of those countries, which diversified the basis of authority there. Louis Perez in *Cuba Under the Platt Amendment* discusses how the U.S. had early on pronounced its claim to imperial succession in the Caribbean and the acquisition of Cuba was envisaged as an act of colonial continuity. After Cuba was ceded by Spain to the United States, there was a legal assumption of sovereignty over a territorial possession that was presumed incapable of separate nationhood by some Americans.51

The governmental structure that was used for the occupation of Germany also bears similarities to previous U.S. occupations. In Germany, the U.S. reused methods it had used earlier in occupied countries, such as Haiti. The United States invaded Haiti on 15 July, 1915 due to the political upheaval that was occurring within the country. The United States claimed that occupation was necessary to prevent intervention, in particular by Germany.52 The Haitian-American Treaty of September 1915 provided that the U.S. would establish and train a Haitian gendarmerie in the country. The practice of developing an American controlled native force had been used previously in Cuba and Puerto Rico.53 The U.S. appears to have partly based its occupation authority in Haiti upon the Haitian-American Treaty, in addition to the rights of a

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conquering power for the occupation of Haiti. The indirect governmental structure that was used in Germany following surrender resembles the structure that was primarily utilized in Haiti.

The occupation of Germany bears similarities to prior U.S. occupied countries due to the shifting and growing occupation models and theories that were employed by U.S. policymakers. Since the authority for the occupation of Germany underwent shifts, this represents the forward motion regarding U.S. occupation models and theories. There are a limited number of circumstances that precede an occupation, thus the shifts that U.S. occupations have undergone demonstrate a clear pattern in the way that authority was handled during the occupation of Germany. The occupation of Germany bears similarities to each of the prior U.S. occupations that have been discussed. However, one big change that occurred was the noticeable shift in the basis of authority in Germany. A second large change was the decision by the Allied Powers to share the occupational authority over Germany by dividing the country into different zones of occupation. The occupation authority for Germany suggests that the U.S. was applying lessons learned from its prior occupations.

**Organization and structure**

The occupation of Germany following World War II occurred in several phases. The initial occupation model was based primarily upon the military conquest of an area or territory. As stated in the *Plan for Operation of Military Government*, “Until it is possible to establish Military Districts, Military Government will be carried out on an ad hoc basis in accordance with the tactical areas of command, and Military Government operations will be the responsibility of
each military Commander in the areas occupied by his forces."54 Since the military was still involved in active combat there was no definite way to organize a centralized military occupation authority. Therefore the command for the areas of occupation was the responsibility of the local Military Commander.

As the Army continued to advance, the character of military government was defined within the *Plan for Operation of Military Government* (1944). This document determined that “during the period of the Supreme Commander’s responsibility, the Military Government of Germany will be a military administration and representatives of Allied civilian agencies will not participate except to the extent approved by the Supreme Commander.”55 The initial occupation structure was to be based on a military organization even as active combat wound down. A military governmental structure was the next stage in the evolution of an occupational government. The Combined Chiefs of Staff and other policymakers believed that in order to provide security and stability, a centralized military government was essential.56 During this period the Headquarter Twelfth Army Group instructed that the Supreme Commander was to make it clear to the local population that military government was intended to aid military operations, to protect displaced Allied Nationals, to eliminate Nazism, Fascism, the Nazi Hierarchy and their collaborators, to restore and maintain law and order, and to apprehend war criminals. The 1944 Plan for Operation of Military Government in Germany was based on a directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the provisions of the Standard Policy and

54 Annex III Plan for Operation Of Military Government, 1944; First Army G-5 Section Military Gov’t in Germany #2 1944, pg. 50; First U.S. Army G-5; Records of U.S. Army Operational, Tactical & Support Organizations (World War II And Thereafter), RG 338; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
55 Annex III Plan for Operation Of Military Government, 1944, Section 1 Political and General; First Army G-5 Section Military Gov’t in Germany #2 1944 pg. 54.; First U.S. Army G-5; Records of U.S. Army Operational, Tactical & Support Organizations (World War II And Thereafter), RG 338.
Procedure for Civil Affairs and Military Government Operations in North-West Europe. 57 The stability of the country had to be secured before policies could be effectively implemented and enforced.

The U.S. established the military hierarchy before the occupation began in 1944. A plan for the operation of the military government explained that, “Prior to promulgation, all legislation to be enacted by the Military Governor would be submitted to Supreme Headquarters for approval, except on unusual occasions when the military situation requires emergency action to be taken, in which case a detailed report should be made.” 58 The Supreme Headquarters, also known as Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), formed in February 1944 to control Allied forces that fought in north-west Europe. 59 This centralized hierarchy ensured that U.S. policymakers had an active role in the policies and directives regarding the direction of the occupation for Germany. The Military Governor was not granted a large amount of leeway in making his own decisions regarding the situation in Germany.

Following the collapse of Germany, the organization plan from the Office of Military of Military Government for Germany in 1945, stipulated that the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.) and the Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone) were primarily part of the control machinery set up by the Allies for the civil government of Germany. The U.S. adapted their organizational structure and administrative procedures to the functions to be performed and to normal governmental practice rather than to military forms and procedures. 60 Both of these

58 Annex III Plan for Operation Of Military Government, 1944, Section 1 Political and General; First Army G-5 Section Military Gov’t in Germany #2 1944, pg. 55; First U.S. Army G-5; Records of U.S. Army Operational, Tactical & Support Organizations (World War II And Thereafter), RG 338.
60 Organization Plan, Office Of Military Government For Germany (U.S.) And Office Of Military Government (U.S. Zone) Part I 5 Dec. 1945; pg. 3.; U.S. Military Government; Foreign (Occupied) Area Reports 1945-54; (the Adjutant
offices administered the occupation while remaining two distinct entities. The Office of Military
Government for Germany (U.S.), for instance, constituted the Theater Commander’s staff for
Military Government. This Office performed the following functions: provided the U.S. element
in the Allied Control Authority of Germany, developed Military Government policies for the
U.S. Zone and exercised functional control over Military Government activities within the U.S.
Zone, Bremen Port Command and Berlin District.\(^6_1\) These offices were part of the transition
from a military structured government to a civilian structure that was utilized for the majority of
the occupation due to the ad hoc evolution of the military government.

On 21 June, 1945, at a Special Meeting with Army commanders, General Lucius D. Clay
(Military Governor of Germany) stated “that the War Department was of the opinion that
Military Government in an occupied country was not a job for soldiers and that responsibility
therefore should not continue beyond the minimum time necessary from a strictly military
viewpoint. The responsibility should be turned over to the political as soon as practicable.”\(^6_2\) In
essence, there was a contention between the War Department and Army Commanders regarding
the timeframe for shifting the occupation from being militarily based to civilian based. The War
Department wished to have a quick transition while the Army Commanders wished to wait until
it became practical to do so. The ultimate goal for the military was to be in a position to turn over

\(^{61}\) Office of Military Government For Germany (U.S.), Status Report On Military Government Of Germany U.S. Zone,
(15 March 1946), 7.

\(^{62}\) Special Meeting With Army Commanders, Minutes of Meeting 22 June 1945; Interviews by Maj. Donald B.
Robinson, HIST Sec, SHAEF; Historical Division; Program Files; SHAEF; Records: Military Government, 1944-46;
Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (World War II), RG 498; National Archives at College
Park, College Park, MD.
the political the entire organization and be relieved of further responsibility for government in Germany.63

Before the end of the war with Germany, policies established the post-war arrangements, since U.S. policymakers understood that the military government could not exist indefinitely. In AG 014.1, Directive for Military Government of Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender from 9 November 1944 it created an organizational model that was based upon the existing civil administrative, judicial and law enforcement structure, which would be utilized to the fullest extent possible. The U.S. policymakers from an early point in planning intended on using a governmental structure that utilized the existing German government and working through it.64 The objectives contained within the directive reinforce the initial approach taken towards Germany; that of a defeated nation rather than a liberated one.

The occupation transitioned into a political organizational structure in 1946. This change is evident in the directives and general orders that were sent to the Supreme Commander, the Military Governor or Allied Commander. For example, a Summary from 1946 stated that the “Governmental and administrative reorganization in Germany, starting on the basis of almost complete disorganization at the moment of Nazi collapse, has gone forward within a framework established by the enunciation of basic Allied policies and by the division of Germany into four zones of military occupation.”65 The framework the Allied Powers had earlier discussed and

63 Special Meeting With Army Commanders, Minutes of Meeting 22 June 1945; Interviews by Maj. Donald B. Robinson, HIST Sec, SHAEF; Historical Division; Program Files; SHAEF; Records: Military Government, 1944-46; Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (World War II), RG 498.
64 Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Office of the Chief of Staff, AG 014.1-1 (Germany), 9 November 1944; Military Govt of Germany Interim Directive For; US Group Control Council (USGCC) Adjutant General; General Correspondence 1944-45; Records of US Occupation Headquarters, WWII, RG 260.
65 Reorganization of Government and Administration in Germany No. 3401, Summary, 1 May 1946; Government (Civil)-Germany (Reorganizing of Gov’t & Administration in Germany-No. 3401) 1 May 1946, pg. ii; Foreign (Occupied) Area Reports 1945-54; (The Adjutant General’s Office) Administrative Services Division Operations Branch, RG 94; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
created ensured that the division of Germany occurred with as little difficulty as possible. This provided more time for priorities such as democratization and de-Nazification.

Problems occasionally arose during the initial phases of establishing the occupation. A 1946 summary stated that the “Difficulties in the way of administrative reconstruction were occasioned by the initial shifts in occupation lines and by the character of the eventual zonal boundaries, which were frequently drawn without regard to established German administrative units.”66 When Allied Powers initially divided Germany Territory, it was done without considering German administrative units; and it became difficult to utilize these units as part of the occupation governmental structure. Policymakers subsequently shifted the initial zones of occupation to take into consideration the German administrative structure.

Some American policymakers recognized, after approximately a year, that the direction that the policies that were guiding Germany were not producing the expected results. Scholar John Gimbel states that a major thrust of Secretary of State, George Marshall’s early planning was the search for a way to quicken Germany’s recovery that would not require US/UK subsidies to go to Germany directly.67 The Marshall Plan, also known as the European Recovery Program, was a blueprint for European economic recovery by Secretary of State George Marshall.68 The United States, in June 1947, agreed to administer aid to Europe, once the countries met to decide what they needed. The Marshall Plan began in April 1948, when Congress established the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) to administer foreign aid.

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66 Reorganization of Government and Administration in Germany No. 3401, Summary, 1 May 1946; Government (Civil)-Germany (Reorganizing of Gov’t & Administration in Germany-No. 3401) 1 May 1946, pg. ii; Foreign (Occupied) Area Reports 1945-54; (The Adjutant General’s Office) Administrative Services Division Operations Branch, RG 94.
The United States sent about $13 billion in food, machinery, and other products to Europe and in 1952 the aid ended.\textsuperscript{69}

Once the Marshall Plan was implemented in early 1948, it shifted the occupation’s organizational structure to focus more on the economic rehabilitation of Germany. The first phase of the occupation emphasized political reforms and had the German people rebuild their country, within U.S. parameters, and without Allied assistance. Following the implementation of the Marshall Plan the United States became actively involved in the rehabilitation of Germany, opposite of earlier policy decisions. The Marshall Plan provided economic aid, helping to restore industrial and agricultural production, establish financial stability, and expand trade.\textsuperscript{70}

The use of an indirect government departed from the past occupation models of the United States. The occupation structure that the U.S. had utilized in previous occupations typically consisted of a direct government with a noticeable American presence. However, in Haiti there had been a marked shift away from a direct structure to an indirect one. Prior to Haiti, many U.S. occupations were structured within the model of imperialism or colonizaton.

The structure that was utilized in the occupations of Cuba and the Philippines has the greatest similarities to the initial governmental structure in post-war Germany. The Platt Amendment specified the terms under which the U.S. military occupation of Cuba would end and effectively relegated Cuba to the status of a U.S. protectorate. The objectives that the U.S. had for Cuba did not change much; only the approach to government shifted under the Platt Amendment. During the first occupation of Cuba the U.S. had been able to create a functioning government through direct rule, although, after the official end of the Cuban occupation, it was a difficult structure to maintain without U.S. support.

At the beginning of the occupation of the Philippines, in contrast to Cuba, there were few policies or directives guiding the United States. On 21 December, 1898 President McKinley issued an executive letter of instruction in which he proclaimed U.S. sovereignty over the Philippines, and directed that American military government be extended throughout the islands. In the fulfillment of the rights of sovereignty that the United States had received from Spain, in addition to the obligations of government, the actual occupation and administration of the entire group of the Philippine Islands became immediately necessary. The military commander, by order of the U.S., was to make it known to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands that in succeeding to the sovereignty of Spain, the authority of the United States is to be exerted there.71

The occupation of the Philippines began in 1898 and President McKinley had instructed that the provisional government be created by the army upon its arrival there, according to James Blount, a politician.72 The United States moved forward in the Philippines based upon the rights of a conquering power. And in 1901, the United States set up a colonial government in the Philippines. During the early 1900s, the U.S. began to allow Filipinos to hold positions in the government. In 1935, the Philippines became a commonwealth with its own elected government and a Constitution molded after that of the United States. The United States retained authority in areas such as foreign affairs and national defense of the Philippines until 1946.73

Instead of conquest, President McKinley announced that the U.S. would seek “the benevolent assimilation” of the Filipino people, although this was not the independence many Filipinos desired.74 According to Balch, similar events occurred in Haiti, where the U.S. occupiers attempted to rebuild and reorganize the country according to the United States’

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objectives for the country. In Germany too, the U.S. utilized the occupation to shift the country into a liberal-capitalist democracy. All of these occupations fit the pattern of attempting to rebuild or restructure the country according to U.S. objectives.

The occupation of Haiti bears the strongest resemblance to the civilian government structure that Germany transitioned into following the military government. The occupation of Haiti began in 1915 and the Treaty with Haiti put most of the functions of the government of the Republic under the control of the Occupation Authority. The U.S placed the government of Haiti under its direct control quickly after the military had landed and secured key areas. The Gendarmerie that the United States trained and recruited became the instrument of American authority in Haiti creating the indirect government structure that was incorporated there. The day-to-day governing of the country was the responsibility of the Gendarmerie officers. Prior occupations had shown that a direct government was a large drain on time and resources and the U.S. utilized an indirect government during the occupation of Haiti. From Cuba and the Philippines, the United States learned that direct government of occupied territory did not produce expected results and was difficult to maintain after ending the occupation. The U.S. shifted its occupation model to use an indirect government structure in Haiti.

The occupation of Germany also used an indirect government. By continuing the current government and working through it, allowed the occupied people to believe that their country’s government was the one making decisions. Working through the German government provided a buffer for the United States, especially if the occupied people become disgruntled or upset with policies or other decisions.

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76 Emily Greene Balch, *Occupied Haiti*, 136.
Policies and Directives

Policy makers carefully considered the Military Government and American objectives in post-war Germany. This discussion is apparent in the Directive from 9 November 1944, which stated:

Within the area occupied by your group of Armies you are responsible for attainment of the following primary objectives of the military government: Imposition of the will of the Allies upon occupied Germany; care, control, and repatriation of displaced United Nations nationals and minimum care necessary to effect control of enemy refugees and displaced persons; apprehension of war criminals; elimination of Nazism – Fascism, German militarism, the Nazi Hierarchy and their collaborators; restoration and maintenance of law and order, as far as the Military situation permits; protection of United Nations property; control of certain properties and conservation of German foreign exchange assets; and preservation and establishment of suitable civil administration to the extent required to accomplish the above objectives.  

At the beginning of occupation, U.S. official policies stated that they were not going to rebuild the economy in Germany and that it was up to the German people to do that task. For example, the interim directive APO 757 from 12 December 1944, stated that the “no effort will be made to rehabilitate or succor the German people. Rather, the sole aim of the Military Government is to further military objectives.” The Allied Powers had not come to help the

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78 Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Office of the Chief of Staff, AG 014.1-1 (Germany), 9 November 1944; Military Govt of Germany Interim Directive For; US Group Control Council (USGCC) Adjutant General, pg. 2; General Correspondence 1944-45; Records of US Occupation Headquarters, WWII, RG 260.
79 Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force G-5 Division, APO 757 12 December 1944; Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force G-5 Division; U.S. Group Control Council (USGCC) Adjutant General;
German people. American policymakers further stated in *APO 757* that “Reports from the field indicate that Military Government Detachments and G-5 staff of subordinate formations are inclined to try to do too much to relieve the problems of the German people. There seems to be a disposition to approach the administration of Germany with the idea that it is our job to make Germany a “happy land” again. It is essential that all Military Government personnel be disabused of this concept.”80

Aware of the shift from military to civilian government that would need to occur, U.S. policymakers put into place polices and directives to help ensure that the transition from one form of authority to another would be as smooth as possible. For instance *Directive to SCAEF Regarding the Military Government* stated that “The administrative policies shall be uniform throughout those parts of Germany occupied by forces under [the Supreme Commander’s] command subject to any special requirements due to local circumstances.”81 This directive helped to ensure that policies that were created remained uniform from the onset. It would have difficult to reconcile various policies as the occupation became centralized. This directive was important since it was issued to ensure that uniform policies were created during the initial occupation, which would help ensure that once the military occupation ended it would transition smoothly into a civil government occupation.

The transition period between government structures was also discussed and planned for by U.S. policymakers. Policymakers used directives to ensure that the initial phase of occupation

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80*Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force G-5 Division, APO 757 12 December 1944; Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force G-5 Division; U.S. Group Control Council (USGCC) Adjutant General; General Correspondence, 1944-45; Records of U.S. Occupation Headquarters, WWII, RG 260.*

81*C.C.A.C. 119/4 Combined Civil Affairs Committee Directive for Administration of Post-Defeat Military Government in Germany 6 October 1944, Enclosure; G-5 Div., SHAEF, Development of Policy for Germany (Oct. ’44, from Aug. ’44), pg. 3; Historical Division-Program Files; SHAEF; Records: Military Government, 1944-46; Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (World War II), RG 498; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.*
did not limit or hinder the following phases of occupation. Within an Interim Directive to the Supreme Headquarters regarding the military government in Germany from 9 November 1944, a section concerns the areas and periods of responsibility in Germany during the initial occupation. This section discussed the transition period and the policies that were used prior and after the Supreme Commander was relieved of his position. This directive states the “In the absence of tripartite policy it is essential that the Supreme Commander’s policies be limited to those necessary for the attainment of the primary objectives of Military Government during his period and that the way be left as smooth as possible (by omission rather than commission) for the assumption of power by the Control Commission Council on its tripartite basis.”

The initial Military Government of Germany was designed to establish military control and be the first phase of the occupation control machinery. Until active combat ended there was no process to set up a stable centralized government and the initial government helped to create the conditions for the second phase of control machinery.

The Potsdam Declaration played a vital part regarding policies and decisions regarding the occupation of Germany following surrender. The Allied policies laid down at Potsdam and implemented by directives in the different zones, established four major principles: maintenance of German unity; governmental and administrative decentralization; de-Nazification of the civil service; and democratization of government and administration. Policies like these from 1946 appear to focus largely on the restructuring of the administration in Germany along with democratization. The principle of German unity meant to ensure that the people of that country

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82 Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Office of the Chief of Staff, AG 014.1-1 (Germany), 9 November 1944, Annex II; Military Govt of Germany Interim Directive For; US Group Control Council (USGCC) Adjutant General, pg.44; General Correspondence 1944-45; Records of US Occupation Headquarters, WWII, RG 260.

83 Reorganization of Government and Administration in Germany, No. 3401 Washington D.C. 1 May 1946 Summary; Government (Civil)-Germany (Reorganizing of Gov’t & Administration in Germany-No. 341) 1 May 1946, pg. ii; Foreign (Occupied) Area Reports 1945-54; (The Adjutant General’s Office) Administrative Services Division Operations Branch, RG 94; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
did not become fragmented and swallowed by another country. The decentralization of both the government and administration was geared towards creating a liberal-capitalist democracy. De-Nazification was another crucial requirement for the structure of the U.S. structure to take root and flourish. The democratization of Germany was one of the primary objectives during the U.S. occupation of Germany.\textsuperscript{84}

Yet, U.S policy with respect to Germany developed over time. Likewise agreement among the Allied governments required time to develop. Accordingly, there were frequent revisions of the plan for U.S. Military zones as the governing policies matured.\textsuperscript{85} The policies developed and changed in relation to what was occurring internally in Germany, in addition to the external changes occurring in Europe. These changes are reflected in the shifting policies and objectives for the occupation of Germany.

This is evident in a directive from 1947 that emphasized public order and prosperity. This Directive from 11 July, 1947 to the Commander in Chief regarding the United States policy toward Germany specified that the basic interest of the United States throughout the world is a just and lasting peace. The directive stated that “Such a peace can be achieved only if conditions of public order and prosperity are created in Europe as a whole. An orderly and prosperous Europe requires the economic contributions of a stable and productive Germany as well as the necessary restraints to insure that Germany is not allowed to revive its destructive militarism.”\textsuperscript{86}

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\textsuperscript{84} Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Office of the Chief of Staff, AG 014.1-1 (Germany), 9 November 1944, Annex II; Military Govt of Germany Interim Directive For; US Group Control Council (USGCC) Adjutant General; General Correspondence 1944-45; Records of US Occupation Headquarters, WWII, RG 260.


\textsuperscript{86} Department of State, For The Press July 15, 1947 No. 582, Directive; Foreign (Occupied) Area Reports 1945-54; Special, Germany (U.S. Zone); The Adjutant General’s Office Administrative Services Divisions Operations Branch RG 94; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
Early in the next year the United States implemented the Marshall Plan. The U.S. recognized that in order to meet their occupation objectives, some rehabilitation of Germany had to occur.

The United States then utilized an economic model of occupation to ensure that Germany was rebuilt according to U.S. policymakers’ objectives. Official policy shifted towards economic aid and reconstruction since the original policies were firm on the fact that Germany would be responsible for that task. Although the United States did not, initially, focus on the German economy during occupation, there were hints of economic concerns in early policies. Such as General Order No. 2 – Occupation, this included sections discussing the control of certain properties and conservation of German foreign exchange assets. United States policymakers understood that preventing complete economic collapse was vital to the occupation.

Previous American occupations were likewise based largely on policies, treaties, and amendments, documents such as the Paris Treaty and the Platt Amendment. There was no coordinated official group that could design or review policies regarding the occupations of Cuba and the Philippines. In those occupations, the current U.S. president made a large number of the decisions, working within the framing documentation. The Joint Army and Navy Board, usually called the Joint Board, was established after the Spanish-American War in 1903. The Joint Board was the major war planning authority for the United States.

Following the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898, the military occupation of Cuba began on January 1, 1898 and ended May 20, 1902. The Teller Amendment was one of four amendments passed by Congress in a joint resolution on 19 April, 1898, that served as a prelude to the declaration of war against Spain. The Teller Amendment stated that the United States had no intention of annexing Cuba. Advocates and opponents of expansion could be found and the

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rationales also varied. Some opposed annexation of Cuba on racial grounds and others did so on economic grounds different from those that guided Teller’s amendment. The other amendments that were passed at this same time also dealt with Cuba. The other amendments were 1) Cuba was declared to be an independent country, 2) Spain was told to withdraw, and 3) the President was directed to use military force to bring about the previously stated two goals. The Teller Amendment prevented the annexation in Cuba. In addition, it also provided the legal justification for three U.S. military interventions in Cuba in 1906-1909, 1912, and 1917-1922.

According to Louis Perez, the four provisions of the Secretary of War, Elihu Root, outlined to Secretary of State John Hayes regarding Cuba, were not new policy formulations. Root himself acknowledged that his proposals owed some inspiration to England’s relation with Egypt. That had allowed England to retire from Egypt and maintain moral control. Thus the United States was drawing inspiration from other countries like Great Britain and their policies regarding the occupation or colonization of countries. Although the U.S. was using ideas from other countries there is no concrete proof that similar inspiration occurred for the occupation of Germany.

In the Philippines, the Treaty of Paris defined the parameters of the initial occupation and how the U.S. proceeded there. The acquisition of the Philippines proved a controversial issue both in the United States and the Philippines. Within the United States it set off a heated political debate between pro- and anti-imperialist forces. There was no equivalent of the Teller Amendment for the Philippines. Arguments in favor spoke of Manifest Destiny, economic gain, and national security. Opponents, some of whom supported continental expansion and the

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90 Louis A. Perez, *Cuba Under the Platt Amendment 1902-1934*, 32.
92 Louis A. Perez, *Cuba Under the Platt Amendment*, 46.
annexation of Hawaii, challenged President McKinley’s decision to acquire the Philippines on racial and moral grounds and with the argument that domestic problems took precedence over foreign policy. President McKinley utilized an organic act to establish the government there. An organic act is a congressional act that confers the powers of government upon a territory. And in the case of the Philippines, the islands’ unincorporated status meant that, like other new dependencies, it would receive its government through a separate, congressional “Organic Act,” rather than by territorial precedents.

The surrender terms and established policies regarding Germany are comparable to the treaty that Haiti and the United State signed prior to the start of the occupation of Haiti. The Haitian-American treaty that was signed in 1915 defined the parameters of the occupation and established the character of the occupation. The policies that were created for the occupation of Haiti were geared to create a stable self-government there and the only government that would create a stable situation there was one similar to what the U.S. had. By crushing Haitian peasant rebellion and by creating the mechanism for strongly centralized government control in Port-au-Prince, the occupation eliminated the very safeguards against entrenched despotism in Haiti.

American beliefs regarding Germany influenced its policy there; however it did not look down upon the German populations as harshly as it did other occupied peoples. John Dower states that while German atrocities were known and condemned from an early date, but in keeping with their practice of distinguishing between good and bad Germans, Allied critics tended to describe these as “Nazi” crimes rather than behavior rooted in German culture or

personality structure. In addition, the Germans were engaged in several separate wars, on the eastern front, on the western front, and against the Jews—and their greatest and most systematic violence was directed against peoples whom most English and Americans also looked down upon, or simply were unable to identify with strongly.98 In Germany, one focus of the occupation was ensuring that the wrong people did not gain the power to lead the country in a wrong direction once again.

Conclusion

The occupation of Germany by the United States bore the legacy of previous occupations. It emphasized some of the same objectives, such as democratization and the shifting of the economy. The United States’ primary objective in occupying Germany was not the betterment of the country or its people. As in previous occupations, the United States was pursuing its own interests and goals. Factors such as an indirect government and an emphasis on democracy are elements that can also be seen in prior U.S. occupations. The occupation of Germany shows influences of prior U.S. occupied countries. However the differences show that U.S. occupation models and theories shifted as well. The biggest difference between the occupation of Germany has from prior ones is the larger amount of policies and discussions that were created regarding Germany.

CHAPTER TWO: U.S. Occupation of Japan 1945-1952

American planners regarded Germany as the most powerful and dangerous foe among the Axis powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan. The United States chose to focus the country’s major efforts against Germany, while fighting defensively in the Pacific. After Germany’s defeat, Allied forces shifted to the Pacific to crush Japan; and the other members of the Allied Powers accepted this strategy.99 However the initial Japanese drives in the Pacific made nonsense of U.S. prewar plans and expectations. The Allies quickly lost areas such as Singapore and Burma and even victories at the Coral Sea and Midway failed to eliminate Japanese offensive capabilities in the South Pacific.100 Area commanders in the Pacific were given greater authority, leading to a decentralization of military authority. This contrasted with what had occurred in Germany prior to and just after defeat. In addition, Japan’s surrender forced quick policy changes. U.S. policy had anticipated an occupation post defeat not post surrender. U.S. policymakers had not created policies regarding the surrender of Japan and what would occur following surrender. The policies that existed were geared only towards a defeated Japan.

Allied policy developed in a series of summits that began with the Washington ("Arcadia") Conference in December 1941, which produced the agreement on the grand strategy regarding World War II. On 1 January, 1942 during the Conference the representatives signed a “Declaration of the United Nations” which laid the groundwork for a concerted Allied response to Axis aggression worldwide.101 The U.S. Navy and Army held different views about waging war on Japan. The Navy had called for the blockade and bombardment of the Japanese homeland which was based on pre-war contingency planning, while the Army had called for a full scale

invasion on the ground. As World War II progressed, the rivalry between these two branches grew, even while the U.S. Navy was initially given the priority.\textsuperscript{102}

The U.S. developed policies for the occupation of Japan that differed greatly from the ones that were made for Germany. This could have been due to the primary focus on Germany and the European theater; there was a tendency to have fewer military policies and directives due to the decentralization in the Pacific theater. In Japan, the policies and directives tended to be more inclusive. General Douglas MacArthur was also allowed a large amount of leeway in regards to the occupation in its entirety, such as the occupation structure utilized.

Another large differentiating factor was U.S. racial ideology regarding Japan and its occupation. As Michael L. Krenn states in \textit{Race and U.S. Foreign Policy from 1900 Through World War II}, race played an undeniable role in the U.S. attitude toward the Japanese threat in the Pacific during the 1930s and 1940s. When war broke out between the two nations in 1941, the U.S. racial stereotypes of the Japanese, which had been built up over decades, were used to dehumanize the enemy; leading to what historian John W. Dower has called a “war without mercy” in the Pacific.\textsuperscript{103} Race and racism had figured in previous occupations as well, including in Cuba, Haiti, and the Philippines.\textsuperscript{104}

The organizational structures, policies, and directives that were used for the occupation of Japan meant to shift the country to a liberal-capitalist democracy to help fulfill the United States’ occupation model. American policymakers used previous United States occupations models and theories by refining them for the situation in Japan. General MacArthur implemented an occupation structure designed to guide the Japanese monarchy into a democracy. And the racial

\textsuperscript{104} Prime examples are Paul Kramer \textit{Blood of Government, Race, Empire, the United States & The Philippines} (2006), Emily Green Balch \textit{Occupied Haiti} (1972), and Louis A. Perez Jr., \textit{Cuba Between Empires 1878-1902} (1983).
perceptions about Japan also helped to shape and influence the directives and policies that were established for the occupation of Japan.

**Authority for occupation**

The basis of the authority for the occupation of Japan appears to have originated from documents that were created in anticipation of Japan’s defeat. The basis for Allied control in Japan was similar to what was utilized for the occupation of Germany. One crucial element for the occupation of Japan was the Potsdam Declaration, which various basic directives referenced. The Potsdam Declaration was a document created by the leaders of the Allied Powers, Secretary General Joseph Stalin, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin Roosevelt during the Potsdam Conference, codenamed Terminal. The Potsdam Declaration called on Japan to surrender unconditionally or to suffer utter devastation of the Japanese homeland. The declaration was issued on 26 July, 1945 and, less than a month later, the Japanese surrender was announced on 15 August, 1945.\(^{105}\)

This thirteen point document called for the elimination of the authority and influence of those who misled Japan and announced the occupation by the Allied Powers until a new order could be established (Articles 6 and 7). The Potsdam Declaration also ordered the disarmament of Imperial forces and punishment of war criminals but pledged to encourage the revival of democratic tendencies in addition to guaranteeing democratic freedoms and basic human rights (Articles 9 and 10). The Potsdam Declaration permitted Japan to keep basic industries and participate in world trade but stipulated the payment of reparations in Article 11. Article 12 stated that the occupation would be withdrawn when the Japanese people had established a

peacefully inclined and responsible government. And article 13 promised prompt and utter destruction should Japan fail to comply.\textsuperscript{106}

The Potsdam Declaration provided the framework that U.S. policymakers referred to when creating policies and directives regarding the occupation of Japan. The surrender documents for Japan consisted of the Potsdam Declaration and the Instrument of Surrender, which was partially built upon the articles within the Potsdam Declaration. With fewer restrictions, when compared to Germany, American policymakers could create policies that to effectively responded to the situation in Japan in addition to better fulfilling American objectives. For example, the \textit{Basic Post-Surrender Directive} from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 3 November 1945, to the Supreme Commander, General Douglass MacArthur, stated that:

\begin{quote}
The basis of your power and authority over Japan is the directive signed by the President of the United States designating you as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SWNCC 21/6 (J.C.S. 1467)) and the Instrument of Surrender (SWNCC 21/6 (Annex “A” to J.C.S. 1380/5)), executed by the command of the Emperor of Japan (SWNCC 21/6 (Annex “B” to J.C.S. 1380/5)). These documents, in turn, are based upon the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945 (SWNCC 149/1 (Annex “C” to J.C.S. 1380/5)), the reply of the Secretary of State on 11 August 1945 to the Japanese communication of 10 August 1945 (SWNCC Memo for Info. No. 19 (Annex “E” to J.C.S. 1380/5), and the final Japanese communication on 14 August 1945 (SWNCC Memo for Info. No. 19 (Annex “F” to J.C.S. 1380/5)).\textsuperscript{107}
\end{quote}

The Japanese communications that were sent to the Allied Powers were likely sent from the Suzuki Cabinet, which was one element of the Imperial government.\textsuperscript{108}

U.S. authority for the occupation of Japan was based upon surrender documents and communications to and from Japanese government officials rather than pre-established policies and directives. United States policymakers had to re-organize policies and directives regarding

\textsuperscript{106} Takemae Eiji, \textit{Inside GHQ The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy}, 41.
\textsuperscript{107} Joint Chiefs of Staff, Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government In Japan Proper, Enclosure, Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander For The Allied Powers For The Occupation And Control Of Japan; Folder 10, J.C.S., 3 November 1945 pg. 134; Subject File, 1945-1950; Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, 1907-1966, RG 331; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
\textsuperscript{108} Take, Eiji, \textit{Inside GHQ The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy}, 46.
what would occur in post-surrender Japan. The intelligence at that time made it appear that Japan would not surrender under any circumstance, so they had anticipated only a Japan that was defeated militarily. But General MacArthur in 1945 had instructed his G-3 section to draft an alternative to the invasion plan (Operation Downfall) should Japan surrender earlier than anticipated. This resulted in “Operation Blacklist” a blueprint for non-belligerent occupation.\footnote{Takemae Eiji, \textit{Inside GHQ The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy}, 39.} Although U.S policymakers did not have official policies drawn up in 1945, General MacArthur did, which granted him leeway since he had a plan for an occupation following surrender.

In addition, the United States utilized the right of a conquering power, since the Allied Powers had classified Japan as an enemy. Although the planned invasion of Japan never occurred, the United States could claim this right, especially since American forces were the majority that was in combat in the Pacific Theater. With this, American policymakers could justify that the United States was the sole authority for the occupation of Japan, which changed the character of the occupation since there was only one occupying force. The U.S. occupying force had to adhere to the Surrender Terms and the objectives that were laid out at Potsdam; however, it appears that the Surrender Terms were less rigidly adhered by the U.S. when compared to Germany due to the decentralization of the U.S. military and the limited input of other Allied Powers in Japan.

The Supreme Commander for Japan (General MacArthur) was invested with the typical powers of a military government in an enemy territory. General MacArthur also had the power to take any steps deemed advisable and proper to effect the surrender and provisions of the Potsdam Declaration. It was believed that unless General MacArthur though it necessary, or was instructed to the contrary, he would not establish direct military government, but would exercise his powers, as far as compatible with the accomplishment of his missions, through the Emperor
of Japan or the Japanese government. From the beginning of the occupation, an indirect government would work through the Japanese governmental structure. Since there was no invasion of the Japanese homeland, there was not a large need for a direct military government, which is why the indirect government structure began shortly after Japan formerly surrendered.

A directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1945 to General MacArthur discussed the Supreme Commander’s authority and the relationship between him and the occupied country which helped to establish the basis of authority for the occupation. This directive states that “You will exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission. Our relations with Japan do not rest on a contractual basis, but on an unconditional surrender.” This directive established the basis of authority on the rights of a conquering power, stemming from the unconditional surrender of Japan. If the United States had occupied Japan as part of a contractual obligation instead, it would have had less freedom in designing and running the occupation than it did.

Previous occupations relied more on broad American foreign relations policies, amendments and policies (such as in Cuba), and/or the right of a conquering power, as in the Philippines. The right of a conquering power changes the entire character of an occupation. An occupation based on the rights of a conquering power proceeds differently than an occupation stemming from intervention. Typically when an occupation begins following an intervention, there are predetermined parameters that define the whole of the occupation. The opposite usually occurs when occupation begins based on the right of a conquering power, due to a lack of

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111 Directive To The Supreme Commander For the Allied Powers Authority Of The Supreme Commander For The Allied Powers; Certified Directive To SCAP From The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Serial No. 5; Directives To The Supreme Commander For the Allied Powers From The Joint Chiefs Of Staff, 8/13/1945-2/13/1952; Records Of International Conferences, Commissions and Expositions RG 43; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
predetermined guidelines. Rather, the occupying power determines the guidelines and objectives that are to be met during the occupation of the conquered country. Within occupied Japan, there existed fluidity between the rights of a conquering power and intervention. This fluidity, which did not exist in Germany, allowed the United States to choose the framework that best suited their occupation objectives.

The authority on which the United States based its occupation of Japan on is very similar to its previous occupations, especially since the majority of U.S. occupations have some foundation in the rights of a conquering power. In Japan, this is particularly true due to Japan’s unconditional surrender. One large difference in the authority over Japan was that it was not divided into different zones of occupation between the Allied Powers, such as in Germany. The United States was the sole exerciser of the rights of an occupying power in Japan, which changed the character of the occupation. The authority for the occupation of Japan bears large similarities to the prior occupations of the Philippines and Haiti. As evidenced by the use of the rights of a conquering power and the way that this right was used in Japan. However, the largest difference that exists between prior U.S. occupations and Japan is the fluidity that existed regarding the bases of U.S. authority in Japan. While this flexibility of authority contains similarities to the authority of the Philippines, this is the first time that such a strong fluidity existed in the authority for a U.S. occupation.

**Organization or structure that was planned**

According to scholar Merle Fainsod in *Japan’s Prospects*, the unconditional surrender of Japan posed a new and unexpected problem for American policymakers and planners. There was to be no invasion and no combat phase; military government was to begin as a post-surrender
accompaniment to peaceful occupation. This development caught unawares those who were charged with the responsibility of training for and planning the military government of Japan. The collapse of Japanese resistance had not been thoroughly anticipated. But even though the occupation of Japan post-surrender was not largely planned for, the policies and directives regarding the organization of post-invasion occupied Japan could be altered to fit a Japan following surrender.

When the occupation of Japan began, the objectives of the direct military government were to take over any and all phases of civil government where the Japanese civil government could no longer function effectively, and to return the areas to the responsible Japanese civil government at the earliest possible opportunity. The United States designed the direct military government in Japan to provide security and stability. This was the first phase of Allied control machinery for the occupation of Japan. The Allies did not deem a prolonged direct military government necessary, partly due to the cancelation of the final invasion and the relatively short period of transition into an indirect civilian occupation governmental structure.

According to Fainsod, the occupation planners initially discussed and created policies for Japan based upon what had been drawn up for Germany. He states that the planning group under Brigadier General William Crist (Initial head of Military Government Section) was proceeding, in 1945, on a concept of military government growing out of experience in Europe and the Pacific islands. The plan was to have a large staff of military government officers engaged in

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113 Headquarters Eighth Army United States Army Office of the Commanding General APO 343 Annex Number 2 to Operational Directive Number 49; Operational Directives HQ Eighth Army A.P.O 343 1946, pg. 1; Operational Directives and Orders, 1945-46; Records of U.S. Army Operational Tactical And Support Organizations (World War II And Thereafter RG 338; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
the active direction and supervision of the Japanese administrative structure, operating not only at headquarters but at lower levels as well.

However, within the occupation of Japan, the Joint Chief of Staff decided to install a different type of military government in Japan. A *Joint Chiefs of Staff 1380/15 Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper* (3 November, 1945) directed the Supreme Commander if at all possible, that the occupation government would work “through the Emperor of Japan or the Japanese Government.”

Rather than implementing an initial direct military government, U.S. policymakers created an indirect structure.

The organizational structure of the Japanese occupation remained fairly consistent in the departments and hierarchy that were initially created. The Supreme Commander was at the top of this hierarchy. General of the Army Douglass MacArthur held that position for the majority of the occupation. The next level down was the chief of staff. The chief of staff oversaw sections such as a public relations section, a legal section and a diplomatic section. Then the deputy chief of staff supervised the civil information and education section, government section and the natural resources section, for example. A General Headquarters organization chart from 1947 shows an occupation forces level that is absent from the organization model a year later. The reduction of Allied forces and the “civilianizing” of the occupation may have led to the elimination of that level.

General MacArthur’s organization for military government contrasted with parallel organizations in the European theater. According to Fainsod it was exclusively a headquarters

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115 Joint Chiefs Of Staff Basic Directive For Post-Surrender Military Government In Japan Proper J.C.S 1380/15; Folder 10 J.C.S., 3 November 1945 pg. 135; Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II RG 331.
116 General Headquarters, 1947; Folder 8: Military Government Japan Organization Charts August 1946 September 1947; Foreign (Occupied) Area Reports 1945-54; The Adjutant General’s Office RG 407; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
organization; that is, unlike traditional forms of military government, there was no military
government field organization. It utilized the Japanese channel of command from top to bottom
and avoided direct contact with the Japanese civilian population. All orders and directives that
originated in General MacArthur’s headquarters were addressed to the Imperial Japanese
government rather than to the populace. It used Japan’s governmental facilities to implement
SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) directives. SCAP transmitted its directives
and memoranda to the Japanese Government through the Central Liaison Office, a Japanese
agency.

As the situation in Japan became more secure, in 1946 there was a shift from a military
government into an indirect civilian governmental structure. Through this indirect governmental
structure General MacArthur oversaw the functioning of the occupation in Japan. The direct
military government in Japan was thus in place for a shorter period of time than in Germany.
Moreover, the shift occurred in Japan several months prior to Germany’s shift. Since the
Japanese Government had not collapsed as the German government did, the Allied forces were
able to prop up the existing structure with a military government for the initial period of
occupation. The duration of the direct military government as discussed by Annex Number 2 to
Operational Directive Number 49 states that the “Direct Military Government will not be
continued longer than necessary. It will be terminated by direction of SCAP only.”

While utilizing the indirect structure, the United States took the opportunity to shift the
Japanese government to a liberal-capitalist democracy. The Basic Directive For Post-Surrender

118 General Headquarters—July 1947; Folder 8: Military Government Japan Organization Charts August 1946
September 1947; Folder 8: Military Government Japan Organization Charts August 1946 September 1947, pg. 252;
Foreign (Occupied) Area Reports 1945-1954; The Adjutant General’s Office RG 407; National Archives at College
Park, College Park, MD.
119 Direct Military Government; Folder: Operational Directives HQ, Eighth Army A.P.O. 343 1946, pg. 2; Eight U.S.
Army, 1944-56 Adjutant General; Records of the U.S. Army Operational Tactical And Support Organizations (World
War II And Thereafter) RG 338; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
Military Government in Japan Proper, dated 3 November 1945, specified that “Changes in the direction of modifying the feudal and authoritarian tendencies of the government are to be permitted and favored.” The United States wished to make changes to the monarchical Japanese government to allow democracy to grow and thrive instead. Creating a democracy in Japan would help to further other occupation model objectives, such as demilitarization.

The occupation structure that the U.S. had utilized in previous occupations typically consisted of a direct government with a noticeable American presence, which eventually shifted to a more indirect structure. The governmental organization of Japan bears the greatest similarities to the occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934. United States policymakers began with a direct governing structure in Haiti, but in 1917 shifted to an indirect government there. They turned from the U.S. Marines to the local Haitian Gendarmerie as the governing and policing force.

Policies and directives for occupation

The initial objectives regarding occupied Japan focused on the country’s demilitarization, the strengthening of democratic tendencies, and the encouragement of liberal political tendencies. The United Nations stated that its ultimate objective “with respect to Japan is to foster conditions which will give the greatest possible assurance that Japan will not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world and will permit her eventual admission

120 Joint Chiefs Of Staff Basic Directive For Post-Surrender Military Government In Japan Proper J.C.S 1380/15; Folder 10 J.C.S., 3 November 1945 pg. 137; Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II RG 331.
121 Far Eastern Commission, Official Press Release, Enclosure Basic Post-Surrender Policy For Japan; J.C.S. Basic Policy Documents, Japan 10 July 1947 pg. 1; Foreign (Occupied) Area Reports 1945-54; The Adjutant General’s Office RG 407; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
as a responsible and peaceful member of the family of nations.”122 Since this ultimate objective is a liberal democratic concept, it appears that even the United Nations desired the shifting of Japan into a characteristically Western democracy. This objective is similar to what U.S. policymakers had designated as their priority when establishing policies and directives regarding what were to occur during the occupation of Japan.

Postwar Japan’s economy and infrastructure was damaged but not destroyed. Japan’s main island had not been invaded by Allied Forces and did not sustain the damage that typically accompanies invasion. The largest amount of damage occurred due to the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and other bombings in Japan, especially in Tokyo. More than sixty cities had been subjected to carpet bombing, and in many urban centers, the only structures left standing in the wake of incendiary raids were the iron safes of non-existent shops and, here and there, tall concrete chimneys. Everything else had been reduced to ash.123 The human loss of life was vast, such in the first saturation bombing of Tokyo on 9 March 1945. General Curtis LeMay commented that 84,000 men, women, and children were killed in the huge fire storms, a result of the incendiary bombing.124

The policies that were drafted and implemented were designed to support the objectives of democratization and creating a Western type political environment. A press release from 1947 publicized the resolution “that Japan cannot be allowed to control her own destinies again until there is on her part a determination to abandon militarism in all its aspects and a desire to live with the rest of the world in peace, and until democratic principles are established in all spheres

122 Joint Chiefs Of Staff Basic Directive For Post-Surrender Military Government In Japan Proper J.C.S 1380/15; Folder 10 J.C.S., 3 November 1945 pg. 135; Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II RG 331.
of the political, economic, and cultural life of Japan.125 Creating a democracy in Japan was a crucial element in fulfilling U.S. objectives there.

Unlike Germany, where the United States worked in conjunction with the other Allied Powers, Americans drafted the majority of the occupation policies for Japan. The Basic Initial Post Surrender Policy stated that, “Although every effort will be made, by consultation and by constitution of appropriate advisory bodies, to establish policies for the conduct of the occupation and the control of Japan which will satisfy the principal Allied Powers, in the event of any differences of opinion among them, the policies of the United States will govern.”126 U.S. policymakers did consult with the other Allied Powers in creating policies, through groups such as the Far Eastern Commission. However, the United States could make the final decisions regarding policies for Japan.

A U.S. member of the Far Eastern Commission conducted a review of the U.S. occupation policy in 1948, which concluded that the United States was making great progress in creating political and economic institutions. The Far Eastern Commission stated that “This review has revealed that in implementation of the basic policy, SCAP has destroyed Japan’s ability to make war on land, on the sea and in the air. Exceptional progress has been made in establishing political and economic institutions which will permit the development of a democratic and peaceful Japan capable of assuming the responsibilities of a member of the community of nations.”127 Policymakers and many of the occupiers placed a continual emphasis

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125 Far Eastern Commission, Official Press Release, Enclosure Basic Post-Surrender Policy For Japan; J.C.S. Basic Policy Documents, Japan 10 July 1947 pg. 1; Foreign (Occupied) Area Reports 1945-54; The Adjutant General’s Office RG 407.

126 U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, Part II-Allied Authority; U.S. & Inter Policy Documents Belonging to Japan, FEC, etc.; U.S. Delegation Subject File, 1945-1952; Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions RG 43; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

127 Statement to Be Made To Far Eastern Commission By U.S. Member & Transmitted to SCAP and Released For Publication, 1/22/1948; Folder: Occupation: U.S. Delegation Subject File, 1945-1952, pg. 1; Records of International Conferences, Commissions, And Expositions RG 43; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
on ensuring that Japan developed into a functioning member of the community of nations. It seems that during the occupation the opportunity was taken to reconstruct the country into the characteristic Western style democracy.

U.S. policymakers also utilized policies to help ensure that Japan would be reconstructed as a respectable member of the community of nations, that is, similar to countries like Great Britain and the United States. A policy dated 12 September 1949 stated that the United States general objective was “A Japan, peaceful, democratic according to Western standards, internationally cooperative, economically stable and prosperous, and if possible, friendly to the United States.”128 The democratization of Japan was a vital element in U.S. occupation objectives for Japan.

The occupation of Japan resembles prior U.S. occupations in the minimal policies that were created for the situation there. The surrender of Japan to the Allied Powers forced quick policy changes, and the basic framework of the occupation rests upon a small number of documents. Furthermore, the decentralization of authority in the Pacific Theater resulted in fewer specific polices and directives regarding the occupation of Japan, rather there were fewer policies that broadly covered the various aspects of the occupation. With the amount of leeway that General MacArthur was granted he was able to use policies and directives as the framework for the decisions he made regarding Japan while occupied. In addition to the racial ideology that influenced the creation of policies and directives regarding occupied Japan.

Yet the American experience in Japan also deviated from previous U.S. occupations. General MacArthur had the authority to implement directives to the Japanese government without prior consultation to American policymakers. The progression of polices and directives

128 U.S. Policy In Regard To Japan; Folder: Miscellaneous Memoranda, Aide Memoires, etc. 1948-1949; U.S. Delegation Subject File, 1945-1952; Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions RG 43; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
demonstrated in Japan, though the use of specific policies and directives, were used to build a model that fit the Japanese situation following surrender.

**Conclusion**

The United States occupation of Japan moved quickly to an indirect governmental structure. The United States was able to meet occupation objectives while working behind the actual government of Japan without having to take over the daily running of the government. Compared to Germany, the occupation of Japan resembled earlier occupations more closely. The occupation of Japan existed with few foundational policies, was based largely on the right of a conquering power and placed great emphasis on creating a democracy there. From the beginning of the occupation the United States had a large allowance to create an occupational model that fit their objectives for Japan.

Regardless of the similarities that exist between previous U.S. occupations and Japan, the differences that exist are what set Japan apart from other occupations. The occupation of Japan was a culmination of prior influences and contexts that came together, in what some consider a highly successful occupation. Although Japan fits within U.S. occupation models what makes it unique from the rest of U.S. occupations is the combination and use of influences into a highly functioning model of occupation.
Conclusion

The study of U.S. occupations reveals links among the different countries and evidences the need for U.S. occupations to be studied as whole rather than as singular events. The similarities and differences between the occupations of Germany and Japan and prior U.S. occupations demonstrate a development in U.S. occupation models and theories even if there is no stated evidence of this consciousness regarding United States policymakers. There has been an increasing tendency for the United States to establish an indirect government whenever possible, as the best way to develop a stable democracy in the U.S.’s own image. Furthermore, the United States’ model of occupation has changed from primarily a military into an economic occupation model.

The U.S. occupations of Germany and Japan have several shared characteristics. One similarity is the indirect governmental structure that was used in both Germany and Japan. A second similarity is the type of policies that were created for each country; each occupation was established through the creation of policies prior to the beginning of the occupation. A third similar characteristic was the emphasis that was placed on creating a liberal-capitalist democracy within both Germany and Japan. This was important occupation objective for each country and for the termination of the U.S. occupation there.

The occupations of Germany and Japan also demonstrate the different directions that American policy took in the mid-twentieth century. Within Germany, with the centralization of authority in the European theater, a large number of policies and directives guided the occupation from prior to surrender to its official completion. The occupation of Germany followed a very structured and regimented process. This proved crucial because the German government was on the verge of collapse prior to surrender. In Germany the direction the occupation took was focused on the rebuilding of the country and shifting the country into a
liberal-capitalist country. In addition, to the greater involvement of the other Allied Powers during the sharing of the occupation of Germany. The United States was not the sole power determining occupation policies and government in post-war Germany.

The U.S. occupation of Japan differed from that of Germany in several respects. Fewer official directives and policies structured the occupation. Secondly, the United States directed it with less active involvement from the other Allies. Even within the U.S. government, a smaller group determined its shape; General MacArthur and General Headquarters largely guided the occupation of Japan. The decentralization in the Pacific theater provided greater leeway for the Supreme Commander and less oversight for American policymakers. Even so, the occupation of Japan replicated various aspects of prior U.S. occupations, such as the large emphasis on democratization. As the occupation of Japan evolved, it became focused on taking the government from a monarchy to a liberal-capitalist one, and the shifting of the Japanese culture away from its ancestral past.

The occupations of Germany and Japan were the product of years of culminated experience in occupying countries. Both Germany and Japan are a part of a larger history of United States occupations. U.S. occupations were not events that existed solely by themselves rather they were dynamic events that built upon previous knowledge and situations. Placing the occupations of the United States into context with each other provides a better understanding of how American policymakers learned from previous occupations. In addition, to providing insight into how U.S. occupations have grown and evolved from one another.

There are many future directions for research in this area. I have researched government records; however, other kinds of sources might reveal ties between the occupations of Germany and Japan with previous ones. One might research the writings of journalists and other
commentators and critics in the immediate postwar period to see if they linked Germany and
Japan to previous occupations in the mass media, for instance. I have discussed the cultural turn;
however, I chose to focus on foreign policy history. Other researchers, working from a social or
cultural history framework, could investigate the cultural or social impacts that U.S. occupations
have as a whole. In addition, they could examine U.S. occupations to try and discover any
cultural or social influences that are present in U.S. occupations as a whole. I think that the
study of occupations needs to be further researched to determine if there is documented past
consciousness of U.S. occupations.
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